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Abstract
With the fast growth of the Internet and the World Wide Web, security has become a major
concern of many organizations, enterprises and users. Criminal attacks and intrusions into
computer and information systems are spreading quickly and they can come from anywhere on
the globe. Intrusion prevention measures, such as user authentication, firewalls and cryptography
have been used as the first line of defence to protect computer and information systems from
intrusions. As intrusion prevention alone may not be sufficient in a highly dynamic environment,
such as the Internet, intrusion detection has been used as the second line of defence against
intrusions. However, existing cryptography-based intrusion prevention measures implemented
in software, have problems with the protection of long-term private keys and the degradation
of system performance. Moreover, the security of these software-based intrusion prevention
measures depends on the security of the underlying operating system, and therefore they are
vulnerable to threats caused by security flaws of the underlying operating system. On the other
hand, existing anomaly intrusion detection approaches usually produce excessive false alarms.
They also lack in efficiency due to high construction and maintenance costs. In our approach,
we employ the “defence in depth” principle to develop a solution to solve these problems.
Our solution consists of two lines of defence: preventing intrusions at the first line and
detecting intrusions at the second line if the prevention measures of the first line have been
penetrated. At the first line of defence, our goal is to develop an encryption model that en-
hances communication and end-system security, and improves the performance of web-based
E-commerce systems. We have developed a hardware-based RSA encryption model to address
the above mentioned problems of existing software-based intrusion prevention measures. The
proposed hardware-based encryption model is based on the integration of an existing web-based
client/server model and embedded hardware-based RSA encryption modules. DSP embedded
hardware is selected to develop the proposed encryption model because of its advanced security
2features and high processing capability. The experimental results showed that the proposed DSP
hardware-based RSA encryption model outperformed the software-based RSA implementation
running on Pentium 4 machines that have almost double clock speed of the DSP’s clock speed
at large RSA encryption keys.
At the second line of defence, our goal is to develop an anomaly intrusion detection model
that improves the detection accuracy, efficiency and adaptability of existing anomaly detec-
tion approaches. Existing anomaly detection systems are not effective as they usually produce
excessive false alarms. In addition, several anomaly detection approaches suffer a serious effi-
ciency problem due to high construction costs of the detection profiles. High construction costs
will eventually reduce the applicability of these approaches in practice. Furthermore, existing
anomaly detection systems lack in adaptability because no mechanisms are provided to update
their detection profiles dynamically, in order to adapt to the changes of the behaviour of moni-
tored objects. We have developed a model for program anomaly intrusion detection to address
these problems.
The proposed detection model uses a hidden Markov model (HMM) to characterize normal
program behaviour using system calls. In order to increase the detection rate and to reduce
the false alarm rate, we propose two detection schemes: a two-layer detection scheme and a
fuzzy-based detection scheme. The two-layer detection scheme aims at reducing false alarms by
applying a double-layer test on each sequence of test traces of system calls. On the other hand,
the fuzzy-based detection scheme focuses on further improving the detection rate, as well as
reducing false alarms. It employs the fuzzy inference to combine multiple sequence information
to correctly determine the sequence status. The experimental results showed that the proposed
detection schemes reduced false alarms by approximately 48%, compared to the normal database
scheme. In addition, our detection schemes generated strong anomaly signals for all tested traces,
which in turn improve the detection rate.
We propose an HMM incremental training scheme with optimal initialization to address
the efficiency problem by reducing the construction costs, in terms of model training time and
storage demand. Unlike the HMM batch training scheme, which updates the HMM model using
the complete training set, our HMM incremental training scheme incrementally updates the
HMM model using one training subset at a time, until convergence. The experimental results
showed that the proposed HMM incremental training scheme reduced training time four-fold,
3compared to the HMM batch training, based on the well-known Baum-Welch algorithm. The
proposed training scheme also reduced storage demand substantially, as the size of each training
subset is significantly smaller than the size of the complete training set.
We also describe our complete model for program anomaly detection using system calls in
chapter 8. The complete model consists of two development stages: training stage and testing
stage. In the training stage, an HMM model and a normal database are constructed to represent
normal program behaviour. In addition, fuzzy sets and rules are defined to represent the space
and combined conditions of the sequence parameters. In the testing stage, the HMM model and
the normal database, are used to generate the sequence parameters which are used as the input
for the fuzzy inference engine to evaluate each sequence of system calls for anomalies and possible
intrusions. The proposed detection model also provides a mechanism to update its detection
profile (the HMM model and the normal database) using online training data. This makes the
proposed detection model up-to-date, and therefore, maintains the detection accuracy.
Chapter 1
Introduction
With the fast growth of the Internet and the World Wide Web, computer and information
systems have increasingly become the targets of criminal attacks and intrusions. Attacks spread
very quickly and they can come from anywhere on the globe [114]. The reported number
of computer and network attacks rises sharply every year [11, 35]. Therefore, finding the best
possible ways to protect valuable information and computer systems against intrusions is crucial.
An attack, or intrusion, on a system is a security policy breach. Most attacks cause security
policy breaches in very specific ways [5]. For example, certain attacks may enable an attacker
to read specific files, but they do not allow the attacker to modify any system components.
Another attack may cause a system service disruption to authorized users, but it does not
allow the attacker to access any files. Athough computer and network attacks vary in types
and capabilities, they usually cause breaches of four different security properties of the system
[3, 5, 70]:
• Confidentiality: An attack causes a confidentiality breach if it allows unauthorized access
to data.
• Integrity: An attack causes an integrity breach if it allows unauthorized modification to
the system state or data.
• Availability: An attack causes an availability breach if it keeps authorized users from
accessing a particular system resource when they need it.
• Control: An attack grants an attacker privilege to interfere with system operation in viola-
tion of the access control policy of the system. This can lead to a subsequent confidentiality,
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5
integrity, or availability breach.
In regard to the violation to these four security properties, there are two common types
of attacks: denial of service (DoS) attacks and system penetration attacks. DoS attacks may
cause an availability breach because they attempt to slow or shut down the targeted systems or
services. For example, “ping of death” attacks can crash certain Microsoft Windows systems [5].
In contrast, system penetration attacks may cause breaches to all four security properties. Sys-
tem penetration attacks usually involve unauthorized acquisition and/or modification of system
privileges, resources, or data. For example, a “Remote Disk Read” attack allows an attacker on
the network to read private data files on the target system without the owner’s authorization
[5].
There have been several approaches to protect computer and information systems from crim-
inal attacks and intrusions. Among them, defence in depth is the best asset-protection strategy,
in which several security mechanisms are combined to create a defence wall with multiple pro-
tection layers [3, 76]. This strategy is a result of the fact that all security mechanisms can
be vulnerable to some form of compromise. Furthermore, it may require an enormous cost to
substantially increase the strength or reliability of any given security mechanism [76]. In light
of the defence in depth strategy, intrusion prevention has been used as the first line of defence,
and intrusion detection has been used as the second line of defence, to protect computer and
information systems from intrusions.
Intrusion prevention: first line of defence
Generally, intrusion prevention measures, which include a set of access control mechanisms,
such as authentication, firewalls and cryptography, have been used to protect computer and
information systems as the first line of defence [81, 70]. Each access control mechanism can
be used to protect a resource in a very specific way. For example, authentication can be used
to verify the identity of a user, a process or a computer, that attempts to gain access to a
resource. On the other hand, a firewall can be used to protect a local system or a private
network from network-based security threats by controlling the incoming and outgoing traffic.
In our approach, we focus on improving the security and performance of cryptography-based
intrusion prevention measures for E-commerce applications.
Intrusion prevention measures for E-commerce systems must ensure two important security
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aspects: communication security and end-system security [32]. Communication security has
to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and authenticity of the information ex-
changed among communicating parties. End-system security requires strong security measures
to protect sensitive information, such as long-term private keys.
Cryptography techniques have been long in use to address the communication security prob-
lems, such as confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation of origin and authenticity. Cryptography
plays a crucial role in software-based security packages and protocols, such as Secure Socket Layer
(SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS). Researchers have pointed out that software-based
security packages in general and SSL/TLS in particular, have problems with the protection of
long-term private keys and the degradation of performance [32, 39, 61]. Furthermore, since the
security of these software-based security packages depends on the security of the underlying
operating system, they are susceptible to threats caused by security flaws of the underlying
operating system. Therefore, improving the communication security, end-system security and
performance of existing E-commerce systems is a major objective of this research.
Intrusion detection: second line of defence
Intrusion detection is usually needed as the second line of defence, when previous intrusion
prevention measures of the first line of defence have been bypassed. The major benefits of an
intrusion detection system (IDS) include [5, 81]:
• Real-time reporting of intrusions and misuses so that appropriate actions can be taken.
• Auditing of system configurations and vulnerabilities.
• Acting as quality control for security design and administration, especially of large and
complex enterprises.
• Providing useful information about intrusions that take place, allowing enhanced diagnosis,
recovery, and elimination of causative factors.
There are two broad categories of intrusion detection techniques: misuse detection and
anomaly detection [26, 93]. In misuse detection, known attacks or system weaknesses are first
encoded into patterns or signatures. Then, these signatures are used to verify the current
activities, and any matched activity is considered an attack. In anomaly detection, a detection
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profile is first constructed to characterize normal behaviour or historical activity patterns of
an object. Then, the detection profile is used to verify the object’s current activities, and
any significant deviation from normal behaviour is considered a possible attack. While misuse
detection can only effectively detect known attacks, anomaly detection has the potential to
detect novel and unknown attacks. This is because no advance knowledge about specific attacks
is required in anomaly detection [26, 93]. In our approach, we focus on anomaly detection,
specifically in detecting anomalies in the execution of programs, as well as intrusions against
programs.
Accuracy, efficiency and adaptability are the most important properties of any intrusion
detection systems [81, 82]. Generally, existing anomaly detection systems usually produce ex-
cessive false alarms, which will virtually disrupt the normal operations of the monitored systems.
In addition, several anomaly detection approaches, such as those presented in [102, 134] suffer
a serious efficiency problem due to high training costs of the detection profiles. Furthermore,
existing anomaly detection systems lack in adaptability, because no mechanisms are provided to
update their detection profiles dynamically, in order to adapt to the changes of the behaviour of
monitored objects [81, 82]. Therefore, improving the detection accuracy, efficiency and adapt-
ability of existing program anomaly intrusion detection approaches is another major objective
of this thesis research.
1.1 Thesis Aims
We propose a solution to protect computer and information systems against intrusions with two
lines of defence: preventing intrusions at the first line, and detecting intrusions at the second
line if the prevention measures of the first line have been bypassed.
Specifically, we focus on enhancing the following aspects of existing E-commerce systems at
the first line of defence:
• Communication security
• End-system security
• Performance.
And we aim at improving the following characteristics of existing program anomaly intrusion
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detection approaches at the second line of defence:
• Accuracy
• Efficiency
• Adatability.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
This thesis research provides contributions to three fields: E-commerce security, machine learn-
ing and anomaly intrusion detection.
1.2.1 Hardware-based RSA encryption model
This thesis develops a hardware-based RSA encryption model for the enhancement of security
and performance for E-commerce applications.
This thesis presents a hardware-based RSA encryption model, aiming at enhancing security
and performance for E-commerce applications with the following contributions:
1. Hardware-based RSA encryption modules are developed to enhance the security and per-
formance for E-commerce applications. The security of the proposed encryption model is
assured by the strength of RSA encryption at large keys and the security of a hardware-
based cryptosystem. On the other hand, the model’s performance is guaranteed by the
hardware’s high processing capability.
Hardware-based cryptosystems are generally considered more secure than software-based
counterparts since a hardware based cryptosystem runs on its own physical memory space,
and therefore it can effectively prevent malicious access from external programs. This also
means that the security of a hardware-based cryptosystem does not depend on the security
of the underlying operating system. Furthermore, hardware can then be used to safely store
sensitive information, such as long-term private keys.
Experimental results showed that the proposed hardware-based RSA encryption model
performs better than the software-based RSA implemetation, running on Intel Pentium
4 machines that have almost double clock speed of the DSP’s clock speed at large RSA
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encryption keys. The results confirmed that the proposed encryption model is more scal-
able than software based implementations, and it can be used to efficiently improve the
security and performance of E-commerce applications.
2. Techniques are developed to integrate hardware-based RSA encryption modules into exist-
ing web-based client/server E-commerce systems. These techniques also include a method
to improve the throughput of communication channels between hardware-based encryption
modules and computer applications.
Some parts of our work in this area, including the above contributions has been published
in [41].
1.2.2 HMM incremental training scheme for program anomaly detection
This thesis develops a new HMM incremental training scheme which aims at reducing HMM
training time and storage demand. The proposed HMM incremental training scheme can be used
to solve the efficiency problem for existing HMM-based program anomaly detection approaches.
Hidden Markov model (HMM) is a powerful data modelling tool in a wide range of ap-
plications [103, 104]. The application of Hidden Markov models to characterize the normal
behaviour of monitored objects in anomaly detection has also reported high detection accuracy
[42, 102, 134]. However, these HMM-based anomaly detection approaches suffered a serious
efficiency problem because the construction of HMM models, using the well-known Baum-Welch
algorithm, is very expensive in terms of training time and space. The time and space complexi-
ties of Baum-Welch algorithm are O(N2T ), where N is the number of HMM states and T is the
length of the observation sequence [77, 104]. The high training costs make HMM-based anomaly
detection approaches less efficient for use in practice, especially when N and T are large. This
thesis presents an efficient HMM incremental training scheme with the following contributions:
1. An optimal initialization method for HMM training: Random initialization is
a common method used in HMM training, where random generated values are used as
initial values for HMM parameters. The HMM training convergence, based on random
initialization, is usually slow and this leads to longer training time. This thesis proposes
an optimal initialization method to improve the HMM training convergence. Experimental
results showed that HMM training based on the proposed initialization method reduced
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training time up to 67.36%, compared to HMM training based on random initialization.
The proposed initialization method consists of:
(a) An algorithm to compute the prior probabilities from training data.
(b) A method to initialize HMM parameters using a combination of the computed prior
probabilities and random generated values for HMM training.
2. An HMM incremental training scheme with optimal initialization: We improve
the HMM training scheme in [16] and make it incremental. Unlike the Baum-Welch algor-
ithm which uses the complete set of training data to update the HMM model, the proposed
HMM incremental training scheme only uses one subset of training data at a time to up-
date the HMM model until convergence. This results in faster training convergence and
lower storage demand. The optimal initialization method is incorporated into the proposed
HMM incremental training scheme to further reduce training time. Experimental results
showed that the proposed HMM incremental training scheme with optimal initialization,
reduced training time about four times, compared to the Baum-Welch algorithm. The
reduction of storage demand is K times, where K is the number of data subsets used. The
proposed HMM incremental training scheme includes:
(a) Weighted merging equations for HMM parameters λ(A,B, pi). These equations are
used to merge two same-size HMM models based on their weights.
(b) An HMM incremental training algorithm based on weighted merging, which updates
the HMM model using one subset of training data at a time until convergence.
Some parts of our work in this area, including the above contributions has been published
in [43].
1.2.3 HMM-based model for program anomaly detection
This thesis develops an HMM-based model for program anomaly detection using system calls,
which aims at improving the detection accuracy, efficiency and adaptability of existing program
anomaly detection approaches.
This thesis presents an HMM-based program anomaly detection model using system calls
with the following contributions:
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1. A temporal-based anomaly signal evaluation scheme to improve the strength
of anomaly signals: In [25], the anomaly signal was measured by the percentage of the
number of abnormal sequences detected in the whole test trace. However, since abnormal
sequences usually distribute in small groups across the test trace, this anomaly signal mea-
surement method does not accurately represent the distribution of abnormal sequences in
the test trace. A temporal-based anomaly signal evaluation scheme is proposed to improve
the strength of anomaly signals by grouping individual abnormal sequences into tempo-
rally local regions. The proposed anomaly signal evaluation scheme is used to evaluate the
anomaly signal in the proposed HMM-based program anomaly detection model.
2. A two-layer detection scheme to reduce false positive alarms: The proposed
two-layer detection scheme uses an HMM model and a normal database [25] to create a
double-layer test in order to reduce false alarms. Sequences of system calls of test data
are first evaluated by the normal database to find mismatched and rare sequences. Then
only mismatched and rare sequences are evaluated by the HMM model to find abnormal
sequences. Experimental results showed that the proposed two-layer detection scheme
effectively reduced the false alarms by about 28%, compared to the normal database scheme
[25].
3. A fuzzy-based detection scheme to further reduce false positive alarms and
to increase detection rate: It is a fact that the normalcy and the abnormalcy are
not truly crisp concepts, and therefore it is not always possible to correctly classify an
object’s behaviour as normal or abnormal using crisp conditions [18, 33, 34]. A fuzzy-based
detection scheme is developed to improve this classification problem. In this detection
scheme, first fuzzy sets and rules are used to represent the space and combined conditions
of parameters of each test sequence of system calls. The sequence parameters are generated
by an HMM model and a normal database. Then, the fuzzy reasoning is used to evaluate
each test sequence by combining the sequence parameters based on the pre-defined fuzzy
sets and rules. Experimental results showed that the fuzzy-based detection scheme reduced
false alarms by about 28% and 48%, compared to the two-layer detection scheme and the
normal database scheme [25], respectively. Furthermore, it also produced strong anomaly
signals for all tested abnormal traces, which helped to improve detection accuracy. The
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proposed fuzzy-based detection scheme includes:
(a) An empirical method to represent space and combined conditions of sequence param-
eters using fuzzy sets and rules.
(b) A fuzzy reasoning method to evaluate each sequence of system calls by combining
sequence parameters from multiple sources.
4. The efficient HMM incremental training scheme is used to construct and update the HMM
model in the proposed HMM-based anomaly detection model. This improves the proposed
detection model’s efficiency.
5. A scheme for the online updating of the detection model: An online update scheme
is developed to update the HMM model and the normal database, which are the two main
components of the proposed HMM-based anomaly detection model, using the online test
data. First, the online test data is cleaned from anomalies to produce an online training
set. Then, the online training set is used to incrementally update the HMM model and
the normal database.
Some parts of our work in this area, including the above contributions has been published
in [42, 43].
1.3 Thesis Structure
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Part I, which consists of Chapter 2, focuses
on preventing intrusions for E-commerce systems using hardware-based encryption. Chapter
2 first investigates the problems of the existing software-based security solutions, and then
presents the proposed hardware-based RSA encryption model for the enhancement of security
and performance for E-commerce systems.
Part II, which includes six chapters, from Chapter 3 to Chapter 8, focuses on detecting
intrusions on programs using anomaly detection. Chapter 3 discusses the advantages and disad-
vantages of the existing approaches for program anomaly detection, and then presents the aims
and the outline of our anomaly intrusion detection approach. Chapter 4 gives a brief introduc-
tion to hidden Markov models, and their three basic problems and solutions, which will be used
to develop the proposed HMM-based anomaly detection model. Chapter 5 describes our basic
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model for program anomaly detection, in which HMM modelling is used to characterize normal
program behaviour using system calls. It also presents our two-layer detection scheme, which
is an extension to the basic model, aimed at reducing false alarms. Chapter 6 describes the
proposed efficient HMM incremental training scheme for program anomaly detection. Chapter 7
presents our fuzzy-based detection scheme, aimed at further reducing false alarms and increasing
the detection rate. Chapter 8 describes the proposed complete HMM-based program anomaly
detection model using system calls.
Chapter 9 summarizes the thesis and outlines some possible improvements for future work,
followed by the Appendices and Bibliography.
Part I
Intrusion Prevention:
Hardware-based Encryption Model
for E-commerce Applications
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Chapter 2
E-Commerce Security Enhancement
Based on DSP Hardware
RSA Encryption
This chapter presents a hardware-based encryption model for the enhancement of E-commerce
security. The proposed encryption model focuses on two main security issues: (i) information
confidentiality and long-term private key protection, and (ii) performance improvement for E-
commerce applications. The model’s architecture is based on the existing web-based client/server
model, and is enhanced with hardware-based encryption modules. A prototype E-commerce
system, based on the proposed encryption model, has been built for the proof of concepts.
Performance evaluation shows that the proposed encryption model is suitable for the business-
to-customer E-commerce.
2.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, the security of E-commerce applications depends on two aspects:
communication security and end-system security [32]. Cryptography-based security packages
and protocols, such as Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) have
been widely used to ensure communication security for Internet and E-commerce applications.
These security protocols make use of TCP to provide a reliable end-to-end secure communication
service. Figure 2.1 shows the relative location of SSL/TLS in the TCP/IP protocol stack. TLS
15
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Figure 2.1: Relative location of SSL/TLS in the TCP/IP protocol stack
is approved by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) as a standard protocol for secure
communications. As TLS is very similar to SSL, thereafter we only discuss SSL. SSL’s general
features are as follows:
• SSL uses public key cryptography for communication parties to authenticate each other
and to exchange shared secret keys.
• SSL uses secret key cryptography to encrypt and decrypt all information exchanged in
communication sessions.
• SSL requires at least one communication party to hold a public key certificate.
SSL was developed by Netscape in 1994 and it quickly became an industrial standard for
secure communications over the Internet. It has been implemented in most mordern Internet
applications, such as web servers and web browsers. Although SSL is widely used in Internet
and E-commerce applications, there are still some issues that need to be addressed:
1. Protection of long-term private keys: A communication party, that has a public key certifi-
cate, is also holding a private key corresponding to the public key stored in the certificate
[32]. A common question is how this private key can be protected during its lifetime? Soft-
ware, whether it is an operating system, a web browser, or an application package, that
gets access to the private key, has to protect that key. In most cases, present technology
will not be able to provide strong assurance for the protection of private keys [32].
2. Degradation of performance: Like almost all present security solutions, SSL provides the
security at the expense of performance, because it uses system resources to establish secure
communiation channels and to encrypt and decrypt all traffic between communication
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Figure 2.2: SSL Performance for HTTP ‘authentication’ requests [61]
parties. In order to measure the SSL’s effect to the performance, Kaven [61] has conducted
experiments on a client/server communication system using three options as follows:
(a) No SSL, no VPN1: the client sends requests to the server using a direct connection,
without SSL and without VPN.
(b) SSL, VPN: the client sends requests to the server using a VPN connection over SSL.
(c) SSL, no VPN: the client sends requests to the server using a SSL connection.
The results of these experiments presented on Figure 2.2 and 2.3 [61] clearly show that SSL
degrades the performance for both HTTP ‘authentication’ and ‘get’ requests significantly.
Similarly, Secure HTTP (HTTP over SSL) is usually slower than normal HTTP. He’s [39]
experiments on the performance of Secure HTTP confirm that performance reduction of
Secure HTTP compared to HTTP is 33% on average.
In general, SSL/TLS and software-based security packages, that are used to address the
problems of E-commerce security, do not provide features that can address the security issues
of E-commerce as a whole. In particular, SSL/TLS does not provide mechanisms to protect
private keys during their lifetime. It is also noted that performance degradation is an issue of
software-based security packages.
Hardware-based cryptography can overcome many security problems suffered by software-
based security packages. Hardware-based cryptography has two main advantages over software-
1VPN stands for Virtual Private Network
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Figure 2.3: SSL Performance for HTTP ‘get’ requests [61]
based cryptography:
• Security : Hardware-based cryptosystems are considered more secure than software-based
equivalents, because hardware cryptosystems run in their own physical memory space,
which effectively prevents malicious memory access. Unlike software cryptosystems, hard-
ware cryptosystems are not dependent on the security of the underlying operating system
[6]. This means that they are not affected by operating system flaws that lead to secu-
rity threats. Furthermore, sensitive information, such as long-term private key, which is
burnt into a hardware chip, is effectively protected from illegal accesses and modifications
[6]. Smart cards are the best example of using dedicated hardware to store important
information [32].
• Performance: Generally, dedicated hardware provides high computing power, compared
to that of general-purpose computers. Therefore, hardware can be used to speed up the
encryption and decryption process. This also means that longer encryption keys can be
used. And, this in turn improves security.
2.1.1 Aims
We propose a hardware-based encryption model for existing E-commerce systems, which focuses
on three major aims:
1. To enhance the confidentiality of transaction data of E-commerce systems.
CHAPTER 2. E-COMMERCE SECURITY ENHANCEMENT BASED ON DSP 19
2. To improve the private key security of E-commerce end-systems.
3. To impvove the performance of E-commerce systems.
2.1.2 Outline of the Proposed Approach
In order to ensure the confidentiality of transaction data of an E-commerce system, we use the
RSA public key encryption algorithm [108] as the core algorithm to encrypt all data at each
end before they are transferred to the other end. The RSA encryption can provide a high
level of security and its strength has been proven in practice [92, 113, 122]. As a public key
algorithm, RSA has simpler key exchange mechanism, compared to that of secret key encryption
[92, 113, 122]. RSA has been used in a wide-range of applications, to provide data confidentiality,
non-repudiation of origin and digital signature [32, 92, 113, 122].
The private key security is guaranteed using an integrated hardware module as the key stor-
age medium. Hardware has been proven to be the best medium to store important information,
such as long-term private keys [6, 32]. Specifically, we use Digital Signal Processors (DSPs) to
develop our hardware-based encryption modules. On one hand, DSPs provide more computing
power than small microchip devices, such as smart cards. On the other hand, DSPs are more
flexible than the dedicated VLSI (Very Large Scale Integrated) chips. In addition, DSP boards
support several types of computer communication interfaces, such as PCI interface, COM ports
and USB ports. This makes it more favourable for the development and deployment of DSP
applications.
The use of hardware as the platform in the proposed encryption model also serves for the
purpose of performance improvement. As discussed in Section 2.1, dedicated hardware can
provide high computing power, compared to that of general-purpose processors. This is very
important for performance improvement of RSA encryption implementations.
The proposed encryption model is based on the integration of the existing client/server model
of E-commerce applications and hardware-based encryption modules. The hardware modules
are integrated into both ends of an E-commerce system. They perform data encryption and
decryption, as well as store the system’s life-time private keys. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, we
discuss the architecture and implementation of the proposed encryption model in details.
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2.2 Related Work in Hardware-based Cryptosystems
Hardware cryptography is an on-going research topic [67, 98]. Research and development on
hardware-based RSA cryptosystems can be roughly classified into two categories:
1. Reconfigurable Hardware Cryptosystems:
This solution is based on special hardware architectural design to build fast RSA cryptosys-
tems. A new approach in this category is Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). An
FPGA is an array of logic gates that can be hardware-programmed to fulfill user-specified
tasks. In this way, one can create special purpose functional units that may be very ef-
ficient for a specific task. As FPGAs can be reconfigured dynamically, it is theoretically
possible to optimize them for more complex special tasks at speeds that are higher than
what can be achieved with general-purpose processors [96, 135].
2. Embedded Hardware Cryptosystems:
Smart cards and Digital Signal Processors (DSPs) are leading hardware in this category.
Generally, a smart card is a plastic card with a special integrated circuit (IC) chip imbed-
ded in the surface of the card. There are two principal types of smart cards, namely
microprocessor-based and memory-based. The IC chip in the card provides intelligence
sufficient to protect its information from theft or damage. Smart cards usually have limited
processing power and storage capacity [32, 45].
A DSP is a specialized digital microprocessor used to efficiently and rapidly perform cal-
culations on digital signals that were originally analog in form [135]. DSPs provide more
computing power and storage capacity than smart cards. For example, a Texas Instru-
ments’s TMS320C6416 DSP board has a 32-bit processor running at 1000 MHz, and ex-
ternal RAM memory of 16 megabytes [127], as opposed to a typical smart card that has a
16-bit microprocessor and 8 kilobytes of RAM [45].
On the DSP platform, Hu et al [46] reported a DSP-based RSA cryptosystem. In this work a
Texas Instruments’ TMS320C6201 DSP PCI card is used as the hardware platform to implement
the RSA encrytion algorithm. This DSP-based RSA cryptosystem was reportedly to outperform
the RSA implementation in software environment using C++ language at PC level. The use of a
DSP PCI card is an advantage in this system, because it can reduce overhead of communications
between the host computer and the DSP. A common point between this work and our approach
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is that DSP hardware of Texas Instruments’ TMS320C6000 DSP family was used as the platform
to support the RSA encryption. However, the reported work is a stand-alone DSP-based RSA
cryptosystem while our hardware-based encryption modules are integrated into an E-commerce
system in order to improve the system’s security and performance.
In other DSP-based approach, Er et al [20] presented a design and implementation of an RSA
cryptosystem using multiple DSP chips. The reported system makes use of parallel processing in
order to speed up the RSA encrytion. The most interesting feature of this system design is that
it allows for additional DSP chips to be inserted in allocated slots to improve performance. A
master DSP chip is used to control and co-ordinate all the slave DSP chips, while the slave DSPs
carry out the actual task processing. With 8 slave DSPs, the system’s performance was found
70 times faster than the corresponding software implementation at the PC level. In this system,
the DSP cryptosystem is controlled by a host PC application through UART serial channels.
On reconfigurable hardware platform, Buldas et al [10] presented a VLSI implementation of
the RSA and IDEA encryption engine. The VLSI module can generate and hold RSA keys in
its firmware. It uses the RSA encryption for secure key exchange, and the IDEA algorithm for
block encrytion. The reported VLSI module only supports maximum RSA moduli of 768 bits
which is too short for an RSA key for practical applications [108, 122].
In [96], an FPGA implementation of the RSA algorithm is reported. The FPGA struc-
tures are built using a modified Montgomery multiplier, where the multiplication and modular
reduction operations are carried out in parallel rather than interleaved as in the traditional
Montgomery multiplier. This helps the reported RSA structures outperform structures which
are built based on the traditional Montgomery multiplier. The proposed implemenation report-
edly had double throughput rate, compared to that of implementations, based on the traditional
Montgomery multiplier. Another advantage of this implementation is it can reduce the size of
the chip.
Kim and Lee [65] proposed an integrated crypto-processor which is a special-purpose mi-
croprocessor. This crypto-processor is optimized for cryptography algorithms. The proposed
system supports secret key algorithms, such as AES, KASUMI, triple-DES, and public key algo-
rithms, including RSA and ECC. The crypto-processor consists of a 32-bit RISC processor block
and co-processor blocks. Each co-processor block is a dedicated hardware implementation of a
cryptographic algorithm. The co-processor block allows fast execution of encryption, decryption
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and key scheduling operations. The RISC processor block can be used to perform several cryp-
tographic algorithms, such as hash, and other application programs, such as user authentication
and IC card interface. The proposed crypto-processor can be used for various security applica-
tions, such as storage devices, embedded systems, network routers, security gateways using IPSec
and SSL protocol. There are many other reports along this line, as in [64, 109, 118, 125, 126].
2.3 The Proposed DSP-Based RSA Encryption Model
We introduce a new DSP hardware-based encryption model using the RSA public key algorithm
[108] for E-commerce systems, as shown in Figure 2.4. The model’s architecture is based on the
web-based client/server model. The server consists of a web server, a server DSP communication
module and a DSP hardware RSA decryption engine. The client includes a web browser, a client
DSP communication module and a DSP hardware RSA encryption engine. The server and the
client communicate with each other using TCP/IP networks, such as the Internet. For simplicity,
one way of exchanging information from the client to the server is presented. First, a plaintext
message is encrypted by the client’s hardware encryption engine using the server’s public key
to produce a ciphertext message. The ciphertext message is then sent to the server. Next, the
ciphertext message is decrypted by the server’s hardware decryption engine using the server’s
private key.
Regarding public key distribution from the server to the client, the most common method
is that, the client gets the server’s public key certificate that includes the server’s identity and
public key. Generally, a public key certificate is a certificate which uses a digital signature to
bind a public key together with an identity that can be the information about an organization,
or a person. In a typical public key infrastructure (PKI) scheme, public key certificates are
issued by trusted parties called Certificate Authorities (CAs) [32, 135]. A CA certificate can be
used to verify an individual’s identity and that a public key belongs to an individual [135]. In
our experiments, for simplicity we incorporate the server’s public key into a web page and send
it to the client.
A detailed description of components of the server and the client in the proposed encryption
model is as follows:
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Figure 2.4: Architecture of proposed DSP hardware RSA encryption model. The parts wrapped
by dashed lines are new components that are added to an existing client/server model.
1. The Server:
(a) Web server is used to host a functional E-commerce website. It serves website’s
content to client and accepts information submitted from client.
(b) The server DSP communication module runs on the server and works on the web
server’s requests. It is responsible for all communications between the web server and
the DSP hardware RSA decryption engine.
(c) The DSP hardware RSA decryption engine runs on DSP hardware to decrypt cipher
messages received from the web server. This decryption engine stores the server’s
RSA long-term private key.
2. The Client:
(a) Web browser is responsible for sending requests, managing downloads and displaying
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web pages. It can also submit user data forms to the web server.
(b) The client DSP communication module runs embeded inside the client web browser
as a plug-in. It is responsible for all communications between the client web browser
and the DSP hardware RSA encryption engine.
(c) The DSP hardware RSA encryption engine runs on the DSP hardware to encrypt
plaintext messages received from the client web browser. The encryption engine is
also used to store the client’s RSA private key for the decryption of messages from
the server.
On the client side, the client DSP communication module is designed to be downloadable1
and installable automatically from server to client. The procedure of sending information from
the client to the server in the proposed encryption model has the following steps:
1. On the user’s behalf, the client web browser sends a request to the server for a web page,
such as an online credit card payment page, where the user’s payment information needs
to be encrypted before being sent to the server. The client DSP communication module is
embeded into the requested web page. The client browser loads the web page, and installs
and activates the client DSP communication module. The client DSP communication
module is only downloaded and installed if it is not already present in the client system.
The server’s public key is also incorporated into the requested web page that is sent to the
client web browser.
2. When the user enters data (plain text) into the data entry form in the web page and
submits the information, the client DSP communication module captures the plain text.
It then establishes an input communication channel to the DSP hardware RSA encryption
engine, and then sends the plain text and public key to the encryption engine.
3. Upon receiving the plain text and public key, the DSP hardware RSA encryption engine
encrypts the plain text to produce the cipher text. It then sends the cipher text back to
the client DSP communication module through an output communication channel.
4. Next, the client DSP communication module forwards the cipher text to the browser, and
then the browser submits the cipher text to the server.
1The security of downloadable ActiveX components is discussed in Section 2.4.2
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5. When the server gets the cipher text, it passes the message to the server DSP communica-
tion module through its object interface. In turn, the server communication module opens
an input communication channel to the DSP hardware RSA decryption engine, and then
sends the cipher text to the decryption engine.
6. Upon receiving the cipher text, the DSP hardware RSA decryption engine decrypts the
cipher text to get the plain text, using the server’s stored private key. It then sends the plain
text back to the server DSP communication module through an output communication
channel.
7. In the end, the server DSP communication module forwards the plain text back to the
server.
2.3.1 Communications between host computer and DSP
In the proposed encryption model, as shown in Figure 2.4, all communications between the client
web browser and the DSP hardware RSA encryption engine, as well as communications between
the web server and the DSP hardware decryption engine, are supported by the Real Time Data
Exchange (RTDX) channels. RTDX comes as a software library of the DSP application devel-
opment tools. Figure 2.5 shows the RTDX-based communication mechanism between the client
browser and the DSP encryption engine. Figure 2.6 describes the RTDX-based communication
mechanism between the web server and the DSP decryption engine.
RTDX is a new technology of Texas Instruments (TI), that enables two ways of commu-
nications between the DSP applications and computer applications. The RTDX’s application
programming interface includes the RTDX built-in library and the RTDX exported library. The
RTDX built-in library is used in DSP applications to support RTDX communications on DSP
target side while RTDX exported library is included in computer applications to support RTDX
communications on computer side. The RTDX communication channels can support real-time
and full duplex data exchanges between the host computer and the target DSP [62].
RTDX communication channels can be operated in two modes: non-continuous and continu-
ous mode. In non-continuous mode, the transferred data is recorded into a log file that has been
specified in RTDX configuration. As data is saved in a log file, non-continuous mode is suitable
for off-line processing. In continuous mode, data is logged into a circular memory buffer in the
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Figure 2.5: Communications between the client web browser and
the DSP hardware RSA encryption engine using RTDX channels
Figure 2.6: Communications between the web server and the DSP
hardware RSA decryption engine using RTDX channels
RTDX Host Library, which helps continuously obtain and display live data from a target DSP
application [62]. In our experiments, we use RTDX in continuous mode to get the real time
data, as well as to avoid storing plain text data to computer’s hard disk.
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2.3.1.1 RTDX communications on the client side
As shown in Figure 2.5, the client web browser exchanges information with the DSP hardware
RSA encryption engine, using RTDX channels supported by the client DSP communication
module. The data flow from the client web browser to the DSP encryption engine is as follows:
• First, the browser sends user data that needs to be encrypted to the client DSP commu-
nication module through its object interface.
• Next, the browser object interface forwards the data to the computer RTDX interface of
the client DSP communication module.
• Then, the computer RTDX interface opens an input RTDX communication channel to
send the data to the DSP RTDX interface of the DSP encryption engine.
• Upon receiving the data, the DSP RTDX interface transfers it to the DSP encryption
engine for encryption.
On the opposite direction, the data, which is an encrypted message, can be sent from the
DSP encryption engine to the client web browser using the following procedure:
• First, the DSP encryption engine forwards the data to its DSP RTDX interface.
• Next, the DSP RTDX interface opens an output RTDX communication channel to send
data to the computer RTDX interface of the client DSP communication module.
• Upon receiving the data, the computer RTDX interface transfers it to the browser object
interface.
• In the end, the browser object interface forwards the data to the client web browser. The
client web browser in turn submits the data to the server.
2.3.1.2 RTDX communications on the server side
As shown in Figure 2.6, the web server exchanges information with the DSP hardware RSA
decryption engine, using RTDX channels supported by the server DSP communication module.
The RTDX-based communication mechanism on the server side is very similar to that of the
client side. The only difference is that the web server communicates with the server DSP
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communication module using the Server Object Interface, instead of the Browser Object Interface
of the client. In addition, the web server sends the encrypted message (submitted from the client
web browser) to the DSP decryption engine and then gets back the decrypted message.
2.4 Implementation of the Proposed Encryption Model
In this section, we discuss the implementation details of crucial components of the proposed
hardware-based encryption model, including the DSP hardware RSA encryption engine, the
client DSP communication module, the DSP hardware RSA decryption engine and the server
DSP communication module. We chose Microsoft Windows as our software platform and DSP
hardware and development tools from Texas Instruments (TI) to develop these components.
Specifically, Microsoft Visual C++ was used to develop the client DSP communication module
and the server DSP communication module. The DSP hardware RSA encryption engine and the
DSP hardware RSA decryption engine were built using the TI’s TMS320C6416 DSP and Code
Composer Studio. TI’s Code Composer Studio is a C programming development environment
for DSP applications.
2.4.1 DSP hardware RSA encryption engine
The DSP hardware RSA encryption engine consists of two parts: the RSA encryption engine
and the DSP RTDX interface. The RSA encryption engine is the implementation of the RSA
algorithm on DSP hardware, while the DSP RTDX interface is the communication interface
between the RSA encryption engine and the client DSP communication module.
2.4.1.1 Implementation of RSA encryption engine
As discussed in Section 2.1, the RSA public key encryption algorithm [108] is selected as the
core encryption algorithm for the proposed encryption model. The RSA algorithm was invented
by R. Rivest, A. Shamir and L. Adleman in 1977. Table 2.1 summaries the RSA encryption
scheme [122]. The RSA encryption protocol consists of two major processes: (1) - Key Gener-
ation to generate RSA key pair, which are public and private keys, and (2) - Encryption and
Decryption of messages, using RSA key pair. Only the private key of the RSA key pair needs
to be kept secret, while the public key can be made publicly available and transmitted through
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Table 2.1: RSA public key encryption algorithm
Key Generation
Select p, q p and q both primes, p 6= q
Calculate n = p ∗ q
Calculate φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1)
Select integer e gcd(φ(n), e) = 1; 1 < e < φ(n)
Calculate d d ≡ e−1 mod φ(n)
Public key KU = {e, n}
Private key KR = {d, n}
The modulus n
Encryption component e
Decryption component d
Encryption
Plaintext: m ; m < n
Ciphertext: c = me mod n
Decryption
Ciphertext: c
Plaintext: m = cd mod n
open communication environment, such as the Internet.
Important notes on the generation of RSA keys
In the RSA key generation process, the prime numbers p and q should be selected so that
the factoring n = p ∗ q is computationally infeasible. The major restriction on p and q, in order
to avoid the elliptic curve factoring, is that p and q should be roughly the same bit length and
sufficiently large [92]. For example, if a 1024-bit modulus n is to be used, then each of p and
q should be about 512 bits in length. Another restriction on the primes p and q is that the
difference p− q should not be too small. If p− q is small, then p ≈ q and hence p ≈ √n. Thus,
n could be factored efficiently, simply by trial division by all odd integers close to
√
n. If p and
q are chosen at random, then p − q will be appropriately large with overwhelming probability
[92]. In addition to the mentioned conditions, it is recommended that p and q be strong primes.
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A prime p is said to be a strong prime if it satisfies the following three conditions [92]:
(i) p− 1 has a large prime factor, denoted r;
(ii) p+ 1 has a large prime factor; and
(iii) r − 1 has a large prime factor.
Use of small encryption component
Small encryption component e, such as e = 3, may be used to improve the efficiency of
the RSA encryption [92]. A common encryption component e may be shared among a group
of entities, and each entity in the group must have its own distinct modulus n. If an entity
wants to send a message to other entities in the group, it encrypts the original message using
common encryption component and a modulus from each of other entities to produce one cipher-
text message for each entity. However, this scheme is vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks, in
which an eavesdropper can recover the original message by analyzing corresponding ciphertext
messages sent to other entities. Padding a random bit-string to the original message on each
encryption can be used to prevent this type of attach [92]. In our proposed model, we chose
encryption component size as same size of the modulus in order to prevent attacks that exploit
the weaknesses of small encryption components.
Use of small decryption component
Similar to the use of small encryption component e, small decryption component d may be
used to improve the efficiency of the RSA decryption [92]. However, if the decryption component
d is small and gcd(p − 1, q − 1) is small, d can be efficiently computed from the modulus and
the encryption component (n, e). Hence, in order to avoid this type of attacks, we chose the
decryption component size roughly the same size of the modulus n [92].
Size and format of encryption blocks
In the RSA algorithm, the equation c = me mod n is used to encrypt message m using the
public key (n, e). In order to make the RSA encryption work properly, the message m must be
represented as an integer, and integer value of(m) must be smaller than integer value of(n)
[92]. Therefore, for a large message M , it must first be divided and formatted into r encryption
blocks (m1,m2, ...,mr) such that:
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integer value of(mi) < integer value of(n), i = 1, r
The size of encryption blocks could be a fixed or changeable value, depending on the system’s
design. Theoretically, the encryption block size could be any non-zero value, provided that
integer value of(mi) is smaller than integer value of(n). However, the block size should not
be too small because a block cipher with small block size may be vulnerable to the attacks, based
on statistical analysis [92]. One such attack involves simple frequency analysis of cipher text
blocks. Therefore, to get the maximum security, the block size should be as large as possible
[92] and roughly the same size as the size of the modulus n.
The format of RSA encryption blocks has been formally defined in “PKCS #1: RSA En-
cryption, version 1.5 and 2.0” [55, 56]. An encryption block EB, that consists of a block type
BT, a padding string PS and data D, is a formatted octet string as follows [55, 56]:
EB = 00 || BT || PS || 00 || D
where || is the concatenation sign. If the modulus n has k octets, each encryption block
also has the same k octets. The leading 00 octet makes sure that the converted integer value
of the encryption block is smaller than the value of the modulus n. The block type BT is one
octet which is 00 or 01 for private key operation, and 02 for public key operation. The padding
string PS consists of k − 3 − ||D|| octets, where ||D|| is the length of the data D in number of
octets. For public key operation, the padding string should be pseudorandomly generated and
nonzero. The padding string should be at least eight octets long, which is a security constraint
for public-key operations, that prevents an attacker from recoving data by trying all possible
encryption blocks [55, 56]. Therefore, the minimum size of the encryption block EB is 12 octets
to satisfy the defintion of the encryption block format (minimum 1 octet for data, and 11 octets
for the leading octet, the BT, the PS and 1 octet between PS and the data).
For the purpose of performance testing, we chose to use a simple method to format a large
message into encryption blocks in our implementation. Our encryption blocks consist of only
the data. The size of encryption blocks in the number of octets is calculated as follows:
size of encryption blocks (octets) = k − 2
where k is the size of the modulus n in number of octets.
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As we use the radix of 216 (as explaining in next heading) to represent the big integers for
RSA operations, the size of a big integer’s digit is 16 bits or 2 octets. Therefore, the substraction
of 2 octets (which is equivalent to one meaningful big integer digit) from the modulus size is to
make sure that integer value of(mi) is always smaller than integer value of(n).
Big integer representation for RSA implementation
Most modern 32-bit computing architectures, including the TI’s TMS320C6416 DSP and
personal computers, support standard types of integers, which are represented using fixed num-
ber of bits. The maximum size of integers supported by these computing systems is 32 bits.
This means the maximum value representable in these system is 232 − 1 = 4, 294, 967, 295. By
the requirement of the RSA algorithm, RSA keys would be in the level of 10100, or even larger,
which cannot be held by computing systems in the standard types of integers. One solution
is to use arrays of fixed integers to represent big integers, or multiple precision integers. This
representation allows the accommodation of any integer values, and is therefore limited only by
the size of the physical memory.
Takagi [125] reported a fast radix-4 modular multiplication hardware algorithm. Numbers
are represented in a redundant representation, and additions and subtractions are performed
without carry propagation. The algorithm was found efficient especially in applications where
modular multiplications are carried out iteratively. However, this specialized hardware algorithm
is not suitable for DSPs which have general-purpose processors.
In our work, we select 65536, or 216 as the base for multiple precision integer representation.
The major advantage of representing integer in base 65536 over decimal representation is that
it requires much less memory. This is especially important in the embedded systems, such as
DSPs that usually have limited memory space.
Another advantage of base 65536 representation over smaller bases, such as 256 or 28 is that
a big integer on base 65536 has fewer number of digits than the same integer value on smaller
bases. This means that arithmetic operations on base-65536 integers require less number of
memory references, as well as less number of standard-integer-atomic operations. These in
turn help to improve the computational performance. A larger base than 65536 would make
the implementation of the arithmetic operations more complicated. This is because on most
current computing systems, where the largest integer supported is 32-bit long, and the results
of arithmetic operations on such integers would overflow the 32-bit registers.
CHAPTER 2. E-COMMERCE SECURITY ENHANCEMENT BASED ON DSP 33
Table 2.2: Definition of BigInt Data Struture
typedef struct {
unsigned short *digits; // pointer to array of digits
// the least significant digit at index 0
unsigned int size; // number of digits of the big integer
short sign; // sign of the big integer,
// sign = -1 for negative number, and 1 otherwise
} BigInt ;
In addition, on base 65536 (216), fast shift operations can be used to replace the high-cost
multiplication and division operations. This in turn gives better computational performance.
We define a simple data structure BigInt to store big integers for the implementation of
the RSA encryption algorithm, as shown in Table 2.2. Each digit in the BigInt type can store
a 16-bit integer number, ranging from 0 to 65535. The maximum size of the big integer is
232 = 4294967296 digits. Hence, the biggest integer value can be represented is 655364294967296.
This great integer value is sufficient to represent very large RSA keys, such as 2048-bit key,
which is about 616 base-10 digits.
BigInteger package implementation
BigInt package is the heart of the RSA algorithm implementation. The package consists of
necessary arithmetic and logic functions on big integers to support RSA encryption and decryp-
tion. The implementation of arithmetic functions is based on efficient arithmetic algorithms,
given in [92]. Auxiliary functions, such as input and output, are also implemented to convert
text messages to BigInt and vice verse. Table B.1 (page 180) shows major functions of the BigInt
package.
2.4.1.2 Implementation of the DSP RTDX interface
The RTDX built-in library is included into the implementation of the DSP RTDX interface,
to support real-time communication between the RSA encryption engine and the client DSP
communication module. The DSP RTDX interface provides functions to initialize the RTDX
communication sessions, open communication channels, read and write data to channels and
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close channels. In order to make the RTDX communication channels work properly, they need
to be configured with correct mode and suitable buffer size. We selected the RTDX continuous
mode to get the real time data transfer. Table B.2 (page 182) lists the core RTDX built-in
functions that are used in the DSP RTDX interface.
2.4.2 Client DSP communication module
Since the client DSP communication module plays the role of a communication bridge, it must
be able to communicate with both the client web browser and the DSP hardware RSA en-
cryption engine. The module exchanges information with the DSP encryption engine using
RTDX channels, and it communicates with the client web browser via the browser’s object in-
terface. The browser object interface is the Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) interface on
Microsoft platform. The implementation of the communication module consists of two commu-
nication interfaces: the Browser Object Interface and the Computer RTDX Interface (as shown
in Figure 2.5, page 26). The browser object interface’s functions are callable from the browser,
using browser’s scripting languages, such as JavaScript. The computer RTDX interface is imple-
mented, based on RTDX exported library that provides functions to establish communication
channels to the DSP application. Table B.3 (page 183) lists the core RTDX exported functions
that are used to build the client DSP communication module. Table B.4 (page 184) lists the
major functions in the implementation of the client DSP communication module.
The client DSP communication moldule is designed and implemented as a web browser
plug-in, using Microsoft’s ActiveX technology. There is a security concern on the downloadable
ActiveX control code [27]. However, a digital signature scheme called “Authenticode”, which
is developed by Microsoft, can be used to sign the code. This scheme allows certifying the
authenticity and integrity of programs [27].
In order to use the client DSP communication module, it is embedded into web pages,
using the HTML <OBJECT> tag. Table 2.3 shows a segment of HMTL code that is used to
incorporate the client DSP communication module into a web page. The module was designed
to be downloadable and installable automatically on the client machine if it is not already
present in the client system. When the communication module is loaded into the client browser,
its interface functions can be invoked using browser’s scripting languages, such as JavaScript.
Table 2.4 shows a segment of JavaScript code that is used to call an interface function of the
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Table 2.3: Sample HTML code to embed the DSP communication module into a web page
<OBJECT NAME="dsp_comm" ID="dsp_comm" WIDTH=0 HEIGHT=0
CLASSID="CLSID:08E5AB55-BD25-437F-A03F-7FB44B6FEFE4"
CODEBASE="/dsp/ClientComm.ocx">
</OBJECT>
Table 2.4: Sample JavaScript code to invoke the DSP communication module from browser
// get the plain text
var plainText = new String(document.myForm.plainText.value);
if (plainText.length>0){
// assign the board name and DSP CPU name
var boardName = new String("C6416 Revision 1.1 DSK");
var cpuName = new String("CPU_1");
// get the RSA public key pair
var rsa_keys = new String(document.myForm.eKey.value+"."+
document.myForm.nKey.value);
// invoke the DSP encryption engine to encrypt the message
// through the DSP client communication module
// and assign the result to the cipher text control
// "dsp_comm" is the name of the embedded client DSP communication module
document.myForm.cipherText.value =
document.dsp_comm.DSPEncrypt(boardName, cpuName, rsa_keys, plainText);
}
communication module from the client web browser.
Improvement of RTDX communication performance
The RTDX library provides basic input and output functions which can be used to read
data from and write data to RTDX communication channels. However, in order to maximize
the performance of RTDX channels, the number of read and/or write operations to a channel
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Figure 2.7: RTDX data transfer speed in single and batch modes
in a communication session should be kept to a minimum [62]. In a simple term, if the amount
of data to transfer is 100 bytes, the data transfer is more efficient if the data is wrapped in a
compound, and sent at one time than sending 100 times with one byte in each message. We
encapsulated the data into a Microsoft Visual C++ SAFEARRAY of bytes, and sent them to the
target DSP, using the Write() function (as shown in Table B.3 (page 183)). To get the data
from the DSP target, we read the bulk of data into a SAFEARRAY of bytes, using ReadSAI1()
function (as shown in Table B.3 (page 183)), and then extract the bulk data to appropriate
data types. Figure 2.7 shows the RTDX data transfer speed in two cases: in the first case, we
use single read and write (Single Mode), and the next case, we use the SAFEARRAY of bytes, as
above mentioned (Batch Mode). The performance data shows that the data transfer speed of
the latter is about 8 times faster than the former, on average. For the DSP target application,
there is no need to use a compound data type, because the RTDX built-in functions, such as
RTDX_read() and RTDX_write(), support both single and bulk data transfer (as given in Table
B.2 (page 182)).
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Table 2.5: Sample VBScript code to invoke the decryption function
’ declare variables
Dim boardName, cpuName
Dim cipherText, plainText
Dim rsaObj
’ get the cipher text from client
cipherText = Request.Form("cipherText")
’ Specify the DSP board and CPU used
boardName = "C6416 Revision 1.1 DSK"
cpuName = "CPU_1"
’ create an instance of server DSP communication object
Set rsaObj = Server.CreateObject("ServerComm.DSPComm")
’ pass the cipher text to DSP decryption engine through the server
’ DSP communication module for decryption and get back plaintext
plainText = rsaObj.DSPDecrypt(boardName, cpuName, cipherText)
’ release the server object after use
Set rsaObj = nothing
2.4.3 DSP hardware RSA decryption engine
The implementation of the DSP hardware RSA decryption engine uses the same core arithmetic
and logic functions on big integers, as those of the DSP hardware RSA encryption engine, as
discussed in Section 2.4.1. The decryption engine has two components which are the DSP
RTDX interface and the RSA decryption engine. The DSP RTDX interface is responsible for
communications with the server DSP communication module, and RSA decryption engine is the
implementation of the RSA decryption. In order to decrypt a cipher message, the decryption
engine uses the server’s private key which is also stored in the DSP.
2.4.4 Server DSP communication module
The server DSP communication module plays the same role as the client DSP communication
module on the client side. Therefore, the core implementation of this module is very similar to the
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implementation of client DSP communication module. It has two communication components,
including the server object interface and the computer RTDX interface. The server object
interface is used to communicate with the web server, and the computer RTDX interface is
used to exchange information with the DSP decryption engine. The server DSP communication
module is developed using Microsoft Visual C++, and linked in the form of a Dynamic Link
Library (DLL). Its server object interface provides interface functions that are callable from
server-side scripts, such as Microsoft VBScript and JScript. Table B.5 (page 184) lists the
major functions in the implementation of the server DSP communication module. Table 2.5
shows a VBScript code segment that is used to invoke an interface function of server DSP
communication module.
2.5 Experimental Design and Results
In the first part of this section, we describe the hardware and software, which are used in the
development process and in the experiments of the proposed encryption model. Then, the design
of experiments for the evaluation of the proposed model’s security and performance is discussed.
In the last part, we present the experimental results.
2.5.1 Hardware and software
We chose Microsoft Windows as the software platform, which includes the operating system and
applications, running on server and client machines for our experiments. The DSP hardware
and software development tools are from Texas Instruments Inc.
2.5.1.1 Hardware
• The client machine was a PC with an Intel Pentium 4 1.8 GHz CPU and 512MB RAM,
running Microsoft Windows XP Professional.
• DSP devices were the Texas Instruments’ TMS320C6416 1000 MHz DSP Starter Kits
(DSK) [127]. The block diagram, board layout and major features of the TMS320C6416
DSK are given in Appendix A. TMS320C6416 is a fixed-point DSP chip, running at
the default clock speed of 1000 MHz. The DSP can be configured to run at other clock
speeds of 500, 600, 720, 850 and 1200 MHz. The DSP chip has 1024 KBytes fast internal
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RAM memory for code and data. In addition, the DSP board has 16MB SDRAM main
memory. The board also has a USB 1.0 port for communications with the host computer.
The TMS320C6416 DSK is built on the TI’s industry-leading line of low cost and high
performance DSP development boards.
• The server used in experiments was a PC with an Intel Pentium 4 2.4 GHz CPU and
512MB RAM, running Microsoft Windows 2000 Server Family. A web server and a data-
base server are installed on the server machine to host a functional E-commerce website.
The website is used as the environment to test the proposed encryption model.
2.5.1.2 Software
• Development Tools for TMS320C6416 DSP : The Texas Instruments Code Composer Stu-
dio 3.0 and the attached RTDX library were used to develop the RSA encryption and
decryption engines on DSP hardware.
• Development Tools for client and server applications: Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 was used
to build the server DSP communication module and the client DSP communication module.
• Web browser : The web browser used in our experiments was Microsoft Internet Explorer,
because it supported the ActiveX/OLE technology that was used to develop the client
DSP communication module.
• Web and database servers: The web server software used was Microsoft Internet Infor-
mation Services 5.0. In order to test our encryption model, we built a simple but fully
functional E-commerce website on the web server, with the Microsoft SQL Server 7.0 as
database backend. The E-commerce website provides customers with online registration
for various types of commercial events. The customers can register their details with the
system, then select the interested events, and make the online payment. The design and
implementation of the website and its database are not discussed in this thesis due to
limited space.
2.5.2 Experimental design
In order to begin experiments on the proposed DSP hardware RSA encryption model, the first
step is to generate RSA key pairs. We developed a simple module to generate RSA key pairs
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for our experiments. The RSA keys, we choose to generate, are 128, 256, 512, 1024, 1536 and
2048 bits in length. For each RSA key pair, the public and the private components are roughly
the same length, and their length is equal to the modulus’s length.
In the next step, we used the generated RSA keys to conduct three types of experiments as
follows:
1. Performance tests on the proposed encryption model: the aim of these experiments was to
measure the model’s performance, including DSP encryption/decryption speed, overhead
of RTDX communications. We also measure the impact of RSA key length, DSP clock
speed and message size, to the encryption speed. Since the RSA public (encryption) and
private (decryption) keys had the same length, the complexities of the encryption and
decryption were equal. Therefore, we only measure the DSP encryption performance to
represent the model’s performance. In order to get the performance information, first,
we measure the amount of time taken for each task in the encryption process. We then
compute the speed performance, base on the amount of time taken and the size of input
message. The amounts of time taken are collected as follows:
• Encryption time: The amount of time taken, from the time the web browser sends
plain text message to the DSP encryption engine, to the time it gets back the corre-
sponding cipher text message from the DSP.
• Message transfer time: The amount of time taken for round trip of a message sent
from the client browser to the DSP encryption engine, and then the DSP sends the
message back to the client browser, without doing the encryption.
In this performance testing, we also tested the proposed model with different DSP clock
speeds, in order to measure the effect of the DSP clock speed to the model’s performance.
The TMS320C6416 DSP clock speeds, that are selected for experiment, are 500, 720, 1000
and 1200 MHz.
2. Testing the proposed encryption model with the online credit card payment: In this exper-
iment, we measure the amount of time taken for the encryption of information of typical
online credit card payments.
3. Performance testing of the RSA implementation in software: We measure the speed per-
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formance of software-based RSA implementation, running on Pentium 4 PC machines
with different clock speed CPUs, in order to compare with the performance of the DSP
hardware-based RSA implementation.
The sizes of input messages used in experiments are 512, 1024, 2048, and 4096 bytes.
2.5.3 Experimental results
2.5.3.1 Model’s performance
For each RSA key pair of 128, 256, 512, 1024, 1536 and 2048-bit, we conducted four tests,
with different messages of 512, 1024, 2048 and 4096 bytes in size as mentioned in Section 2.5.2.
The performance results are shown in Tables 2.6, 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 for the TMS320C6416 DSP,
running at 500, 720, 1000 and 1200 MHz, respectively. Figure 2.8 presents the relation between
RSA key length and the encryption speed for a 2048-byte message, on the DSP running at 500,
720, 1000 and 1200 MHz. Figure 2.9 shows the relation between the 1000 MHz-DSP encryption
speed and the message sizes, at encryption keys of 512, 1024 and 2048 bits. Figures 2.10 and
2.11 describe the effect of the DSP clock speed to the encryption speed for short encryption
keys and long encryption keys, respectively. Figure 2.13 shows the RTDX data transfer speed
between computer and the DSP, using USB port.
As shown in Figure 2.8, the encryption speed decreases dramatically, when the length of
keys increases, for all DSP clock speeds. However, the decrement rates are vary for each DSP
clock speed. Another important factor, that affects the encryption speed, is the DSP clock
speed. It can be seen from Figures 2.10 and 2.11 that the encryption speed is proportional to
the DSP clock speed. It is also noted on Figure 2.9 that the message size has small impact on
the encryption speed. The encryption speed almost becomes stable when the message is large
enough (2048 to 4096 bytes).
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Figure 2.8: Dependence of the encryption speed on the RSA key length
Table 2.6: Encryption speed of the DSP running at 500 MHz
Message
(Bytes)
Speed on RSA key length (Kbit/s)
128-bit 256-bit 512-bit 768-bit 1024-bit 1536-bit 2048-bit
512 18.78316 8.44545 2.48505 1.20945 0.61789 0.31697 0.13476
1024 20.20637 8.39237 2.62102 1.31286 0.68694 0.31795 0.16172
2048 19.95210 8.58101 2.61442 1.31674 0.72779 0.34685 0.17969
4096 19.13739 8.62978 2.66670 1.31620 0.74973 0.34671 0.19010
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Figure 2.9: Dependence of the encryption speed on the size of input messages
Figure 2.10: Dependence of the encryption speed on the DSP clock speed for short keys
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Figure 2.11: Dependence of the encryption speed on the DSP clock speed for long keys
Table 2.7: Encryption speed of the DSP running at 720 MHz
Message
(Bytes)
Speed on RSA key length (Kbit/s)
128-bit 256-bit 512-bit 768-bit 1024-bit 1536-bit 2048-bit
512 30.72000 12.59016 3.60563 1.74150 0.88992 0.45851 0.19409
1024 28.98113 12.59016 3.80198 1.89630 0.98462 0.45755 0.23305
2048 24.97561 11.95331 3.74634 1.88814 1.04561 0.49886 0.25856
4096 25.49378 11.88395 3.78092 1.88351 1.07620 0.49886 0.27361
Table 2.8: Encryption speed of the DSP running at 1000 MHz
Message
(Bytes)
Speed on RSA key length (Kbit/s)
128-bit 256-bit 512-bit 768-bit 1024-bit 1536-bit 2048-bit
512 34.90909 15.67347 4.80000 2.37771 1.22684 0.63002 0.26881
1024 30.72000 14.91262 5.12000 2.59459 1.35929 0.63288 0.32222
2048 30.72000 15.51515 5.12855 2.60560 1.44497 0.69065 0.35867
4096 33.57377 16.21108 5.21562 2.60670 1.49126 0.69166 0.37975
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Table 2.9: Encryption speed of the DSP running at 1200 MHz
Message
(Bytes)
Speed on RSA key length (Kbit/s)
128-bit 256-bit 512-bit 768-bit 1024-bit 1536-bit 2048-bit
512 51.52203 20.77430 5.95493 2.92085 1.49144 0.76269 0.32229
1024 39.41620 19.95615 6.21941 3.13529 1.64114 0.76157 0.38750
2048 39.38462 19.44304 6.21862 3.11858 1.73651 0.83049 0.43013
4096 39.40040 19.38361 6.26300 3.12349 1.78762 0.83017 0.45589
Table 2.10: Increment rate of the encryption speed on the DSP clock
speed. The encryption speed of 500 MHz DSP is used as the unit speed.
DSP Clock
Speed (MHz)
Increment rate of encryption speed (times)
128-bit 256-bit 512-bit 768-bit 1024-bit 1536-bit 2048-bit
500 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
720 1.25 1.39 1.43 1.43 1.44 1.44 1.44
1000 1.54 1.81 1.96 1.98 1.99 1.99 2.00
1200 1.97 2.27 2.38 2.37 2.39 2.39 2.39
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Figure 2.12: Increment rate of the encryption speed on the DSP clock speed for
128 and 2048-bit keys. The encryption speed of 500 MHz DSP is used as the unit
speed.
Figure 2.13: RTDX data transfer speed on message size
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Table 2.11: Encryption time of a typical set of the payment information on DSP at 1000 MHz
Encryption time on RSA key length (s)
128-bit 256-bit 512-bit 768-bit 1024-bit 1536-bit 2048-bit
Time (s) 0.01213 0.03009 0.10496 0.21398 0.41906 0.81947 1.93924
Figure 2.14: The relationship between the RSA key size and the encryption time of
a typical set of the credit card payment information on DSP at 1000 MHz
2.5.3.2 Experiments with online credit card payment
We simulate the online credit card payments to measure the model’s performance for payment
transactions. In this experiment, the DSP hardware RSA encryption engine is used to encrypt
the customers’ card payment information (which consists of card number, expiry date, card se-
curity code and name on card, in total of 80 bytes maximum), using the server’s public key. The
encrypted payment message is then submitted to the server. Upon receiving the encrypted pay-
ment message, the server requests its DSP decyption engine to decrypt the encrypted payment
message, using its own private key. The server then gets the actual payment information for
verification. In the end, the server sends its response to client that the payment transaction is
accepted, or rejected. Table 2.11 and Figure 2.14 show the amounts of time in seconds needed to
encrypt a typical set of payment information on different key lengths. According to the results
of this experiment, as shown in Figure 2.14, the encryption time of the payment information is
less than 2 seconds at 2048-bit key, and less than 0.5 seconds at 1024-bit key.
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Table 2.12: Encryption speed of the software implementation on the Intel Pentium 4 1.8 GHz
machine
Message
(Bytes)
Speed on RSA key length (Kbit/s)
128-bit 256-bit 512-bit 768-bit 1024-bit 1536-bit 2048-bit
512 48.00000 17.06667 4.46512 2.08130 1.04348 0.52531 0.22152
1024 56.88889 17.65517 4.77019 2.26215 1.15402 0.52603 0.26551
2048 56.88889 17.96491 4.77019 2.27051 1.22439 0.57507 0.29490
4096 56.88889 18.12389 4.84161 2.26049 1.26108 0.57544 0.31200
Table 2.13: Encryption speed of the software implementation on the Intel Pentium 4 2.4 GHz
machine
Message
(Bytes)
Speed on RSA key length (Kbit/s)
128-bit 256-bit 512-bit 768-bit 1024-bit 1536-bit 2048-bit
512 69.81818 23.27273 6.00000 2.81319 1.42222 0.71243 0.29733
1024 76.80000 23.27273 6.40000 3.06587 1.56895 0.71144 0.35671
2048 78.76923 24.38095 6.37344 3.06893 1.66775 0.77792 0.39496
4096 78.76923 24.28458 6.50159 3.06893 1.71908 0.77812 0.41939
2.5.3.3 Experiments of RSA software implementation on different PC machines
In addition to the experiments on DSP hardware RSA encryption model, we have also conducted
experiments to test the performance of software implementation of the RSA encryption on some
PC computer systems, using the same inputs (message size and key length) as those used in
the tests on the proposed encryption model. Performance data are presented in Table 2.12, and
2.13 for experiments on the computer system running the Intel Pentium 4 CPU at 1.8 GHz and
2.4 GHz, respectively. Figure 2.15 shows the relationship between the RSA key length and the
encryption speed on Intel Pentium 4 1.8 GHz and 2.4 GHz machines.
It can be seen from Figure 2.15 that the size of encryption keys has similar impact on the
ecnryption speed of P4-based machines as that of DSP. The encryption speed drops sharply
when the key length increases, especially with keys from 128 to 512 bits. The performance
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Figure 2.15: The relationship between the RSA key length and the encryption speed
of the software implementation on the Intel P4 1.8 GHz and 2.4 GHz machines
comparison between 1200 MHz-DSP and P4-based machines, as shown in Figures 2.16 and 2.17
indicates that the DSP performs better than these Intel P4-based machines at large keys (from
512 to 2048 bits).
Figures 2.16 and 2.17 show the comparison of the encryption speed for the 2048-byte message
on the DSP hardware at different clock speeds and the software implementation running on PC
systems, using Pentium 4 1.8 GHz and 2.4 GHz CPUs.
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Figure 2.16: Encryption speed of DSP and PC machines for short encryption keys
Figure 2.17: Encryption speed of DSP and PC machines for long encryption keys
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Table 2.14: RSA Security’s recommendation of RSA key sizes [108]
Protection Lifetime of Data Present 2010 Present 2030 Present 2031 and Beyond
Minimum RSA key size 1024 bits 2048 bits 3072 bits
2.6 Discussion
2.6.1 Model’s performace
In this section, we analyze the proposed model’s performance results, compared to that of RSA
software implementation on Pentium-based PC machines. In addition, main factors which affect
the model’s performance, such as length of encryption keys, DSP clock speed and the size of
input messages, are also discussed.
2.6.1.1 Performance comparison with RSA software implementation on Pentium
based PC machines
From the experimental results presented on Figure 2.16 and 2.17 (page 50), the 1200 MHz DSP
performs better than Pentium 4 based PC machines on large keys, although it is slower than
these PC machines on short keys. At short keys of 128 bits the DSP is slower than the Pentium
4 1.8 GHz machine, however, it performs slightly better than this PC machine at 256-bit keys
and outperforms the P4 machine at larger keys. At 2048-bit keys the DSP is about 46% faster
than the P4 1.8 GHz machine. Similarly, the DSP performs better than the P4 2.4GHz machine
at encryption keys of 768 bits and larger, although it is slower than the PC machine at short
keys of 128 bits, 256 bits and 512 bits.
The DSP’s performance gain at large keys indicates that the proposed DSP based encryption
model is more suitable for practical applications, as it is more scalable than the software im-
plementation running on modern Pentium based PC machines. Practical RSA security requires
large-size keys, because short keys of 128 bits and 256 bits can be factored quickly, and even
512-bit keys are not secure at present [108]. It is recommended by RSA Security Inc. [108], as
shown in Table 2.14, that a reasonable RSA key size should be at least 1024 bits for the present
time, and 2048 bits for the next 20 to 25 years [108, 122].
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2.6.1.2 Dependence of speed performance on the length of encryption keys
It is clearly shown on Figure 2.8 (page 42) that the length of encryption keys has a big impact on
the proposed model’s speed performance. For all supported DSP clock speeds, the encryption
speed drops dramatically when the length of encryption keys increases from 128 bits to 2048
bits. When the length of keys is doubled from 128 bits to 256 bits, the encryption speed drops
by half, and encryption speed reduces to one fourth when the key size increases from 1024 bits
to 2048 bits. This shows how computationally intensive RSA encryption is, especially for large
keys [92]. Therefore, an crucial question is how to determine the size of RSA encryption keys
that can help to balance the level of security and the performance. Although the model’s speed
is relatively slow with large keys, it is fast enough for small and medium size messages. The
time taken to encrypt a message of a typical online credit card payment information is about
0.105 second and 0.419 second at 512-bit and 1024-bit keys respectively, as can be seen in Table
2.11 (page 47).
2.6.1.3 Dependence of speed performance on DSP clock speed
When the DSP clock speed increases, the encryption speed increases proportionally, depending
on the length of encyption keys used (refer to results presented in Figures 2.10 (page 43), 2.11
(page 44), and 2.12 (page 46)). When the DSP clock speed increases from 500 MHz to 1000
MHz, the encryption speed increases 1.54 times and 2.0 times respectively, at encryption keys of
128 bits and 2048 bits respectively (as shown in Table 2.10 (page 45) and Figure 2.12 (page 46)
). This means that the encryption speed gains more at longer encryption keys, with the same
increase in DSP clock speed. Therefore, in order to get further gains on performance, especially
for the RSA operation on the server side, a choice of a high-speed multi-processor DSP is the
ideal solution.
2.6.1.4 Dependence of speed performance on the size of input messages
It can be seen from Figure 2.9 (page 43) that the size of messages has different impacts on the
speed performance of the proposed encryption model, depending on the length of encryption
keys used. On the tested message sizes, the larger a message is, the higher the encryption speed
is. The DSP-1000 MHz encryption speed increases 8.65%, when the message size raises from
512 bytes to 4096 bytes at the encryption key of 512 bits, while speed gain is 41.27% at 2048-bit
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encryption key, for the same increase in message size. The reason for the speed performance
gain for large messages is that for any message size, the initialization and cleaning work of the
encryption process gets the same overheads. However, when the message is large enough, the
speed performance will be stable. This is because the overhead of the initialization and cleaning
job accounts for only a small portion of the total time for the encryption process.
2.6.1.5 Communication performance
As shown in Figure 2.13 (page 46), the communication speed is proportional to the message size
due to the use of data transfer in batch mode. However, the RTDX communcation, based on
USB 1.0 is still not fast enough to support the transfer of large amounts of data. A possible
solution to improve the communication throughput, is to use faster communication interfaces
such as USB 2.0 or PCI interface. A faster DSP-computer communication interface will improve
the communcation performace as well as the overall performance of the proposed encryption
model.
2.6.2 Security
The security of the proposed encryption model is ensured by the strength of the RSA encryption
algorithm and the hardware cryptography features. RSA security is based on the difficulty
of factoring big prime integers. Generally, the larger the key, the more secure the system
[92, 108, 122]. Table 2.15 [108, 122] shows the estimated cost for factoring RSA keys from 428
bits to 1024 bits, in which the amount of time required to break the key is expressed in the total
number of arithmetic operations. A 1024-bit key will be 52 million times harder to break in
time, and about 7200 times harder to break in terms of space, compared to the 465-bit key. We
have tested the proposed encryption model with RSA encryption keys, ranging from 128 bits to
2048 bits, in which large-size keys (from 1024 bits to 2048 bits) are considered good keys (for
use in practice) [108, 122].
As discussed in Section 2.4.1, we used a simple method to format input message into encryp-
tion blocks for performance tests. In order to meet security requirements, standard format of
encryption blocks [55, 56] must be complied. In addition, the padding string of each encryption
block should be generated independently, especially if the same data is entered into more than
one encryption block [55, 56].
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Table 2.15: Estimated cost for factoring RSA keys [108]
Keysize (bit) Total Time Factor Base Sieve Memory Matrix Memory
428 5.5 ∗ 1017 600 Kbytes 24 Mbytes 128 Mbytes
465 2.5 ∗ 1018 1.2 Mbytes 64 Mbytes 825 Mbytes
512 1.7 ∗ 1019 3 Mbytes 128 Mbytes 2 Gbytes
768 1.1 ∗ 1023 240 Mbytes 10 Gbytes 160 Gbytes
1024 1.3 ∗ 1026 7.5 Gbytes 256 Gbytes 10 Tbytes
2.6.2.1 Security of hardware cryptography
Hardware cryptography has built-in features to address the security issues of communication
and end system security, as discussed in Section 2.1. The biggest advantage of hardware-based
cryptographic implementations, over their software counterparts, is that a hardware cryptosys-
tem runs in its own physical memory space, therefore, it effectively prevents illegal memory
access and modification by external programs. Running on a separate physical environment also
means hardware cryptosystems are protected from underlying operating systems’ security flaws
which usually lead to security risks to software implementations. Moreover, hardware can be
used to safely store long-term private keys [6, 32]. This is one of the most important reasons
that hardware was selected as the platform to implement the proposed encryption model. In
our DSP hardware based RSA encryption model, the RSA private key is kept in DSP hardware,
and is thus not directly accessible, even if the host is compromised.
From an architectural aspect, a secure communication tunnel is created between the client
and the server by the integrated hardware based encryption modules. All encryption and de-
cryption tasks are securely carried out inside these hardware modules. This is very important to
the proposed model’s security, because this mechanism can effectively prevent access violation
by malicious propgrams to the model’s code and protected data.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter we presented a new hardware-based encryption model for the enhancement
of security for E-commerce applications. The proposed model is based on the integration of
CHAPTER 2. E-COMMERCE SECURITY ENHANCEMENT BASED ON DSP 55
an existing E-commerce model and embedded hardware based RSA encryption modules. The
security of the proposed model is guaranteed by the strength of RSA encryption at large keys
and the features of hardware-based cryptosystems, such as difficult-to-break-in features and
protected-from-operating-system flaws.
A successful implementation of DSP hardware-based RSA encryption and decryption mod-
ules using Texas Instruments’ TMS320C6416 DSK boards was presented to test the concepts.
We also provided the details on how to communicate efficiently between the host computer
applications (the web browser and the web server) and the DSP hardware based encryption
modules. A fully functional E-commerce system, including the web and database applications,
was built to test the proposed model’s performance and security. From our experimental results,
it is clear that, at large RSA encryption keys, the proposed DSP based RSA encryption system
outperforms a 1.8GHz Intel Pentium 4 PC, and it has comparable performance to a 2.4GHz
Intel Pentium 4 PC that has almost double clock speed of the DSP. The results confirm that
our model is more scalable than software-based implementations and it can be used to efficiently
improve the security and performance of E-commerce applications.
Part II
Intrusion Detection: Hidden Markov
Model Based Program Anomaly
Detection
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Chapter 3
Program Based Anomaly Intrusion
Detection
3.1 Introduction
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring events that occur in a computer system or
network, and analyzing these events for evidence of intrusions [5, 70]. An intrusion detection
system (IDS) usually consists of three functional components: information sources, analysis
and response. Information sources can be drawn from different levels of the target system.
Networks, hosts, and applications are the most common sources in intrusion detection. The
analysis component is responsible for modelling and analyzing the collected data events, to
decide whether those events indicate that intrusions are occurring, or have already taken place.
The response is a set of actions taken when an intrusion is detected. The actions can be
passive measures, such as reporting intrusion alerts to administrators, or active measures, such
as blocking intrusions.
3.1.1 Overview of intrusion detection
Based on the information sources, there are two main types of intrusion detection systems:
network-based IDSs and host-based IDSs. Network-based IDSs detect attacks by capturing and
analyzing network packets. A network-based IDS can be used to protect multiple hosts that
are connected to a network segment, or a switch, which is monitored by the IDS. However,
network-based IDSs may have difficulty processing all packets in a large, or busy network,
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and therefore they may fail to recognize an attack launched during periods of high traffic. By
contrast, host-based IDSs detect attacks by analyzing information collected within an individual
computer system. This allows host-based IDSs to provide a comprehensive analysis of the system
activities, to determine exactly which processes and users are involved in a particular attack on
the system [5].
Based on analysis methods, intrusion detection techniques can be classified into two cate-
gories : misuse detection and anomaly detection [26, 93]. Misuse detection searches for signatures
of known attacks and any matched activity is considered an attack. Misuse detection can detect
known attacks effectively, but it is incapable of detecting novel, or unknown attacks. Anomaly
detection attempts to characterize the normal behaviour of an object and any significant devia-
tion from that behaviour is considered a possible attack. Anomaly detection has the potential
to detect unknown attacks, because no advance knowledge about specific attacks is required
[26, 93]. The work discussed in Part II deals with anomaly detection, specifically in detecting
anomalies in the execution of programs, as well as intrusions against programs.
3.1.1.1 Misuse intrusion detection
Generally, misuse intrusion detection, also known as signature-based intrusion detection, first
defines signatures of known intrusions, then monitors current activities for such signatures, and
reports matched cases. An intrusion signature specifies a pattern of scenarios or events that lead
to an attack or misuse. Intrusion signatures are not only useful to detect intrusions but also
to discover intrusion attempts. A partial satisfaction of an intrusion signature may indicate an
intrusion attempt [70].
There are several misuse intrusion detection approaches which use different representations
of intrusion signatures, as well as apply different matching algorithms to search for intrusion
patterns. For example, NIDES [87], a real-time intrusion-detetion expert system consists of
a rule-based analysis component for misuse detection. The rule-based component uses an ex-
pert system to detect attempts which exploit security vulnerabilities of the monitored systems.
The rule-based component encode known system vulnerabilities, attack scenarios and suspicious
behaviour into rules. For example, one such rule is defined as “more than three consecutive
unseccessful login attempts for the same useid within five minutes is a penetration attempt”. A
monitored activity that satisfies any of these pre-defined rules is flagged.
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The key advantage of misuse intrusion detection approaches is that they are very effective
at detecting known attacks whose signatures have been encoded into rules, or patterns with-
out generating an overwhelming number of false alarms. However, misuse intrusion detection
approaches are not effective at detecting unknown attacks, because there are no matched signa-
tures for such attacks. In addition, since attacks change their patterns quickly and new attack
techniques are invented rapidly, the attack signatures of misuse detection systems must be up-
dated frequently across many platforms in order to be able to detect newly created attacks. This
maintenance work is very labour-intensive task [81].
3.1.1.2 Anomaly intrusion detection
Anomaly intrusion detection involves in first (i) building a profile of normal behaviour of a
monitored object, and then (ii) monitoring the object’s actual behaviour to detect significant
deviations from normal behaviour recorded in the profile. The monitored objects can be users,
programs, network traffic or other resources in a system. Generally, a object’s profile is con-
structed from historical data (also known as training data) collected over a period of normal
operation of the object.
The main assumption of anomaly intrusion detection is that intrusive activity is highly
correlated to anomalous activity [93]. In other word, intrusive activity can be considered as
a subset of anomalous activity. In practice, an intrusive activity can be implemented as a set
of individual activities, and none of these individual activities is independently anomalous [70].
Since the set of anomalous activities is not generally the same as the set of intrusive activities,
the evaluation result for an activity, by an anomaly intrusion detection system, can be one of
the following four possibilities:
1. Intrusive and anomalous: An activity is intrusive and it is correctly reported as intrusive
because it is also anomalous. This is true positive case because the intrusion detection
system correctly reports the activity as intrusive.
2. Not intrusive and not anomalous: An activity is not intrusive and it is not reported as
intrusive because it is not anomalous. This is true negative case because the intrusion
detection system does not report the activity as intrusive.
3. Not intrusive but anomalous: An activity is not intrusive but it is reported as intrusive
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because it is anomalous. This is false positive case because the intrusion detection system
falsely reports the activity as intrusive.
4. Intrusive but not anomalous: An activity is intrusive but it is not reported as intrusive
because it is not anomalous. This is false negative, or missed case because the intrusion
detection system fails to detect the intrusive activity.
Obviously, both false negatives and false positives are not desirable. One possible way to
reduce false negatives is to lower thresholds that define the abnormalcy. However, low thresholds
may result in large volume of false positives, which virtually disrupt the normal operation of the
monitored system and reduce the effectiveness of the anomaly intrusion detection system.
There are several anomaly intrusion detection approaches which use different information
sources as well as apply different modelling techniques to characterize normal behaviour of
monitored objects. Users, programs and network traffic are the most common monitored objects
in anomaly detection. Data modelling techniques, such as statistics, data mining and machine
learning, have been used in many anomaly intrusion detection systems [70, 82, 93].
The main advantage of anomaly intrusion detection approaches is that they have the potential
to detect novel and unknown attacks without advance knowledge about these attacks [26, 93].
This is because anomaly detection approaches focus on detecting abnormal, or unusual behaviour
based on the normal behaviour defined in profiles. However, anomaly detection approaches
usually produce high volume of false alarms, compared to misuse detection counterparts, due to
the unpredictable behaviour of users and networks. In addition, anomaly detection approaches
often require extensive system resources to contruct profiles of normal behaviour from historical
data.
3.1.2 Detecting intrusions by monitoring program behaviour
Monitoring program behaviour to detect intrusions has a major advantage over either moni-
toring user behaviour and network traffic, because of its stability [25, 26, 66, 93]. Unlike the
unpredictable nature of human user behaviour or the unstable pattern of network activity, the
behaviour of a program is relatively stable during its execution because it is generally designed
to perform a limited set of specific tasks [26]. More specifically, the monitored programs in
anomaly intrusion detection are commonly system or privileged programs. These programs are
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usually running in the background to provide services to users or other programs. The behaviour
of these programs should not be changed without our awareness [93]. Therefore, if intrusions
can be detected as deviations from normal program behaviour, false alarms caused by changes
in the historical patterns of user behaviour can be eliminated [93].
The remaining problem is how normal program behaviour should be characterized. Intu-
itively, a program’s normal behaviour can be extracted from the semantic of its source code.
However, this approach is generally unsolvable because the source code of programs are not
always available, especially for commercial software. In addition, the program behaviour ex-
traction from its source code can be very complicated due to the growing comlexity of modern
computer software. A more practical approach is to consider a program as a black box and
monitor its activity and interaction with the underlying operating system [25, 26]. The pro-
gram’s observed information is then used to characterize its normal behaviour. There exists a
mechanism, known as kernel auditing, and supported by many operating systems, which allows
auditing systems to record programs’ behaviour in terms of their interaction with the operating
system [93]. For example, many Unix systems support the Basic Security Modules (BSM) which
provide detailed audit trails for some running processes.
Forrest et al [25] proposed the use of short sequences of system calls, made by an Unix
privileged program to the operating system kernel during its normal execution, to characterize
its normal behaviour. Their approach is based on two assumptions: (i) temporal-ordering short
sequences of system calls of an Unix privileged process are consistent during its normal operation,
and (ii) abnormal sequences of system calls are produced by anomalies or intrusive activities.
This program-based anomaly detection method is relatively simple. Firstly, normal traces of
system calls produced by a program, during its normal execution, were collected. Then, a normal
database, characterizing normal program behaviour, was constructed from normal traces. The
normal database was built by sliding a window of k system calls across normal traces, one system
call at a time, and recording system calls within the sliding window as one short sequence at
each move. During this process, only unique short sequences were added to the normal database.
Then, this normal database was used to classify short sequences of system calls of test traces
to find anomalies. If a short sequence was not found in the normal database, it was considered
as abnormal. The anomaly signal was measured by counting the total number of abnormal
short sequences in test traces. Experimental results showed that short sequences of system calls
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were consistent for some Unix privileged programs and the proposed method was able to detect
several instrusions on Unix sendmail and lpr programs.
Forrest et al [26], in an extension to their previous work [25], conducted further experiments
on a wide range of Unix privileged programs in synthetic1 and real2 working environments.
Instead of simply counting the number of abnormal sequences, the Hamming distance method
was used in the latter to compute the differences between a mismatched short sequence and
short sequences in the normal database. The minimum value of the computed differences was
used as the anomaly signal. Their experimental results also confirmed that short sequences of
system calls are a good discriminator between the normal and abnormal behaviour of programs.
Their proposed detection method [25, 26] is efficient because it requires only one pass through
the training data (normal traces) to build the normal database. However, due to the growing
complexity of modern software applications, the behaviour of a program can be very complicated,
which makes it difficult to construct a complete normal database that covers all execution
scenarios of the program. The incompleteness of the normal database is likely to lead to a high
level of false alarms. Therefore, it is desirable to find more expressive modelling methods to
characterirze normal program behaviour [93].
Several other modelling techniques, such as data mining [78, 79], finite state automata (FSA)
[68, 93, 117] and hidden Markov models [42, 43, 102, 134] have been used to construct models of
normal program behaviour using system calls. In an effort to find the best modelling method for
normal program behaviour using system calls, Warrender et al [134] have investigated various
modelling techniques through extensive experiments. They used the normal database method
[25, 26], frequency based method, data mining, and the hidden Markov model to construct
detection models from the same normal traces of system calls. Their experimental results have
shown that the hidden Markov model method can generate the most accurate results on average,
although the training cost of the hidden Markov model method is high. Other program anomaly
detection approaches based on hidden Markov models also reported promising results [42, 43,
102].
1A type of artificial or simulated environment created to test programs. Detailed description of synthetic
environments is given in [26].
2Also called live environment [26].
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3.1.3 Aims
The hidden Markov model (HMM) is a very powerful data modelling technique [103, 104], and
it has been widely used to construct signal models in speech recognition [16, 28, 29, 30, 72,
104], and in protein sequence analysis in biology [47, 58, 59, 69, 115]. In anomaly detection,
HMM modelling has been used to increase the detection rate, as well as to reduce the false
alarm rate [42, 43, 102, 134]. However, the major drawback of these HMM-based anomaly
detection approaches is that the HMM training using the well-known Baum-Welch algorithm
[104] demands excessive system resources, which makes these HMM-based detection approaches
less efficient for practical use.
We propose an HMM-based program anomaly intrusion detection method using system calls,
which focuses on three major aims:
1. To improve detection accuracy, by reducing false alarms and by increasing the detection
rate. Generally speaking, existing anomaly intrusion detection approaches usually produce
too many false alarms, which will virtually disrupt the normal operations of the monitored
systems. Therefore, reducing the false alarm rate as well as increasing the detection rate
are crucial for any anomaly detection approaches [81, 82].
2. To improve efficiency in terms of training costs and testing costs. As mentioned, HMM-
based anomaly detection approaches consume excessive system resources due to the high
HMM training costs, which also affects the normal operations of the monitored systems.
Therefore, improving efficiency is critical to make HMM-based anomaly detection ap-
proaches practical.
3. To improve adaptability of existing anomaly detection approaches. The proposed detection
method should be adaptable to the changes of normal program behaviour.
3.1.4 Outline of the proposed approach
In order to improve the detection accuracy, we employ the hidden Markov model (HMM) as the
main data modelling technique to construct a model of normal program behaviour using system
calls because HMM is a powerful modelling technique in a wide range of applications [103, 104].
HMM modelling in anomaly intrusion detection has also brought promising results, but is still
in an early stage [42, 43, 102, 134]. Futhermore, in order to increase the detection rate and
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to reduce the false positive rate, we propose two detection schemes: (i) a two-layer detection
scheme and (ii) a fuzzy-based detection scheme. Both detection schemes use a normal database
[25, 26] and an HMM model to evaluate test traces of system calls for possible intrusions. The
two-layer detection scheme aims at reducing false positive alarms by applying two sequential
tests on each short sequence. On the other hand, the fuzzy-based detection scheme focuses on
improving the detection rate, as well as reducing false positive alarms, using fuzzy inference to
combine multiple sequence parameters generated by the normal database and the HMM model.
Efficiency improvement is also critical to HMM-based anomaly detection approaches. A
major factor that affects the overall efficiency of an intrusion detection system is the efficiency of
the construction of the detection model (also known as detection profile, rule base) [25, 26, 134].
Therefore, the efficiency improvement of the HMM construction or HMM training is crucial
to any HMM-based anomaly detection approachs. Traditional HMM batch training using the
Baum-Welch algorithm [104] was found to be expensive in terms of time and storage requirements
[104, 134]. We introduce an HMM incremental tranining scheme with optimal initialization for
program anomaly detection, which aims at reducing training time and storage demands.
While accuracy and efficiency are crucial requirements of an intrusion detection system, its
adaptability is also important in a networked computing environment [82]. This means that an
intrusion detection system should support the dynamic update of its detection model in order to
adapt to the changes of the monitored object’s behaviour. Our HMM-based detection method
supports the online update of its detection model, which is based on the model’s incremental
training scheme using cleaned online training data. This makes the proposed detection model
up-to-date, and therefore, maintains the detection accuracy.
In next section, we review some monitoring techniques in anomaly detection, including mon-
itoring user behaviour, monitoring network activity and monitoring program behaviour. We
then focus our discussion on program anomaly detection approaches using system calls.
3.2 Related Work in Anomaly Detection
Anomaly intrusion detection is based on the assumption that “intrusions are highly correlated to
abnormal behaviour exhibited by either a user, or the system” [93]. Based on this assumption,
anomaly detection techniques usually focus on detecting deviations of an object’s current be-
haviour from its past behaviour. If a deviation is significant it is considered a possible intrusion
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[26, 93].
Initially, one must decide which object to monitor to detect intrusions. The monitored object
can be a single object, or a set of objects, in computer and network systems. Once the monitored
object is selected, an anomaly detection system can be developed in two stages:
1. The construction of the detection model (also known as detection profile, rule base). This
is the process of building a model of the object’s normal behaviour. This task can also be
done in two steps as follows:
(a) Collect training data: collect data for the construction of the detection model. It is
usually assumed that the training data is clean and free from anomalies and intrusions.
(b) Construct the detection model: the detection model is built using suitable data mod-
elling techniques. Data modelling techniques such as data mining, machine learning
and statistics have been commonly used to build detection models [70, 82, 93].
2. Testing for intrusions: monitoring the object’s current behaviour to find deviations from
its normal behaviour, which is recorded in the detection model for possible intrusions.
In subsection 3.2.1, we discuss techniques used to detect intrusions by monitoring objects’
activities. In subsection 3.2.2, we discuss the methods used for modelling normal program
behaviour using system calls. In subsection 3.2.3, we review the methods used to improve detec-
tion accuracy, efficiency, adaptability and extensibility of current anomaly detection techniques.
Subsection 3.2.4 analyses some open issues of current anomaly detection approaches.
3.2.1 Monitoring techniques in intrusion detection
In one of the earliest studies in anomaly detection, Anderson [1] suggested that intruders can be
detected by monitoring the abnormal changes in historical patterns of use for individual users.
In a broader context, this suggestion can be applied to detect intrusions by monitoring objects’
activity such as user behaviour, network activity and program behaviour.
3.2.1.1 Monitoring user behaviour
In light of Anderson’s suggestion [1], Denning [17] proposed a generic detection model that aims
to detect a wide range of security violations including break-in attempts by outsiders and abuses
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by insiders. Denning’s generic detection model [17] is based on the hypothesis that “security
violations can be detected by monitoring a system’s audit records for abnormal patterns of
system usage” [17]. The generic detection model [17] has six main components including the
subjects, objects, audit records, profiles, anomaly records and activity rules, which can be
considered as a rule-based pattern matching system. For a given subject with respect to a given
object, an activity profile is created to represent the normal pattern of the subject’s activity,
which is used to determine whether the subject’s current activity is normal or anomalous.
More recently, Lane et al [73] used machine learning to construct user profiles from sequences
of user commands in order to detect user anomalies. Each record in a user profile is a charac-
teristic sequence which is an ordered and fixed-length set of temporally adjacent actions. Lee et
al [82], on the other hand, applied data mining techniques such as frequent episodes to learn the
normal patterns of user activity from input sequences of shell commands of user sessions. In the
learning process, a new pattern of user commands is compared with the historical patterns and
a similarity score is given. Only patterns with a high similarity score are merged into historical
patterns to create the user profile [82].
A major difficulty of user anomaly detection is that human user behaviour is generally
unstable and unpredictable in nature [93]. This means that the current user activity does not
always match the historical user activities. Therefore, user-based anomaly detection systems
usually tend to generate a high level of false positive alarms. In addition, there are gradual
changes in user behaviour over a long period of time, which makes it even more difficult to
detect user anomalies.
3.2.1.2 Monitoring network activity
Monitoring network activity to detect intrusions has been the attention of many reseachers
[9, 23, 82, 84, 97, 99, 116]. In [99], Paxson described a system, called Bro, which is a real-
time and stand-alone system for detecting network intrusions by monitoring network traffic.
Bro’s security policies are encoded into event handler scripts written in Bro language which is a
specialized language used to express a site’s security policy. Network traffic streams are filtered
into a series of high-level events by an event engine. These events are then processed by event
handler scripts which are interpreted by a policy script interpreter. Bro reportedly achieves some
advanced features including high-speed monitoring, real-time notification, separation between
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mechanism and policy, and extensibility [99]. However, the creation of site security policy scripts
using the Bro language still requires enormous amount of manual engineering work [82].
Aiming at the automatic creation of detection rules from training data, Lee et al [82],
first used various data mining algorithms such as classifications, association rules and frequent
episodes to compute frequent patterns from network connection data. Next, they extracted the
predictive features from these frequent patterns, and then these predictive features were used to
generate rules to detect known network intrusions [82]. The main advantage of this approach is
that it can reduce the amount of manual engineering work to encode the signatures of known
intrusions. However, as a misuse detection approach, it still needs at least one real trace of each
intrusion in order to extract the intrusion pattern, which is not possible for unknown attacks.
Instead of using real traces of known intrusions for detection rule learning, Fan et al [23]
proposed an algorithm called DBA2 (Distribution-based Artificial Anomaly) to generate artificial
anomalies for known network intrusions. These artificial anomalies were used to form initial
anomaly classes, which help a data mining based inductive learner to accurately discover the
boundary between known classes (normal connections and known intrusions) and anomalies. It
is reported that the proposed method performed well on unknown intrusions and comparably
to signature-based approaches on known intrusions [23].
Focussing on detecting intrusions that exploit the weaknesses of implementations of network
protocols, Lee and Heinbuch [84] proposed a network anomaly detection method which is based
on neural networks. The proposed system’s detection model is composed of a hierarchy of
back propagation neural networks. Artificial network data that are generated based on network
protocols’ specifications, are used to train these neural networks. According to the simulation
results, the proposed model was able to detect 100% of specific attacks in the experiment without
any prior knowledge about these attacks [84].
3.2.1.3 Monitoring program behaviour
Recently, there have been significant research interest in anomaly detection by monitoring pro-
gram behaviour [25, 26, 42, 43, 53, 54, 66, 68, 78, 93, 102, 112, 117]. Ko et al [66] proposed
a method to detect a program’s vulnerabilities by monitoring its execution. The normal pro-
gram behaviour is defined using a program policy specification language, in which the allowed
operations of the program are formally specified. It is reported that the program policies are
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concise and clear, and the proposed approach is capable of detecting exploitations of known
and unknown vulnerabilities of programs [66]. However, this is a type of security enforcement
technique that requires special knowledge about the program’s internal functionality to create
an appropriate program security policy. In addition, this approach cannot detect intrusions
that do not cause violations of the pre-defined program security policy. For example, Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks usually flood server programs with huge number of requests, which may
not cause any violations of the internal program security policy.
Other program-based anomaly detection approaches consider a program as a black box and
focus on modelling normal program behaviour using the program’s observed information such
as language library calls [54], temporal signatures [53], and system calls [25, 26, 42, 43, 68, 78,
93, 102, 112, 117]. Jones et al [54] described a program-based anomaly detection method using
language library calls used by a program during its execution. They applied the method of
[25] to construct a normal database from normal traces of language library calls to represent
normal program behaviour. Their experimental results using C language library calls have shown
that the proposed method can correctly detect some intrusions such as buffer overflow, trojan
programs and DoS attacks [54]. The language library call-based method reportedly gave stronger
anomaly signals for a Trojan attack on a mSQL program, than the system call-based approach.
However, there was not sufficient evidence provided in [54] to conclude that the language library
call-based method performed better than the system call-based approach in different attacks
on other programs. In general, low-level system calls represent the system resource usage of a
program better than high-level language library calls [25, 26].
Jones and Li [53] used a temporal signature to characterize normal program behaviour. The
temporal signature was created by measuring time duration between adjacent system calls of a
program. This is an interesting approach because it has the potential to detect intrusions which
do not create sufficient anomalies in the temporal ordering of system calls (which is one of the
basic assumptions of the approaches in [25, 26]). The measurement of elapsed time of consecutive
calls was conducted multiple times, for each unique sequence of system calls, in order to capture
elapsed time patterns. After removing high variance data and noise, the temporal signature was
found relatively stable for a number of applications. However, there are many factors such as
CPU clock speed, CPU load, and the availability of system resources, that affect execution time
of a system call or elapsed time between two consecutive system calls. Because of high variation
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of these factors, it is difficult to remove their effect on the temporal signature. In addition,
execution time of system calls is machine (CPU) dependent, which makes the deployment of the
proposed method even more difficult.
3.2.2 Modelling normal program behaviour using system calls
Program-based anomaly detection using system calls has received a growing attention by many
researchers since the successful initiative of Forrest et al [25]. Inspired by the properties of natural
immune systems, Forrest et al [25] introduced the concept of self of a program to represent its
normal behaviour. A program’s self is defined as a normal database, which is a list of unique
and fixed-length short sequences of system calls as discussed in Section 3.1. Since then, several
other approaches have been proposed to represent normal program behaviour using system calls.
Among them, approaches that are based on data mining [78, 134], finite state automata (FSA)
[68, 93, 117] and hidden Markov models (HMM) [42, 43, 102, 134] have been the most successful.
3.2.2.1 Data mining-based approaches
Lee et al [78, 79] proposed a method to learn detection rules from program traces of system calls
based on data mining. They used a data mining-based rule induction program called RIPPER
[13] to learn detection rules from training data [78, 79]. Two separate sets of detection rules
were learnt: (i) the first set was used to classify a test sequence as normal or abnormal, and
(ii) the second set was used to predict a system call in a test sequence to find violations. The
proposed method’s rule base requires less storage than the normal database of [25, 26]. Another
advantage over [25, 26] is that it requires less training data to build the detection model in order
to achieve the same level of detection performance. However, the construction of the detection
model is much more expensive than the construction of a normal database of [25, 26] in terms of
training time and system resoure requirements. This is because there are additional overheads
generated by the learning of initial abnormal classes using a normal database and by the rule
induction using the RIPPER program.
3.2.2.2 Finite state automata-based approaches
Finite State Automata (FSA) is a natural way to represent normal program behaviour as it
can capture program structures such as loops and branches [117]. In addition, the FSA states
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can remember short-term and long-term correlations among system calls [117]. Kosoresow and
Hofmeyr [68] manually built a Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA) to characterize normal
program behaviour using system calls. The DFA was reportedly able to detect some intrusions.
However, the manual construction of finite state automata from system calls is a time-consuming
task, especially for complicated programs and long running traces of system calls.
Sekar et al [117] proposed an automated method to learn FSA from program execution
information, which effectively solves the DFA manual learning problem [68]. The FSA can learn
the program structures, therefore it is able to capture both short-term and long-term relationship
among system calls. The proposed method [117] makes use of operating system mechanisms to
get program execution information which includes: system calls, values of program counter
(the position from which each system call was made), and the stack information when each
system call was made. Each state in the FSA corresponds to a distinct value of the program
counter, and a transition is a system call. The FSA was reportedly light-weight and had fast
training convergence. Moreover, the proposed method had low false positive rate, and was able
to detect several attacks such as buffer overflow, malicious code changes, password guessing and
DoS. However, learning a program’s structures without its source code and special knowledge
about the program’s internal functionality, is an extremely difficult task. In addition, modern
applications usually make heavy use of language library functions, and functions from dynamic
linked libraries, which makes it even more difficult to learn program structures correctly.
Aiming at improving detection performance, Micheal and Ghosh [93] proposed two simple
state-based algorithms for program-based anomaly detection using system calls. Unlike Sekar
et al’s [117] FSA that requires values of program counter, these finite state automata were
automatically constructed only from normal traces of system calls [93]. In the first algorithm, a
finite state automaton was constructed from training data of system calls to represent normal
program behaviour. The FSA was able to detect the unseen short sequences in the training
data. The second algorithm built a finite state machine, of which each state was associated
with the probability distribution of the successor sequence of system calls. This algorithm was
designed to detect statistical deviations of current program behaviour from its normal behaviour.
The second algorithm had an advantage over the first algorithm as its state machine had the
capability of modelling long-term dependencies in normal program behaviour. The performance
of the proposed detection algorithms was reportedly almost comparable to the normal database
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method [25, 26] while they required much less training data.
3.2.2.3 Hidden Markov model-based approaches
Modelling normal program behaviour, using hidden Markov models (HMM), has some common
characteristics with modelling normal program behaviour, using finite state automata, because
HMM is a special type of finite state machines. Although the hidden Markov model is a powerful
data modelling technique [19, 103, 104], its applications in anomaly detection are still in an early
stage. HMM modelling was used to construct a model of normal program behaviour from normal
traces of system calls [134]. The HMM-based approach [134] can give the best detection accuracy
on average, compared to other modelling methods including normal database method [25, 26],
frequency-based method, and data mining [78].
In an attempt to find the original factor which determines the emission of program system
calls, Qiao et al [102] first constructed an HMM from the training data, then used the HMM to
find the sequence of hidden states for the observation sequence of system calls. Next, they built
a normal database from these hidden states using the approach of [25, 26] to represent normal
program behaviour. It is reported that the proposed method [102] had a smaller detection
database, compared to that of [25, 26], and it required less training data.
HMM-based anomaly detection approaches [42, 102, 134] face a common problem of efficiency
degradation. This is because the training of hidden Markov models from traces of system
calls using the Baum-Welch algorithm [104] was found expensive in terms of time and storage
[77, 104, 134]. Therefore, it is crucial to improve the efficiency of HMM training in order to make
HMM-based anomaly detection approaches more practical. This is one of the main objectives
of our research.
3.2.3 Improving intrusion detection performance: existing methods
An intrusion detection technique can be evaluated based on the following four characteristics
[26, 81, 82]:
1. Accuracy : Accuracy can be evaluated as a combination of detection rate and false postive
rate. A good intrusion detection technique should have a high detection rate as well as
low a false positive rate.
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2. Efficiency : In a narrow context, the efficiency of an intrusion detection technique can be
measured by: (i) the cost of the detection model construction for a monitored object, and
(ii) the cost of testing the object’s current activity against its recorded normal activity.
Each of these costs consists of several factors including time and system resources.
3. Adaptability : An intrusion detection method should be able to detect novel/unknown
attacks. Furthermore, the intrusion detection method should support the dynamic update
of its detection model in order to adapt to the changes of the object’s behaviour.
4. Extensibility : This relates to what extent an intrusion detection system supports extensible
features such as reuse, customization and upgrade.
Next, we discuss the methods that have been used to improve accuracy, efficiency, adapt-
ability and extensibility in anomaly intrusion detection.
3.2.3.1 Accuracy
The common methods that have been used to improve anomaly detection accuracy can be
broadly classified into four categories: (i) improvement of the detection model (also known as
detection database, rule base), (ii) enhancing of the evaluation method of anomaly signal, (iii)
enrichment of the training data quality, and (iv) combination of misuse and anomaly detection
in an unified system.
Among these four methods, improvement of the detection model, or more specifically, finding
more appropriate representations of normal behaviour of monitored objects in anomaly detection,
has been the most effective way to increase detection accuracy. In [68, 93, 117], more expressive
FSA models have been used to learn normal program behaviour using system calls as opposed
to normal databases in [25, 26]. This is because FSA models can capture program structures,
and short-term and long-term correlations among system calls. The proposed method in [117]
reportedly had a much lower false positive rate than the normal database method in [25, 26].
Hidden Markov model was found to give the highest detection accuracy, on average, when
compared to other modelling techniques, including normal database, frequency-based method,
and data mining [134].
Enhancing the evaluation method of the anomaly signal is also an effective way to increase
the detection rate and reduce false alarms. Forrest et al [25] in their initial work, simply counted
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the number of mismatched sequences in the whole test trace and considered this number as the
anomaly signal. However, this result depends on the length of the test trace. In addition, it is not
a good indication of how much difference there is between a mismatched sequence and sequences
stored in the normal database. A better solution on how to measure anomalies was proposed in
[26], which computes the minimum value of Hamming distances between a mismatched sequence
and all sequences in the normal database. Although the latter method gives better detection
accuracy than the former, it is still not suitable for online detection because it does not take the
temporal locality of test sequences into account. Methods which evaluate the anomaly signal
based on temporal frames of test sequences, are more suitable for online detection [93, 117, 134].
Improving the quality of training data for detection model construction can be used to
increase the detection accuracy. Fan et al [23] generated artificial anomalies for known network
intrusions, which were labelled and injected into the training data to help the inductive learner
correctly recognize the boundary between known classes and anomalies. In another approach
to program anomaly detection, Sekar et al [117] used operating system mechanisms to gather
information of program execution, which includes the program counter and stack information at
the time each system call was made. While the program counter values were used to correctly
learn program structures, the stack information helped to detect several types of buffer overflow
attacks. Information, such as parameters of system calls, can also be used to enrich the system
call training data for program anomaly detection.
Misuse detection and anomaly detection can be combined in one system that can take advan-
tages of advanced features of both misuse and anomaly detection techniques in order to improve
detection accuracy. Lunt [87] described a hybrid intrusion detection system, called NIDES,
which has an anomaly detection module and a rule-based misuse detection module. The two
detection modules work in parallel and independently to each other. Fan et al [23], on the other
hand, integrated misuse detection and anomaly detection in one module with an unified decision
making process. The integration of misuse detection and anomaly detection achieved a higher
detection rate and a lower false positive rate than each separate detection technique [23].
3.2.3.2 Efficiency
Building concise and simple detection models is a common approach to reduce both the model
construction cost and the cost of testing for intrusions. The construction of a normal database
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is very efficient in terms of training time and system resources because it requires only a single
pass through the training data [25, 26]. On the other hand, the construction of detection models
needs multiple passes through the training data using other modelling methods such as finite
state automata [68, 93], data mining [78, 79, 23], and hidden Markov models [102, 134]. However,
since these latter methods provide better detection accuracy, the balance between efficiency and
accuracy must be taken into account.
Reducing the required amount of training data for the construction of detection models is
also an effective approach. Lee et al [78] reported two data mining based methods for the
construction of the detection model, which require only 80% of the training data set used by
the normal database method [25, 26] for the same level of detection performance. Finite state
automata based approaches also reported a significant reduction in the required amount of
training data to build detection models [93, 117].
3.2.3.3 Adaptability
Unlike misuse detection, anomaly detection is capable of detecting novel/unknown intrusions
in its characteristics [26, 93]. However, due to the changes of the monitored object’s behaviour
over time, an anomaly intrusion detection system must support adaptive learning, in order to
maintain its detection accuracy. The detection rule base is continuously updated using inductive
learning from new training data, which keeps the detection model up-to-date [79]. This is one
of the most effective approaches to make a detection model that can adapt to the changes of the
object’s behaviour [74, 81, 83].
3.2.3.4 Extensibility
Applying hierarchical architectures has been commonly used to support customization and ex-
tension [79, 82, 100, 142]. In these systems high-level detection modules combine evidences from
multiple local detection modules, each of which is responsible for monitoring a set of specific
objects. The decision making process can be either centralized or distributed, depending on
the system design. However, distributed approaches achieve better extensibility [83, 142]. In
another approach, Paxson’s Bro [99] separates “mechanism from policy” to support customiza-
tion and extension. Nevertheless, the extension of a site’s security policy can only accommodate
signatures of known intrusions.
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3.2.4 Other issues of existing anomaly detection approaches
Apart from the main problems of existing anomaly detection approaches, as discussed in Section
3.1.2 and Section 3.1.3, such as excessive false alarms, lack of efficiency and lack of adaptability,
there are still other unsolved issues that also need to be taken into consideration. They are as
follows:
• There is not a good method for the selection of important parameters. In most anomaly
detection approaches, many critical parameters have been chosen manually or empirically
for each monitored object. For example, there is no formal method available to select
crucial parameters, such as: the length of short sequences in the construction of a normal
database [25, 26, 102, 134]; the number of states of hidden Markov models [102, 134]; and
most importantly, the detection threshold, which is used to determine whether the object’s
current activity is normal or anomalous.
• Detection models are built from noisy data. The assumption of many anomaly detection
approaches is that the input training data is clean and free from anomalies and intrusions.
However, this assumption does not always hold up in practice. Eskin [21] first built a
probability model from the original (noisy) training data, and then used the probability
model to process each original data element to find anomalies. When an anomaly was
found, it was removed from the original training data, and the probability model was
re-calculated. This training method [21] reportedly gives good results provided that the
amount of anomalies in the original training data is small, about 5%.
3.3 Summary
Unlike misuse detection, anomaly detection first constructs a model of normal behaviour of a
monitored object, and then uses that model to evaluate the object’s current behaviour to find
possible intrusions. User behaviour, network activity and program behaviour are the most com-
mon objects to be monitored in computer and network systems in anomaly intrusion detection.
Introduced by Forrest et al [25], short sequences of system calls produced by a program during
its execution have been extensively used in many program anomaly detection approaches. Forrest
et al’s [25] normal database method, which uses short sequences of system calls to represent the
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normal program behaviour, is simple and efficient to build. However, it produces a very low
level of anomaly signals, which is likely to lead to a low detection rate and high false positive
alarms.
Some program anomaly detection approaches, based on HMM modelling to characterize
normal program behaviour, reported a higher overall detection accuracy than those based on
other modelling methods such as normal database, data mining and frequency-based methods
[42, 102, 134]. However, these HMM-based anomaly detection approaches suffer a serious effi-
ciency problem because the HMM training costs are very high in terms of time and storage.
As discussed in Section 3.1.3, our major aims are to improve the detection accuracy, efficiency
and adaptability. In chapters 5 and 7, we incorporate HMM modelling of normal program
behaviour into a two-layer detection scheme and a fuzzy-based detection scheme to improve the
detection accuracy. Chapter 6 discusses our solutions to the HMM training efficiency problem.
In Chapter 8, we present the complete description of the proposed program anomaly detection
model which also provides a mechanism to support adaptability.
Chapter 4
Hidden Markov Models
As indicated in Section 3.1.3, we have chosen the hidden Markov model (HMM) as the main
modelling technique to characterize normal program behaviour. In this chapter, we give a brief
introduction to hidden Markov models, and the HMM three basic problems and their solutions.
These HMM problems and solutions will be extensively used in next chapters to construct and
test HMM-based detection models. The information presented in this chapter is based on Dugad
and Desai [19], Rabiner and Juang [103], and Rabiner [104].
4.1 Markov Models and Hidden Markov Models
Hidden Markov model (HMM) is an extension of the traditional Markov model [103, 104]. Unlike
a Markov model’s states that are observable, a hidden Markov model’s states are not observable
or hidden [104]. Only observations emitted from these hidden states can be observed [104].
4.1.1 Markov models
A traditional Markov process consists of a set ofN distinct states, {S1, S2, ..., SN} and transitions
among states. An example of a Markov process is shown in Figure 4.1, where the number of
states N = 3. In this Markov process, states are fully connected, and transitions are allowed
from one state, to any other states, and to itself. The transitions among states are determined
by the transition probability matrix, A = {aij}, i, j = 1, .., N . For a discrete, first-order and
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Figure 4.1: A Markov process with 3 states {S1, S2, S3}; All states are fully connected.
stationary Markov process, the state transition probabilities {aij} are defined as:
aij = P (qt = Sj , qt−1 = Si), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N
with the standard stochastic constraints:
aij ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N
N∑
j=1
aij = 1, i = 1, N
In a first-order Markov process, the next state is dependent only on the current state, whereas
in an n-order Markov process, the next state depends on previous n states. In a stationary
Markov process, the state transition probability distribution is independent of time. The basic
Markov process is called an observable Markov model because the output of the process is a
set of states at each instant of time, and each state corresponds to an observable event [104].
The restriction of Markov models, that a state is correspondent to one observable event, limits
their application to many real-world problems. Therefore, hidden Markov models have been
introduced to overcome the Markov models’ limitation. A hidden Markov model’s states are not
observable, and an observation is probabilistic function of a state.
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Figure 4.2: A 4-state HMM {S1, S2, S3, S4} with selected state transitions,
and emitted observations {O1, O2, O3, O4, O5}
4.1.2 Hidden Markov models and their notations
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a doubly embedded stochastic process with two hierarchy
levels. The upper level is a Markov process, in which the states are not observable. The lower
level consists of observations, each of which is a probabilistic function of an upper-level Markov
state. Different Markov states will have different observation functions. Figure 4.2 illustrates a
hidden Markov model with 4 states: {S1, S2, S3, S4}, some selected transitions, and observations:
{O1, O2, O3, O4, O5}, which are emitted from states.
HMM is a powerful data modelling tool [103, 104], and it has been widely used in biology
for protein sequence analysis [47, 58, 59, 69, 115], and in speech recognition to build signal
models [16, 28, 29, 30, 72, 104]. The application of hidden Markov models in anomaly intrusion
detection, to construct models of the normal behaviour of monitored objects, has also reported
promising results [42, 43, 102, 134].
Hidden Markov models can be classified roughly into two types based on the observation
density: discrete and continuous HMMs. For discrete HMMs, observations generated from
distinct states are finite in number, while for continuous HMMs observations are infinite and
continuous. As program behaviour can be described by finite states, and there is only a finite
number of system calls, we only consider discrete HMMs hereafter.
In order to represent the cross relations among hidden states that emit system calls, we select
ergodic hidden Makov models for our detection model, in which hidden states are fully connected
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and transitions are allowed from any state to any other states [104]. We define notations for our
hidden Markov models to be used throughout this chapter as follows:
N : Number of hidden states in the model.
M : Number of distinct observation symbols.
T : Length of observation sequence, that is the number of symbols observed.
S : Set of hidden states, S = {S1, S2, ..., SN}.
V : Set of possible observation symbols, V = {v1, v2, ..., vM}.
pi : Initial state distribution, pi = {pii}, where pii = P (q1 = Si), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is the probability
of being in state Si at t = 1.
A : State transition probability matrix, A = {aij}, where aij = P (qt+1 = Sj , qt = Si),
1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , is the probability of being in state Sj at time t + 1, given that the model
was in state Si at time t.
B : Observation probability distribution, B = {bj(k)}, where bj(k) = P (vk at t|qt = Sj),
1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤M , is the probability of observing symbol vk at time t, given that the
model is in state Sj .
Q : Sequence of hidden states, Q = {q1, q2, ..., qt, ..., qT }, where qt is the model’s state at
time t.
O : Sequence of observations, O = {O1, O2, ..., Ot, ..., OT }, where Ot, 1 ≤ t ≤ T , denotes
observation symbol observed at time t.
λ : Entire HMM model, λ = (A,B, pi) is used as compact notation to denote an HMM.
P (O|λ) : The probability of the occurrence of observation sequence O, given the HMM λ.
P (O,Q|λ) : The joint probability of the occurrence of the observation sequence O for the
state sequence Q, given the HMM λ.
HMM assumptions:
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• The first-order Markov assumption: The next state is dependent only upon the current
state.
aij = P (qt = Sj |qt−1 = Si) = P (qt = Sj |qt−1 = Si, qt−2 = Sk, ...) (4.1)
• The stationarity assumption: State transition probabilities are independent of the actual
time at which a transition takes place.
P (qt1 = Sj |qt1−1 = Si) = P (qt2 = Sj |qt2−1 = Si) (4.2)
Standard stochastic constraints to HMM parameters:
• Initial probability pi:
pii ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N (4.3)
N∑
i=1
pii = 1 (4.4)
• Transition probability matrix A:
aij ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N (4.5)
N∑
j=1
aij = 1, i = 1, N (4.6)
• Observation probability distribution B:
bj(k) ≥ 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤M (4.7)
M∑
k=1
bj(k) = 1, j = 1, N (4.8)
Basic conditional probability rules:
• Conditional probability:
P (A|B) = P (AB)
P (B)
(4.9)
• Joint probability:
P (A,B) = P (A|B)P (B) (4.10)
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• The Bayes’ rule:
P (A|B) = P (A)P (B|A)
P (B)
, P (B) > 0 (4.11)
• The Markov chain rule:
P (q1, q2, ..., qT ) = P (qT |q1, q2, ..., qT−1)P (q1, q2, ..., qT−1) (4.12)
= P (qT |, qT−1)P (q1, q2, ..., qT−1)
= P (qT |qT−1)P (qT−1|qT−2)P (q1, q2, ..., qT−2)
= P (qT |qT−1)P (qT−1|qT−2)...P (q2|q1)P (q1) (4.13)
4.2 The Three HMM Problems and Their Solutions
There are three basic problems for most HMM applications:
Problem 1 : Given the HMM λ = (A,B, pi), how to compute P (O|λ), the probability of
the occurrence of the observation sequence O = {O1, O2, ..., OT }.
Problem 2 : Given observation sequenceO = {O1, O2, ..., OT } and the HMM λ = (A,B, pi),
how to choose Q = {q1, q2, ..., qT }, a corresponding state sequence so that the joint prob-
ability P (O,Q|λ) is maximized.
Problem 3 : Given the observation sequence O, how to adjust the HMM model parameters
λ = (A,B, pi) so that P (O|λ) is maximized.
Problem 1 can be viewed as the evaluation problem in which the question is, given a model
and an observation sequence, how do we efficiently compute the probability that the observation
sequence was produced by the model. Problem 2 is a decoding problem in which we try to find
the optimal sequence of hidden states given a model and an observation sequence. Problem 3
is a learning problem where we attempt to find a model that best suits the input sequence of
observations. In the next section, we briefly discuss the solutions to Problems 1 and 3 as they
are used in our HMM-based intrusion detection model. Problem 2 is not discussed here because
it is not relevant to our HMM application.
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4.2.1 Solution to Problem 1: forward and backward procedures
HMM Problem 1 is to efficiently compute P (O|λ), the probability that the sequence of observa-
tions O was generated by the model λ. P (O|λ) may be computed directly as follows:
• Let Q = {q1, q2, ..., qT } be a state sequence, where q1 is the initial state.
• The joint probability of the observation sequence O for the state sequence Q is
P (O,Q|λ) =
T∏
t=1
P (Ot|qt, λ) (4.14)
= bq1(O1)bq2(O2)...bqT (OT ) (4.15)
with assumption that observations are independent.
• The probability of a state sequence Q is
P (Q|λ) = piq1aq1q2aq2q3 ...aqT−1qT (4.16)
• Then we have
P (O|λ) =
∑
Q
P (O,Q|λ)P (Q|λ) (4.17)
=
∑
Q
piq1bq1(O1)aq1q2bq2(O2)aq2q3 ...aqT−1qT bqT (OT ) (4.18)
The direct computation of P (O|λ), using the equation (4.18), involves in the order of
O(2NTT ) calculations that is computationally infeasible, even for small values of N and T
[104]. For example, for N = 5 (states), and T = 100 (observations), the number of compuations
is 2 ∗ 5100 ∗ 100 ≈ 1072 [104]. Therefore, a more efficient procedure to the Problem 1 is required;
such a procedure exists and is called forward-backward procedure. More precisely, we need only
the forward part of the forward-backward procedure to solve the Problem 1. However, we also
discuss the backward part here because it will be used to solve Problem 3.
Forward procedure to compute P (O|λ) [19, 104]:
• Define forward variable αt(i) as:
αt(i) = P (O1, O2, ..., Ot, qt = Si|λ) (4.19)
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• αt(i) is the probability of observing the partial sequence {O1, O2, ..., Ot} and the state i
at time t, given model λ. αt(i) can be computed inductively as follows:
1. Initialization:
α1(i) = piibi(O1), 1 ≤ i ≤ N (4.20)
2. Induction:
αt+1(j) =
[
N∑
i=1
αt(i)aij
]
bj(Ot+1), (4.21)
1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ N
3. Termination:
P (O|λ) =
N∑
i=1
αT (i) (4.22)
Backward procedure to compute P (O|λ) [19, 104]:
• Define backward variable βt(i) as:
βt(i) = P (Ot+1, Ot+2, ..., OT |qt = Si, λ) (4.23)
• βt(i) is the probability of observing the partial sequence {Ot+1, Ot+2, ..., OT } given the
state i at time t and the model λ. βt(i) can be computed inductively as follows:
1. Initialization:
βT (i) = 1 (4.24)
2. Induction:
βt(j) =
N∑
i=1
aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j), (4.25)
t = T − 1, T − 2, ..., 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ N
3. Termination:
P (O|λ) =
N∑
i=1
piibi(O1)β1 (4.26)
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The complexity of the forward and backward procedures is the order of O(N2T ) [104]. These
computation methods of P (O|λ) are much more efficient than the direct calculation in equation
(4.18). For example, when N = 5, and T = 100, we need about 3000 computations for the
forward method, compared to 1072 computations, which is required by the direct method. The
proof of the forward and backward procedures are not discussed in this thesis due to space
limitations. This information can be found in [19, 103, 104].
4.2.2 Solution to Problem 2: Viterbi algorithm
As stated at the beginning of Section 4.2, Problem 2 is not relevant to our work, and is not
discussed. Additional materials are available [19, 103, 104].
4.2.3 Solution to Problem 3: Baum-Welch algorithm
The Baum-Welch algorithm is an Expectation-Maximization (EM) iterative procedure, which is
used to estimate HMM parameters λ = (A,B, pi) to maximize the probability of the observation
sequence O. The following is a brief description of the Baum-Welch re-estimation procedure of
HMM parameters.
Preliminaries:
• Define ξt(i, j) be the probability of being in state i at time t and in state j at time t+ 1,
given observation sequence O = {O1, O2, ..., OT } and λ = (A,B, pi):
ξt(i, j) = P (qt = Si, qt+1 = Sj |O, λ) (4.27)
=
P (qt = Si, qt+1 = Sj , O|λ)
P (O|λ) (4.28)
• Considering the numerator of equation (4.28), we have:
P (qt = Si, qt+1 = Sj , O|λ) = P (qt = Si, O1, O2, ..., Ot, Ot+1, ..., OT , qt+1 = Sj |λ) (4.29)
= P (qt = Si, O1, O2, ..., Ot|λ)P (Ot+1, ..., OT , qt+1 = Sj |λ)
= αt(i)P (Ot+1, ..., OT , qt+1 = Sj |λ) (4.30)
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• Analyzing the second factor of equation (4.30), we get:
P (Ot+1, ..., OT , qt+1 = Sj |λ) = P (qt+1 = Sj , Ot+1|λ)P (Ot+1, ..., OT |qt+1 = Sj , λ) (4.31)
= P (qt+1 = Sj , Ot+1|λ)βt+1(j)
= aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j) (4.32)
• Combining (4.28), (4.30), and (4.32), we get:
ξt(i, j) =
αt(i)aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j)
P (O|λ) (4.33)
=
αt(i)aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j)
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
αt(i)aijbj(Ot+1)βt+1(j)
(4.34)
• Define γt(i) as the probability of being in state i at time t, given observation sequence
O = {O1, O2, ..., OT } and λ = (A,B, pi):
γt(i) = P (qt = Si|O, λ) (4.35)
=
P (qt = Si, O|λ)
P (O|λ)
=
αt(i)βt(i)
P (O|λ)
=
N∑
j=1
ξt(i, j) (4.36)
• By definition of ξt(i, j) and γt(i), we have:
T−1∑
t=1
γt(i) = Expected number of transitions from state i
T−1∑
t=1
ξt(i, j) = Expected number of transitions from state i to state j
Update rules of model parameters:
p¯ii = expected number of times in state i at time t = 1
p¯ii = γ1(i) (4.37)
a¯ij =
expected number of transitions from state i to state j
expected number of transitions from state i
a¯ij =
T−1∑
t=1
ξt(i, j)
T−1∑
t=1
γt(i)
(4.38)
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b¯j(k) =
expected number of times in state j and observed symbol vk
expected number of times in state j
b¯j(k) =
T∑
t=1
Ot=k
γt(i)
T∑
t=1
γt(i)
(4.39)
Baum-Welch algorithm training procedure:
1. Let initial model be λ0.
2. Estimate new model λ based on λ0 and observation sequence O using equations (4.37,
4.38, 4.39).
3. Compute P (O|λ0) and P (O|λ); If P (O|λ)− P (O|λ0) < ∆ go to step 5.
4. Else set λ0 ← λ, and go to step 2.
5. Stop.
where ∆ is the convergence threshold that the HMM training stops when P (O|λ) is stable.
Complexity of Baum-Welch algorithm:
For an HMM with N hidden states, M distinct observation symbols, and an observa-
tion sequence O of length T , the time and space complexities of Baum-Welch algorithm are
O(N(1 + T (M + N))) and O(N(N +M + TN)) respectively [77]. Since the length T of the
observation sequence is usually much larger than the number of states N , and the number of
distinct observation symbols M (T >> N, T >> M), we can consider the time and space
complexities of Baum-Welch algorithm are O(N2T ) [77, 104].
4.2.4 Scaling in probability computation and re-estimation of
HMM parameters
Scaling is a technique which is used in the implementation of the Baum-Welch re-estimation
of HMM parameters to prevent the value underflow problem. This is where the computation
values head to zero exponentially and are out of the precision range of numeric representation of
computers. For example, considering the definition of αt(i) of the equation (4.19) in the forward
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procedure to compute P (O|λ). It can be seen that αt(i) consists of the sum of a large number
of terms, each of which has the form(
t−1∏
s=1
aqsqs+1
t∏
s=1
bqs(Os)
)
(4.40)
with qt = Si. Since each term a and b is generally significant less than 1, it can be seen that
each term of αt(i) starts to head exponentially to zero as t starts to get big [104]. For our
HMM-based intrusion detection, t (the number of data items in the training set) is usually very
large. Therefore, incorporating a scaling procedure is necessary to compute αt(i) and P (O|λ).
Instead of computing P (O|λ), we compute log(P (O|λ)) in our implementation using forward
procedure with scaling. In this procedure, a scaling coefficient ct is used and it is computed as:
ct =
1
N∑
i=1
αt(i)
(4.41)
The forward procedure with scaling is describered as follows [104]:
1. Initialization:
αˆ1(i) = piibi(O1), 1 ≤ i ≤ N (4.42)
c1 =
1
N∑
i=1
αˆ1(i)
(4.43)
αˆ1(i)← c1αˆ1(i) (4.44)
2. Induction:
αˆt+1(j) =
[
N∑
i=1
αˆt(i)aij
]
bj(Ot+1), (4.45)
1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ N
ct+1 =
1
N∑
i=1
αˆt+1(i)
(4.46)
αˆt+1(i)← ct+1αˆt+1(i) (4.47)
3. Termination:
log(P (O|λ)) = −
T∑
t=1
log(ct) (4.48)
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4.3 Summary
Hidden Markov model is a doubly embedded stochastic process with two hierarchy levels includ-
ing the upper level of states and the lower level of observations. Unlike the observable states
of the traditional Markov model, the states of the upper level of the hidden Markov model are
not observable. Each observation of the lower level is a probabilistic function of an upper-level
Markov state. Due to the dual-level structure, hidden Markov models overcome the restriction
of Markov models, where a state is correspondent to one observable event.
There exist three basic problems for most HMM applications. However, we focused on
the solutions to HMM Problem 1, the evaluation problem and Problem 3, the training problem,
because they will be used extensively in our work. Although the convergence of the Baum-Welch
algorithm, the solution to HMM Problem 3, has been proven mathematically, the algorithm has
been found very expensive in terms of time and space. This makes the HMM-based anomaly
detection approaches less efficient for practical use. Our solution to the efficiency problem of
HMM training is presented in chapter 6.
Chapter 5
A Basic Detection Model Based on
HMM Modelling
In this chapter, a basic model, based on HMM modelling for program anomaly detection is
presented, which will be used as a starting point for our approach. First, the two-stage devel-
opment process of the basic model is given in Section 5.1. Then, a two-layer detection scheme
is proposed to further improve the detection performance of the basic model in Section 5.2.1.
5.1 The Proposed Basic Model for Program Anomaly Detection
Based on HMM Modelling
HMM modelling of normal program behaviour is the process of building a HMM model from
training data. The training data is the traces of system calls, which are collected in normal
runs of the program. In this section, we propose a basic model, in which HMM modelling is
used to characterize normal program behaviour, using traces of system calls. The collection
and pre-processing procedures of system call traces are also given. In addition, we present
some preliminary results of using HMM models to generate anomaly signals for abnormal traces
generated by some known intrusions.
5.1.1 Collecting system call data
Generally, application programs use system calls (also called API calls in some systems), or
software interrupts as the mechanism, to request services and resources from the underlying
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operating system. There are hundreds of system calls supported in present day operating sys-
tems. However, the number of distinct system calls used by a specific program is usually a small
portion of the supported system calls. In Unix and Linux systems, popular system calls are
close, execve, fork, kill, open, read, and write [135].
There have been several methods that can be used to collect traces of system calls produced
by a program during its execution [26, 93]. One can use Basic Security Modules (BSM) supported
in many Unix systems to get audit information of running programs. Another popular auditing
and debugging tool, strace, is freely available in almost all Linux systems, and it can also be used
to capture the program’s traces of system calls and related information. On the other hand, Sekar
et al integrated the operating system’s kernel autditing mechanism into their monitoring engine,
to capture system calls, as well as other related information, such as the program counter and
stack information when each system call was made [117]. In our work, we use strace to collect
system call data produced by programs running on RedHat Linux systems. In addition, we
use data traces of system calls of some common Unix programs from the “Computer Immune
Systems Project” at the University of New Mexico (UNM), USA [132] in our experiments.
5.1.1.1 Collecting system call data using strace
Strace is an open-source debugging tool which can trace system calls made by another process,
or program [4]. When attached to a running process, strace can capture traces of system calls
made by the process to the operating system kernel. In addition to the name and parameters
of each system call, other system call information, such as timestamp, return value, and elapsed
time are also available. Table 5.1 shows a sample of a raw trace of system calls of sendmail
process, which was captured by strace on a RedHat Linux 9.0 system. In addition, strace can
also follow and trace system calls of child processes, created by fork system calls, which are
issued by the parent process. This is important because server processes, such as sendmail
usually create child processes to handle new connections.
5.1.1.2 System call data from the UNM project
The system call data sets from the “Computer Immune Systems Project” at the University of
New Mexico consist of several traces of system calls of some common Unix server applications,
such as sendmail, FTP, named, inetd and lpr programs [132]. The procedures of generating
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Table 5.1: A sample of a raw trace of system calls produced by sendmail process,
captured by strace. Each line shows one system call, the first part is the timestamp,
followed by the system call name, parameters and return value, and the elapsed time.
11:57:38 rt_sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, [ALRM], [], 8) = 0 <0.000040>
11:57:38 time([1128563858]) = 1128563858 <0.000014>
11:57:38 open("/proc/loadavg", O_RDONLY) = 6 <0.000065>
11:57:38 fstat64(6, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0444, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 <0.000015>
11:57:38 read(6, "0.00 0.00 0.00 2/41 10368\n", 1024) = 26 <0.000024>
11:57:38 close(6) = 0 <0.000029>
11:57:38 time([1128563858]) = 1128563858 <0.000014>
11:57:38 rt_sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, [ALRM], [ALRM], 8) = 0 <0.000015>
11:57:38 select(4, [3], NULL, NULL, {5, 0}) = 0 (Timeout) <4.998346>
11:57:43 rt_sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, [ALRM], [], 8) = 0 <0.000040>
11:57:43 time([1128563863]) = 1128563863 <0.000013>
11:57:43 open("/proc/loadavg", O_RDONLY) = 6 <0.000063>
11:57:43 fstat64(6, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0444, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 <0.000015>
11:57:43 read(6, "0.00 0.00 0.00 2/41 10368\n", 1024) = 26 <0.000024>
11:57:43 close(6) = 0 <0.000028>
11:57:43 time([1128563863]) = 1128563863 <0.000014>
11:57:43 rt_sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, [ALRM], [ALRM], 8) = 0 <0.000014>
11:57:43 select(4, [3], NULL, NULL, {5, 0}) = 0 (Timeout) <4.998376>
11:57:48 rt_sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, [ALRM], [], 8) = 0 <0.000039>
11:57:48 time([1128563868]) = 1128563868 <0.000014>
11:57:48 open("/proc/loadavg", O_RDONLY) = 6 <0.000063>
11:57:48 fstat64(6, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0444, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 <0.000015>
11:57:48 read(6, "0.00 0.00 0.00 2/41 10368\n", 1024) = 26 <0.000025>
11:57:48 close(6) = 0 <0.000029>
11:57:48 time([1128563868]) = 1128563868 <0.000014>
11:57:48 rt_sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, [ALRM], [ALRM], 8) = 0 <0.000015>
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Table 5.2: A sample of a sendmail trace of system calls from the “Computer
Immune Systems Project” of University of New Mexico [132]. Each pair of
values in first two lines of this table forms a record in system call trace files.
Process identification (PID) 8840 8840 8840 ... 8844 8844
System call number 4 2 66 ... 19 105
Corresponding system call write fork sstk ... lseek sigvec
and collecting these traces are described in [25, 26]. Each trace is a list of system calls produced
by a program’s running processes (including parent and child processes) during its execution.
The first two lines of Table 5.2 shows the sample of a trace file, in which each line is a pair of
the process identification (PID) and the system call number. The mapping between system call
numbers and actual system call names is provided in a separate file. For example, in the system
call mapping file “calls.txt.sun” [132], number 4 is corresponding to the system call “write”,
number 2 represents system call “fork”, and number 19 is “lseek”.
For each program, the collected system call data usually consist of two types of data traces:
(i) normal traces - traces collected during the program’s normal working condition, which are
used to construct the detection model in the training stage, and (ii) abnormal traces - traces
come from the program’s abnormal runs that were produced by real intrusions, or generated by
intrusion tools for some known intrusions, which are used in the model’s testing stage.
The normal traces of system calls in UMN project were collected in two environments:
(i) synthetic environment and (ii) live environment. In synthetic environment, a program’s
normal traces of system calls were collected from its execution in simulated conditions which
were specifically designed to capture the program’s behaviour in a number of scenarios. In live
environment, on the other hand, normal traces of system calls were collected directly from the
program’s runs in real and normal working conditions (without anomalies and intrusions).
5.1.2 The proposed basic detection model using HMM modelling
Figure 5.1 shows the two stages of the proposed basic detection model using HMM modelling:
(i) building a HMM model from the traces of system calls and (ii) testing input traces of system
calls for possible intrusions, using the built HMM model. In HMM building stage, the raw traces
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Figure 5.1: The proposed basic detection model using HMM modelling:
HMM building and HMM testing
of system calls are processed and transformed to HMM observation sequences which are then
used to train the HMM model. In HMM testing stage, a similar pre-processing procedure is
applied to the raw traces of system calls in order to get the HMM test data, and then the HMM
model is used to evaluate each short sequence of system calls for possible intrusions.
5.1.2.1 Pre-processing raw traces of system calls
Raw traces of system calls collected by process auditing tools, such as strace, must be processed
and transformed into HMM observation sequences, before they can be used in the HMM model
construction stage and the testing stage. First, we extract only plain system calls (system calls
without parameters and other related information) from raw traces, and then traces of plain
system calls are transformed into HMM observation sequences, using HMM notations defined
in Section 4.1.2. For data sets from [132], the transformation of traces of system calls to HMM
observation sequences can be applied directly, because the pre-processing of raw system calls
has already been done.
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In the transformation from system calls to HMM symbols, the first step is to determine
the number of distinct HMM symbols M and the set of possible HMM observation symbols,
V = {v1, v2, ..., vM}. Since we consider each system call in raw traces correspoding to one
symbol in HMM observation sequences, the number of distinct HMM symbols M can be chosen
as the number of system calls supported by the operating system and the HMM symbol set can
be the full set of system calls supported by the operating system. However, as the actual number
of distinct system calls used by a program, is usually a portion of the full set of supported system
calls, it is more practical to select M as the actual number of distinct system calls used, and V
as the set of actual system calls used. This selection leads to a smaller number of distinct HMM
symbols, which helps reduce the complexity of HMM training as well as testing for intrusions.
5.1.2.2 HMM training using traces of system calls
The purpose of HMM training is to estimate HMM parameters λ(A,B, pi) from training data
which are traces of system calls in this case. After the number of distinct HMM symbols M
is chosen, the next step in HMM training is to select the number of HMM hidden states N .
It is suggested that number of hidden states N can be chosen based on the number of unique
system calls used by the program [134]. In our HMM training, we choose the number of hidden
states N also equal to the number of unique system calls used by the program. For example,
we select N = M = 35 for an HMM model for inetd program, using data sets collected in live
environment1 [132], because inetd only actually used 35 unique system calls in its normal traces.
Generally, an HMM model can be trained from the training data of observation sequences,
using the traditional Baum-Welch algorithm [19, 104], as discussed in Section 4.2. The Baum-
Welch algorithm requires several passes through the training data to infer the destination model.
As a special case of Expectation - Maximization (EM) algorithms, the Baum-Welch HMM train-
ing scheme consists of two steps at each pass through the training data: (i) E-step - values of the
probability auxiliary function over the whole set of training data are computed, and (ii) M-step
- update of HMM parameters λ(A,B, pi), using the values computed in E-step. HMM training
using Baum-Welch algorithm can be seen as batch training, because the full set of training data
is required in E-step.
However, HMM training using Baum-Welch algorithm was found very expensive in terms
1Also called real working environment.
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of time and storage, especially for large-size HMM models and long observation sequences [77,
104, 134], although its convergence has been proven. The high cost of HMM training is likely to
limit the HMM application in anomaly intrusion detection. In order to reduce the requirement
of system resources and to speed up HMM training, we introduce an efficient HMM incremental
training scheme with optimal initialization, which is discussed in details in Section 6.1.
5.1.2.3 Testing traces of system calls and measuring anomaly signals
In testing stage, the constructed HMM model is used to evaluate test traces of system calls to
find possible intrusions. This task can be done using a number of ways. A standard way is to
compute the probability that the HMMmodel generates a test trace. If the HMMmodel is a good
model of normal program behaviour, normal traces should require only likely probabilities, while
intrusive traces should require unlikely probabilities [134]. However, this method is sensitive to
the length of the test trace. In another approach, Warrender et al considered the HMM model as
a non-deterministic finite automaton, and tracked the state transition and symbol probabilities
required to produce each system call in the test trace [134]. In our approach, we use the HMM
model to classify fixed-length short sequences of system calls, which are formed from the test
trace. In addition, we measure anomaly signals, based on temporally local regions of these short
sequences. To start with, first, we empirically choose parameters for the testing stage:
• Short sequence is a sequence of consecutive system calls in the test trace. Short sequences
have a pre-selected length of k system calls.
• Region is a series of non-overlapped consecutive short sequences in the test trace. Regions
have a pre-selected length of r short sequences.
• Short sequence probability threshold Pˆ is the minimum probability that the HMM model
produces a normal short sequence. The threshold Pˆ is used to determine if a short sequence
is normal or abnormal. If a short sequence probability, P ≥ Pˆ , it is considered normal,
otherwise it is abnormal.
• Region score threshold Aˆ
A region’s anomaly score A is calculated as:
A =
number of abnormal short sequences in the region c
length of region r
(5.1)
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Region score threshold Aˆ is the minimum value of the anomaly score A, that indicates
alarm status.
Next, we form test short sequences by sliding a window of k system calls, through the test
trace, one system call at a time, and recording system calls within the sliding window as one short
sequence at each move. During this process, we form one test region from every r consecutive
short sequences. Non-overlapped regions are selected because a single abnormal short sequence
may generate anomalies in many overlapping regions. The procedure for classifying each short
sequence of system calls and measuring anomaly signal for a test region is as follows:
Input : HMM model λ(A,B, pi), and a test region of r consecutive short sequences of system
calls, O(R) = {O(1), O(2), ..., O(l), ..., O(r)}. Each short sequence has k system calls.
Ouput : Status of a test region (normal or alarm). A region with alarm status can be used
to trigger an intrusion alarm.
1. Reset the abnormal region counter, c← 0.
2. For each consecutive short sequence O(l) in the test region, 1 ≤ l ≤ r:
(a) Compute the observation probability P = P (O(l)|λ) that the HMMmodel λ generates
the short sequence O(l).
(b) Compare probability P against the probability threshold Pˆ ;
If P < Pˆ , increase the abnormal region counter, c← c+ 1.
3. Compute the anomaly score for the region, A =
c
r
.
4. Compare the region anomaly score A against the region score threshold Aˆ;
If A ≥ Aˆ, set the region status to alarm; otherwise set the region status to normal.
Because the anomaly score is computed based on fixed-length temporal regions, this testing
method is independent of the length of the test trace, and therefore it is suitable for online
detection.
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5.1.3 Experimental results
In order to evaluate the capability of HMM modelling of normal program behaviour in the basic
detection model, we construct an HMM model for sendmail program and another HMM model
for inetd program from their normal traces of system calls, and then use these HMM models to
generate anomaly signals for their test traces.
5.1.3.1 Data sets
We use the system call traces of sendmail and inetd programs, which were collected in a live
environment (also called real working environment), as given in [132] for this experiment. The
data sets include:
• Normal traces are traces collected during the program’s normal activities. These traces
are used to construct HMM models.
– The sendmail data include system call traces of sendmail daemon process and its
child processes. There are 13,726 data traces with the total of 15,631,952 system
calls.
– The inetd data include a single trace with 541 system calls.
• Abnormal traces are traces that come from a program’s abnormal runs produced by known
intrusions. Abnormal traces include:
– 105 traces generated by a denial-of-service attack (DoS) on sendmail program.
– 1 trace generated by a DoS attack on inetd program.
5.1.3.2 Results
In the HMM building stage, the first task is to select the HMM size. As discussed in Section
5.1.2, the number of hidden states N and the number of distinct symbols M are chosen as the
number of distinct system calls used in the program’s normal traces. For this sendmail data set,
we use the first 1,000,000 system calls of its normal traces to construct an HMM model with
N = M = 23. For the inetd data set, we use the only available normal trace to construct an
HMM model with N =M = 35.
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Figure 5.2: Anomaly signal (Log(P)) generated by inetd HMM model for an inetd DoS attack
trace. Length of short sequences k = 20 system calls.
In the HMM testing stage, we compute log(P) for each fixed-length short sequence of system
calls in test traces, where P is the probabilty that the HMM model produces a short sequence.
log(P) is considered as the anomaly signal, that the model generates for the test traces. Normal
short sequences should be generated by the HMM model with likely probabilites, while abnormal
short sequences should be generated with unlikely probabilites.
Figure 5.2 shows the anomaly signal in the form of log(P), generated by the inetd HMM
model for the test trace of system calls of a DoS attack on inetd. The test trace consists of
400 short sequences which are created using the sliding window method with length of k = 20
system calls. It can be seen that, the inetd model generates high probabilities (log(P ) ≥ −40.0)
for short sequences from number 35 to the end of the trace, although there are some periodic
irregularities. These short sequences are considered normal. On the other hand, short sequences
from number 13 to 34 associated with unusual low probabilities (log(P ) < −60.0) are considered
abnormal. The discovery of these consecutive abnormal short sequences clearly indicates that
the occurrence of DoS intrusion on inetd is detected. After the DoS attack period, the periodic
pattern of log(P ) of short sequences from number 35 to the end of the trace represents the
normal or recovered pattern of the system calls generated by repeated normal activities of the
inetd program.
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Figure 5.3: Anomaly signal (Log(P)) generated by sendmail HMM model for sendmail DoS
attack traces. Length of short sequences k = 20 system calls.
Similarly, Figure 5.3 shows the log(P) anomaly signal generated by the sendmail HMMmodel
for traces of system calls of a DoS attack on sendmail. 10,000 short sequences are formed from
the sendmail test traces using the same method with the same sequence length, as those used
in inetd test. It is noted that the sendmail model produces high probabilities (log(P ) ≥ −30.0)
for short sequences from number 2278 to 8758. These sequences are considered normal. Mixed
levels of high and low probabilities can be seen in two large groups of short sequences, from
number 1 to 2277 and from 8759 to the end of test traces. However, the high density of short
sequences that are associated with unlikely probabilities (log(P ) < −45.0) indicates that the
occurrence of DoS intrusion on sendmail is detected.
5.2 An Enhancement of the Basic Model: A Two-layer
Detection Scheme
In Section 5.1.3, we conducted a simple experiment on the basic detection model, in which HMM
models were used to generate anomaly signals for two abnormal traces of sendmail and inetd
programs. Due to the limitation of the incomplete training data, the basic detection model
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Figure 5.4: Two-layer detection scheme: evaluation of short
sequences for anomalies and possible intrusions.
with a single HMM-based detection engine may still produce considerable false alarms. In this
section, we propose a two-layer detection scheme which is an extension to the basic detection
model. The two-layer detection scheme aims at reducing false positive alarms. In this detection
scheme, a normal database [25] and an HMM model, are used to form a double-layer test to
evaluate short sequences of system calls, to find anomalies and possible intrusions.
5.2.1 The proposed two-layer detection scheme
Figure 5.4 shows our two-layer detection scheme for the evaluation of short sequences of system
calls of test traces for possible intrusions. The two-layer detection scheme is based on the basic
detection model, discussed in Section 5.1 and the normal database model [25, 26]. The detection
scheme is built as follows:
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1. Building a normal database and an HMM model from training data:
(a) Normal database: The normal database is an ordered list of all unique short sequences
of system calls found in training data. The database is created from the training data
of normal traces of system calls using the method given in [25, 26]. All short sequences
in the normal database have the same number of system calls k, and k is used as the
short sequence length. In addition, the frequency of each short sequence, that is
the number of occurrences of that sequence in training data, is also recorded in the
normal database.
(b) HMM model: The HMM model is trained from normal traces of system calls, using
HMM batch training, based on the Baum-Welch algorithm, as discussed in Section
4.2.3.
2. Detecting anomalies: First, test short sequences are formed from test traces of system
calls, using the sliding window method. The length of each short sequence is k system
calls, and is equal to the length of short sequences in the normal database. Then each
short sequence is evaluated using the following procedure:
(a) Test against the normal database: This test is applied for all short sequences of system
calls in the test traces and is used to find mismatched and rare short sequences.
(b) Test against the HMM model: This test is only used to verify short sequences which
were classified as mismatched and rare by the normal database. For each mismatched,
or rare short sequence, we compute the probability P of the HMM model producing
the short sequence. If P < Pˆ , where Pˆ is the sequence probability threshold, the
short sequence is considered abnormal. Otherwise, it is normal, even though it is not
found in the normal database.
5.2.2 Experimental results
In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed two-layer detection scheme, we conducted
experiments to measure the false positive rate and the detection rate of the proposed two-layer
detection scheme, and compared the results to those of the normal database scheme, as given
in [25].
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5.2.2.1 Data sets
We use sendmail traces of system calls collected in a synthetic environment1, as given in [132].
The format of system call traces and the data collection procedures were discussed in Section
5.1.1. The data sets consist of the following:
1. Normal traces that are collected during the program’s normal activity. Normal traces of
sendmail program include 2 traces with the total of 1,595,612 system calls.
2. Abnormal traces that include known intrusions. The sendmail abnormal traces consist of
1 trace of sm5x, 1 trace of sm565a, 2 traces of syslog-local, and 2 traces of syslog-remote
intrusions.
5.2.2.2 Experimental design
In order to measure the detection rate and the false alarm rate of our two-layer scheme, as
opposed to the normal database scheme [25], our experiments were designed as follows:
1. Measurement of the false positive rate: In this test, we use the proposed detection
scheme to evaluate normal traces of system calls which are not used in the construction
of the normal database and the HMM model. Since the normal traces do not contain any
intrusions, any reported alarms are considered false positive alarms. This experiment was
set up as follows:
(a) Select first 1,000,000 system calls of sendmail normal traces as the full training set.
(b) Form 4 training sets which account for 30%, 50%, 80% and 100% of the size of the
full training set.
(c) Construct normal databases and HMM models from these training sets. The chosen
values for the length of short sequences are k = 5, 11, and 15 system calls.
(d) Select three test traces, each trace of 50,000 system calls from sendmail normal traces,
which are not used in the training process to test for false positive alarms of our
scheme and the normal database scheme [25]. Reported abnormal short sequences
are counted for each test trace.
1A type of artificial or simulated environment created to test programs. Detailed description of synthetic
environments is given in [26].
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Table 5.3: Testing parameters: length of short sequences and probability threshold.
The test set consists of 3 traces, each of which has 50,000 system calls.
Length of
short
sequence k
Number of
short sequences in
each test trace (*)
Total number of
short sequences
in test set
Log probability
threshold of short
sequence log(Pˆ )
5 49,996 149,988 -30.0
11 49,990 149,970 -40.0
15 49,986 149,958 -55.0
(*) Short sequences are formed by sliding a window of k system calls, one system call at a
time, through the test trace of 50,000 system calls, and recording system calls within the
sliding window as one short sequence at each move.
2. Measurement of anomaly signals and the detection rate: In this test, we use the
proposed detection scheme to evaluate abnormal traces to find possible intrusions. Since
the abnormal traces have been collected from the program’s abnormal runs generated by
known intrusions, reported alarms in this case can be considered true alarms, or detected
intrusions. This experiment was implemented as follows:
(a) Construct a normal database and a HMM model from sendmail normal traces of
system calls. We choose length of short sequences k = 11 to build the normal database
from normal traces, and to form test short sequences from abnormal traces.
(b) Use the proposed two-layer detection scheme to evaluate abnormal traces to find
abnormal sequences.
(c) Use temporally local regions to group individual abnormal sequences to measure the
anomaly signals, as discussed in Section 5.1.2. The selected region length is r = 20.
(d) Short sequence probability threshold Pˆ (or log(Pˆ )) and the region score threshold Aˆ
are pre-selected.
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Table 5.4: Overall false positive alarms produced by the normal database scheme [25] and by
the proposed two-layer detection scheme, with the short sequence length, k = 5, 11 and 15.
Training
data sets
(% of full
data set)
Normal database scheme [25] Two-layer scheme
Reported number
of abnormal
short sequences
False
positive
rate (%)
Reported number
of abnormal
short sequences
False
positive
rate (%)
Sequence length, k = 5; 3 test traces with the total of 149,988 sequences
30% 196 0.131 168 0.112
50% 149 0.099 118 0.079
80% 141 0.094 104 0.069
100% 141 0.094 104 0.069
Sequence length, k = 11; 3 test traces with the total of 149,970 sequences
30% 291 0.194 255 0.170
50% 232 0.155 173 0.115
80% 225 0.150 160 0.107
100% 221 0.147 160 0.107
Sequence length, k = 15; 3 test traces with the total of 149,958 sequences
30% 338 0.225 246 0.164
50% 264 0.176 182 0.121
80% 261 0.174 174 0.116
100% 257 0.171 174 0.116
5.2.2.3 Results
False positive alarms
Table 5.4 shows the total number of abnormal short sequences in three test traces with total of
150,000 system calls (each trace consists of 50,000 system calls), reported by the normal database
scheme [25] and by the proposed two-layer scheme on different training sets, with short sequence
length k = 5, k = 11 and k = 15. The overall false positive rate is calculated as the ratio of
the total number of reported abnormal short sequences to the total number of short sequences
in the three test traces. The total number of short sequences in each test trace is dependent on
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Figure 5.5: The relationship between the size of training sets
and the false positive rate with k = 11
Figure 5.6: The relationship between the size of training sets
and the false positive rate with k = 15
the short sequence length and is given in Table 5.3.
It is seen from Table 5.4 that the proposed two-layer scheme has lower false positive rate
than the normal database scheme on all tested training sets and values of short sequence length.
For example, on the training set of 80% of the full set, with k = 15, the false positive rate of the
normal database scheme is 0.174%, while the false positive rate of our scheme is 0.116%. This
is about 33.33% lower in the false positive rates.
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Figures 5.5 and 5.6 describe the dependence of the false positive rate on the size of the
training sets, with the short sequence length k = 11 and k = 15 respectively. When the
size of the training set increases the false positive rate of both methods decreases significantly,
especially from the training set of 30% of the full set, to the training set of 50% of the full
set. For example, with k = 11, the false positive rates of our two-layer scheme are 0.170% and
0.115% on the training sets of 30% and 50% of the full set, respectively. This is a reduction of
about 32.35%.
Anomaly signals and the detection rate
Table 5.5 presents a summary of the detection results, produced by the normal database scheme
[25] and by the proposed two-layer scheme for some abnormal traces embedded with known
intrusions. The detection performance results of the normal database scheme are extracted from
Table 3, given in [25]. In [25], the anomaly signal is represented by the number of abnormal
(mismatched) short sequences detected in the test trace, or by the equivalent percentage which
is calculated as the ratio of the number of abnormal short sequences to the total number of short
sequences of the test trace.
On the other hand, we measure the strength of anomaly signals, based on temporally local
regions. The anomaly score A of a region is computed as the ratio of the number of abnormal
short sequences detected in the region to the region length r, as given in equation (5.1). The
average of anomaly scores is computed over abnormal regions which have the anomaly score A,
with A ≥ Aˆ, where Aˆ is the region score threshold, and Aˆ = 40.0%.
It can be seen from Table 5.5 that the proposed two-layer scheme produced significantly
better detection results than the normal database scheme [25] for all tested abnormal traces.
For sm565a intrusion trace, the normal database scheme detected only 0.6% abnormal seq-
uences, while the proposed scheme detected 38.46% abnormal regions. Similarly, the normal
database scheme almost missed the “syslog-local” intrusion in the syslog-local No2 trace, with
only 1.7% abnormal sequences detected, while our scheme clearly detected the intrusion with
16.67% abnormal regions detected.
Furthermore, our two-layer detection scheme also generated strong anomaly signals on av-
erage. This indicates that the generated anomaly score of each abnormal region is high. The
average of anomaly scores generated by the proposed detection scheme is ranging from 60.42%
for sm5x trace to 74.74% for syslog-remote-2 trace. Figures 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12
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Table 5.5: Detection results produced by the normal database scheme and by the two-
layer scheme for some abnormal traces with the short sequence length k = 11, region
length r = 20 and the score threshold of abnormal regions, Aˆ = 40.0%.
Name
of test
abnormal
traces
Normal database
scheme: % detected
abnormal sequences
[25] (#)
Two-layer scheme
% detected
abnormal
regions (*)
Average of scores
of abnormal
regions (%) (!)
sm565a 0.60 38.46 68.00
sm5x 2.70 31.58 60.42
syslog-local No1 5.10 12.00 73.33
syslog-local No2 1.70 16.67 71.54
syslog-remote No1 4.00 28.26 72.31
syslog-remote No2 5.30 24.68 74.74
(#) Results produced by the normal database model are extracted from Table 3 of [25].
(*) The percentage of the number of detected abnormal regions out of the total number
of regions of the test trace.
(!) The average of anomaly scores is computed over abnormal regions, those with A ≥ Aˆ.
show the anomaly signals produced by our proposed two-layer scheme for abnormal traces of
s5mx, sm565a, syslog-local No1, syslog-local No2, syslog-remote No1 and syslog-remote No2,
respectively, at the short sequence length k = 11. It is noted that we compute the anomaly
score based on temporally local regions, as discussed in Section 5.1.2.3. It can be seen from
these figures that all embedded intrusions can be detected correctly at a region score threshold
Aˆ = 0.40 for all tested traces.
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Figure 5.7: Anomaly signal generated for sm565a abnormal trace by the proposed
two-layer detection scheme with short sequence length k = 11, region length r = 20.
Figure 5.8: Anomaly signal generated for s5mx abnormal trace by the proposed
two-layer detection scheme with short sequence length k = 11, region length r = 20.
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Figure 5.9: Anomaly signal generated for syslog-local abnormal trace No. 1 by
the proposed two-layer detection scheme with short sequence length k = 11, region
length r = 20.
Figure 5.10: Anomaly signal generated for syslog-local abnormal trace No. 2 by
the proposed two-layer detection scheme with short sequence length k = 11, region
length r = 20.
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Figure 5.11: Anomaly signal generated for syslog-remote abnormal trace No. 1 by the
proposed two-layer detection scheme with short sequence length k = 11, region length
r = 20.
Figure 5.12: Anomaly signal generated for syslog-remote abnormal trace No. 2 by the
proposed two-layer detection scheme with short sequence length k = 11, region length
r = 20.
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5.3 Summary
In this chapter, a basic anomaly detection model which is based on HMM modelling, using
program system calls was presented. The model is developed in two stages: the building stage
and the testing stage. In the building stage, an HMM model is constructed from training data
to characterize normal program behaviour. In testing stage, the HMM model is used to evaluate
short sequences of system calls to find possible intrusions. Also in testing stage, a scheme was
given to measure the anomaly signal, which is based on the temporally local regions to group
individual abnormal sequences. The collection and pre-processing procedures of traces of system
calls were also given. The preliminary results showed that HMM-based basic detection model
was able to generate strong and clear anomaly signals for two tested abnormal traces of system
calls of sendmail and inetd programs. A strong anomaly signal helps the HMM-based detection
correctly recognize the program’s abnormal behaviour.
The proposed two-layer detection scheme which is an extension of the basic detection model
produced substantially better overall detection results than the normal database scheme [25].
Our experimental results showed that the two-layer detection scheme correctly detected all
intrusions embedded in the test traces for sendmail program. It also produced about 28% fewer
false positive alarms than the normal database scheme (refers to Table 5.4 (page 105), for the
case of k = 11 on the data sets of 50%, 80% and 100% of full data set). Futhermore, the proposed
two-layer detection scheme generated stronger anomaly signals than the normal database scheme
for several intrusion traces, as presented in Table 5.5 (page 108).
Since the basic detection model uses the traditional HMM batch training to train its HMM
model, the model training cost is high, as discussed in Section 5.1.2.2. In Chapter 6, an efficient
HMM training scheme is proposed to solve the HMM batch training efficiency problem.
Chapter 6
HMM Training for Program
Anomaly Detection
As discussed in Section 5.1, existing HMM-based anomaly detection approaches suffer a serious
efficiency problem, because the HMM batch training using the Baum-Welch algorithm is very
expensive. In this chapter, an HMM incremental training scheme with optimal initialization to
address the efficiency problem of HMM training is presented. The proposed HMM incremental
training scheme aims at reducing training time, as well as storage demands.
6.1 HMM Training for Anomaly Detection
We propose an efficient HMM incremental training scheme as the solution to the efficiency
problem of the traditional HMM batch training. The proposed HMM incremental training
scheme consists two components: (i) an optimal initialization method for HMM parameters,
and (ii) an HMM incremental training scheme. The optimal initialization method attempts to
find optimal initial values for HMM parameters, which help to speed up the HMM training
convergence. On the other hand, the HMM incremental training scheme focuses on reducing
training time and storage demands by incrementally updating the HMM model, using one subset
of the complete training data set at a time.
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6.1.1 Optimal initialization of HMM parameters for HMM training
In HMM training process, the HMM parameters λ(A,B, pi) are adjusted so as to maximize
the probability of the observation sequence O, P (O|λ). Initialization is the first step in HMM
training process, in which HMM parameters λ(A,B, pi) are assigned to pre-selected initial values.
In theory, the values of HMM parameters in HMM training process should converge to a local
maximum of likelihood function [104]. Choosing the initial values for HMM parameters, so
that the local maximum is the global maximum of the likelihood function, is a crucial question.
Unfortunately, there is no simple or straightforward answer for this question [104].
6.1.1.1 Random initialization
In random initialization, randomly generated values are used as the initial values for HMM
parameters in HMM training. The random initialization can be described in the following
simple algorithm:
1. Assign randomly generated values to HMM parameters, A,B, and pi.
pii ← rand(), 1 ≤ i ≤ N (6.1)
aij ← rand(), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N (6.2)
bj(k)← rand(), 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤M (6.3)
where N is the number of HMM states, M is the number of HMM distinct observation
symbols, and rand() is a function that returns a random value between 0 and 1.
2. Normalize A,B, and pi, based on the stochastic constraints to HMM parameters, as given
in Equations (4.4), (4.6) and (4.8).
Generally, random initialization is simple and it can be used to obtain useful re-estimates
of HMM parameters in some cases [104]. However, since random generated values are used as
initial values for HMM parameters, the HMM training convergence is usually slow. This leads
to longer training time. Therefore, there is a need to find more suitable initialization methods
which can improve HMM training convergence.
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6.1.1.2 The proposed optimal initialization method
In order to find optimal initial values for HMM parameters, we propose to compute prior prob-
abilities C = {cij}, i = 1, N ; j = 1, N , where N is the number of hidden states, and use these
values to initialize HMM training parameters. The prior probabilities are defined as the oc-
currence frequencies of two consecutive observation symbols in the input observation sequence.
To compute prior probabilities, we count the number of occurrences of each pair of consecutive
symbols (Ot, Ot+1), t = 1...T −1 in input sequence O. After normalization, prior probabilities C
are used to initialize the HMM parameters in the training process. We use C as the initial val-
ues for HMM parameters A and B since C is relatively close to these parameters in probability
terms, referring to the definition of A and B in section 4.1.2.
The prior probabilities are computed using the following simple algorithm:
Input : Observation sequence O = {Ot}, t = 1, T . Also noted that, we selected the number of
hidden states equal to the number of distinct observation symbols, or N =M as discussed
in Section 5.1.2.2, page 95.
Output : The matrix of prior probabilities C = {cij}, i = 1, N ; j = 1, N .
1. Set cij = 0; i = 1, N, j = 1, N
2. For each pair of consecutive observations Ot and Ot+1 in sequence O, t = 1, T − 1:
(a) Find the corresponding element of C, cij : i← Ot, j ← Ot+1.
(b) Increase counter cij by 1: cij ← cij + 1.
3. Normalize the C matrix based on the transition probability distribution constraints defined
in equation (4.6).
HMM training can then be performed with two types of initializations:
1. Random initialization: assign initial values to all HMM parameters λ(A,B, pi) randomly.
Random initialization is a common initialization method in HMM training using the Baum-
Welch algorithm. The random initialization is implemented based on equations (6.1), (6.2)
and (6.3).
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2. Mixed initialization: assign the combination of prior probabilities and random values to
HMM parameters λ(A,B, pi) as intitial values. The prior probabilities are computed from
the input observation sequence using the algorithm discribed above. We form three ini-
tialization options using prior probabilities:
(a) Init A: assign prior probabilities to A as initial values, and random values to B and
pi as initial values. Specifically, A, B and pi are initilized as:
pii ← rand(), 1 ≤ i ≤ N (6.4)
aij ← cij , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N (6.5)
bj(k)← rand(), 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤M, (M = N) (6.6)
(b) Init B: assign prior probabilities to B as initial values, and random values to A and
pi as initial values. Specifically, A, B and pi are initilized as:
pii ← rand(), 1 ≤ i ≤ N (6.7)
aij ← rand(), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N (6.8)
bj(k)← cij , 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤M, (M = N) (6.9)
(c) Init A&B: assign prior probabilities to matrix A and the observation probability
matrix B as initial values, and random values to pi as initial values. Specifically, A,
B and pi are initilized as:
pii ← rand(), 1 ≤ i ≤ N (6.10)
aij ← cij , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N (6.11)
bj(k)← cij , 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ k ≤M, (M = N) (6.12)
6.1.2 HMM incremental training
Traditional HMM batch training, based on Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithms, such
as the Baum-Welch algorithm, updates HMM parameters using the full training data set at
each iteration. Although the convergence of EM algorithms have been proven mathemetically,
a large number of iterations is required to learn an useful model [36, 37]. This likely leads to
long training time, especially for large-size models and long observation sequences. On the other
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hand, incremental HMM training algorithms first split the full training data set into smaller
subsets, and then incrementally update model parameters using one subset at a time, until
convergence. It is suggested that incremental training algorithms converge faster than their EM
batch counterparts [37, 95].
6.1.2.1 Existing HMM incremental training schemes
Gotoh et al [36, 37] proposed two HMM training schemes using incremental Maximum Like-
lihood (ML) and Maximum a Posterior (MAP) estimation algorithms for speech recognition.
Their HMM incremental training algorithms reportedly converge significantly faster than the
traditional HMM batch training. However, their algorithms only hold when the subsets of train-
ing data are independent. In our training data set, system calls are in interactive relations to
form program functionality, and therefore the assumption of independent data subsets does not
hold.
On the other hand, Davis et al [16] proposed a simple method to learn HMM models from a
training set of multiple observation sequences. In this approach, first each observation sequence
of the training set is used to learn one corresponding HMM model which we call an HMM sub-
model. The learning of HMM sub-models are independent from each other and can be done in
parallel. Then, when the learning of all HMM sub-models is complete, all HMM sub-models
are merged together based on their weights to produce the final HMM model. The proposed
method reportedly gives better recognition performance than the HMM batch training from
multiple observation sequences, as described in [104].
6.1.2.2 The proposed HMM incremental training scheme
In our approach, we improve Davis et al’s [16] training method to make it incremental. Our
proposed HMM training scheme first divides a long training data set into a number of data
subsets. Next, each data subset is used to train one HMM sub-model, and then the sub-model
is incrementally merged into the final HMM model. Figure 6.1 describes our training scheme, in
which λk is the HMM sub-model trained from the subset O(k), and λ(k) is the final HMM model
for k data subsets. To make the merging process simple, we choose an uniform size (number of
hidden states N and number of distinct observation symbols M) for the final HMM model and
all HMM sub-models. The proposed training scheme can be described in the following steps:
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Figure 6.1: The proposed HMM incremental training scheme based on weighted merging
1. Initialize the final HMM model to empty, λ(0) ← .
2. Divide the training data set O into K subsets {O(1), ..., O(k), ..., O(K)}.
3. For each subset O(k), k = 1,K:
(a) Use subsetO(k) to train HMM sub-model λk using the Baum-Welch training algorithm
as described in Section 4.2.
(b) Incrementally merge λ(k) into final HMM model, λ(k) ← λk + λ(k−1).
4. End: λ← λ(K).
The parameters of the final HMM model (A,B, pi) at the subset kth are computed using
incremental weighted merging as follows:
pi
(k)
i = wk ∗ pi(k)i + w(k−1) ∗ pi(k−1)i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N (6.13)
a
(k)
ij = wk ∗ a(k)ij + w(k−1) ∗ a(k−1)ij , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N (6.14)
b
(k)
ij = wk ∗ b(k)ij + w(k−1) ∗ b(k−1)ij , 1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ≤M (6.15)
where ({a(k)ij}, {b(k)ij}, {pi(k)i}) and ({a(k−1)ij }, {b(k−1)ij }, {pi(k−1)i }) are HMM parameters of
sub-model λk and model λ(k−1) respectively, and the weights wk and w(k−1), which represent
the contribution of new data and historical data respectively to the HMM final model, are
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computed as:
wk =
1
P (O(k)|λk)
, P (O(k)|λk) is the probability that (6.16)
the sub-model λk generates subset O(k).
w(k−1) =
1
P (O(1), ..., O(k−1)|λ(k−1))
, P (O(1), ..., O(k−1)|λ(k−1)) is the probability that (6.17)
the model λ(k−1) generates subsets {O(1), ..., O(k−1)}.
In HMM online training, since the historical subsets {O(1), ..., O(k−1)} are not available,
w(k−1) is computed approximately as:
w(k−1) =
1
P (O(k−1)|λ(k−1))
, P (O(k−1)|λ(k−1)) is the probability that (6.18)
the model λ(k−1) generates subset O(k−1).
6.2 Experimental Results
We measure the performance of the proposed HMM training scheme using two sets of experi-
ments. In the first experiment set, we measure the training time of HMM batch training using
random initialization and the proposed mixed initialization method. The best performed option
of the mixed initialization method is named as the “optimal initialization method”. Optimal
initialization helps to improve the convergence rate of HMM training, and therefore to reduce
the overall training time. In the second experiment set, we measure the training time of HMM
batch training and the proposed HMM incremental training scheme. The optimal initializa-
tion method is used in both HMM batch training and the proposed HMM incremental training
scheme in the second experiment set.
6.2.1 Optimal initialization results
In order to examine the effect of different initialization methods to HMM training, we conducted
HMM training experiments with different data sets, using random initialization and mixed
initialization with the three options mentioned above. Our experiments were set up as follows:
1. HMM training data: First, a sendmail data set of 1,000,000 system calls, collected in
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Table 6.1: Length of the training subsets in number of system calls
Subset No 1 2 3 4 5
Length 100,000 300,000 500,000 800,000 1,000,000
% of full set 10% 30% 50% 80% 100%
synthetic environment1 [132], is selected as the full data set. Then, from the full data set,
we form 5 training subsets of 10%, 30%, 50%, 80%, and 100% of the size of the full data
set, as shown in Table 6.1.
2. Size of HMM models: As discussed in Section 5.1.2, we select N = M = 50, which is the
number of unique system calls used by sendmail in this sendmail data set.
3. Performance test of HMM training using different initialization methods: The Baum-Welch
algorithm is used to train HMM models from the mentioned data subsets. For each data
subset, we train HMMmodels using different initialization methods, as discussed in Section
6.1.1. The training time for each HMM model is recorded with common convergence
criteria. An AMD Athlon XP-2200+ based PC with 1GB RAM memory is used in this
performance test.
Table 6.2 shows the training time of HMM models trained from 5 data subsets, using random
initialization and mixed initialization with the three options, as discussed in Section 6.1.1.2. The
difference between the training time of HMM training using random initialization and option
“Init A” of mixed initialization for each data subset are computed, normalized and given in the
last column of the table in the percentage form for comparison.
It is seen from Table 6.2 that any option of mixed initialization gives better performance
than random initialization. Among three options of mixed initialization, two options of “Init
A” and “Init A & B” perform noticebly better than random initialization across the whole data
set. For example, the training time of HMM training, based on “Init A” initialization option is
reduced by 67.36%, compared to that of HMM training, based on random initialization, for the
data subset of 100,000 system calls. The reductions of HMM training time for data subsets of
1A type of artificial or simulated environment created to test programs. Detailed description of synthetic
environments is given in [26].
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Table 6.2: HMM training time based on random initialization and mixed initializa-
tions (Init A, Init B, and Init A & B) on 5 training sets.
Length of
training
subset
HMM training time (minutes) Normalized time
difference between
Init A and Random
Random
initialization
Mixed initialization
Init A Init B Init A&B
A B C D E F=(B-C)/B
100,000 24.77 8.08 9.10 13.08 67.36%
300,000 70.80 30.37 40.57 25.72 57.11%
500,000 100.30 50.50 56.90 53.75 49.65%
800,000 177.27 77.65 128.85 87.80 56.20%
1,000,000 201.37 123.92 180.88 111.07 38.46%
Figure 6.2: Performance comparison between random initialization and mixed initial-
ization (Init A, Init B, and Init A & B) on 5 training sets.
300,000, 500,000, 800,000 and 1,000,000 system calls are 57.11%, 49.65%, 56.20% and 38.46%,
respectively. “Init B” also performs well for small data sets of 300,000 and 500,000 system
calls, but it produces only a small reduction of training time for large data sets of 800,000 and
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1,000,000 system calls.
Figure 6.2 presents the performance comparison between random initialization and mixed
initialization with three options, including “Init A”, “Init B” and “Init A & B”. “Init A”
and “Init A & B” initialization options have about the same performance level. For 5 data
subsets, “Init A” performs better on 3 subsets of 100,000, 500,000 and 800,000 system calls,
while “Init A & B” does better on 2 subsets of 300,000 and 1,000,000 system calls. Although
“Init B” option performs almost comparably to “Init A” and “Init A & B” on small data sets
of 100,000 and 300,000 system calls, it does not perform well on larger data sets. The reason of
performance gains of options “Init A” and “Init A & B” is that the prior probabilities C (the
occurrence frequencies of two consecutive observation symbols), that are used as initial values
of the transition matrix A in “Init A” and “Init A & B” options, are the most suitable to the
transition probability distribution.
6.2.2 HMM incremental training results
In order to measure the performance of our incremental HMM training scheme, we conducted
HMM training experiments using the Baum-Welch batch training and using the proposed HMM
incremental training scheme on the different training sets. Our experiments were set up as
follows:
1. Selected data set: we select a sendmail data set of 1,000,000 system calls collected in
synthetic environment1, as given in [132] for our experiments.
2. Size of HMM models: As discussed in Section 5.1.2, we select N = M = 50, which is the
number of unique system calls used by sendmail in this data set.
3. Performance test of the proposed HMM incremental training scheme: in this performance
test, we measure the training time of our HMM incremental training scheme and the
traditional HMM batch training as follows:
(a) Measure the training time of the Baum-Welch HMM batch training using the original
training set of 1,000,000 system calls.
1A type of artificial or simulated environment created to test programs. Detailed description of synthetic
environments is given in [26].
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(b) Measure the training time of the proposed HMM incremental training. We form 7
incremental training options by dividing the original training set of 1,000,000 system
calls into 2, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 subsets. For each incremental training option,
each subset is used to update the HMM model incrementally, until convergence.
(c) The mixed intitialization option “Init A”, discussed in Section 6.1.1, is used in both
HMM batch training and HMM incremental training.
(d) All HMM models have the same training convergence criteria.
An AMD Athlon XP-2200+ based PC with 1GB RAM memory is used in this HMM
training performance test.
Table 6.3 shows the training time of the Baum-Welch HMM batch training and the proposed
HMM incremental training scheme. The performance results of HMM batch training, based on
the Baum-Welch algorithm, is given in the first row of the table. Other rows show performance
results of the proposed HMM incremental training scheme. There are 7 incremental training
options with the number of training subsets, ranging from 2 to 50. The difference between
the training time of HMM batch training and each incremental training option was computed,
normalized and given in the last column of the table in the percentage form for comparison.
As can be seen from Table 6.3 that the proposed incremental training scheme can reduce
training time substantially on all incremental training options except the option with 2 subsets.
While the training time of the HMM batch training on a single set is 123.92 minutes, the training
time of HMM incremental training on 40 subsets is 48.47 minutes. This is 60.89% reduction.
The corresponding reductions of the training time of other HMM incremental training options
on 5, 10, 20, 30, and 50 subsets are 20.89%, 26.77%, 46.79%, 51.41%, 55.40%, respectively.
Figure 6.3 shows the dependence of the training time of HMM training on the number of
subsets. When the number of subsets increases from 1 (batch mode) to 2, the training time
increases slightly, from 123.92 minutes to 127.72 minutes. Then, the training time decreases
significantly, from 127.72 minutes to 48.47 minutes. This is a reduction of about 2.6 times,
when the number of subsets increases from 2 to 40. When the number of subsets increases to 50,
the training time increases slightly again to 55.27 minutes. This means that the proposed HMM
incremental training gives best performance on 40 subsets, or 25,000 system calls per subset.
CHAPTER 6. HMM TRAINING FOR PROGRAM ANOMALY DETECTION 124
Table 6.3: Training time of HMM batch training and incremental training on the number of
subsets. The total length of each training set is 1,000,000 system calls.
Index
i =
0,...,7
Number
of
subsets
Length
of each
subset
Total
training
time
(mins)
Average
training time
per subset
(mins)
Normalized time
difference bewteen
incremental and
batch training
A B C Di = Ci/Ai Ei = (C0 − Ci)/C0
0 1* 1,000,000 123.92 123.92 0
1 2 500,000 127.72 63.86 -3.07%
2 5 200,000 98.03 19.75 20.89%
3 10 100,000 90.75 9.08 26.77%
4 20 50,000 65.93 4.80 46.79%
5 30** 33,333 60.22 2.01 51.41%
6 40 25,000 48.47 1.21 60.89%
7 50 20,000 55.27 1.11 55.40%
* Batch training: number of subset is 1
** There is 1 subset of 33343 system calls in this incremental option
When the number of training subsets is too small, the proposed HMM incremental training
scheme performs poorer than the HMM batch training scheme. For example, the training time of
HMM batch training is 123.92 minutes, while the training time of HMM incremental training on
2 subsets is 127.72 minutes. This is because the time saving produced by incremental training is
relatively small, when the number of training subsets is small. This time saving is not sufficient to
compensate the extra training time caused by the additional overhead of the HMM incremental
weighted merging. However, when the number of training subsets is increasing, the time saving
is increasing, and this additional overhead is becoming insignificant.
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Figure 6.3: The dependence of training time on the number of subsets in HMM incremental
training. 1 subset indicates HMM batch training. The total length of each training set is
1,000,000 system calls.
6.3 Summary
In this chapter, an HMM incremental training scheme with optimal initialization, which aimed
at addressing the efficiency problem of the HMM Baum-Welch batch training, was presented.
As compared to the HMM batch training, our HMM incremental training scheme reduced the
training time by over 4 times, and reduced the required storage, by K times, where K is the
number of training subsets used. This efficiency improvement is significant, and it makes our
HMM-based detection model more efficient for practical use.
Another advantage of our incremental training scheme is that the HMM model is updated
more frequently during the training process, because the model update is based on each subset
which is significantly smaller than the full training set. For example, the average training time
for each subset of 25,000 system calls is only 1.21 minutes, compared to the total training time
of 123.92 minutes for HMM batch training on the full training set. The frequent update by the
incremental training is suitable for online update of HMM-based detection models.
In Chapter 8, the proposed incremetal HMM training scheme will be used to construct the
HMM model in the training stage of the proposed complete detection model, as well as to
support online update of the HMM model, using online training data.
Chapter 7
Detecting Program Anomalies Based
on Fuzzy Inference
In this chapter, a fuzzy-based extension of the two-layer detection scheme, which aims at further
improving detection accuracy is presented. We are motivated by the fact that the normalcy or
abnormalcy in anomaly detection are not truly crisp concepts [18, 33, 34]. Therefore, it is difficult
to correctly classify an object’s behaviour as normal or abnormal, using crisp conditions. Fuzzy
logic and its fuzzy sets and rules are naturally suitable to be used to represent the space of these
imprecise concepts. Furthermore, fuzzy inference’s capability of combining information from
multiple sources helps anomaly detection accurately evaluate the object’s behaviour.
7.1 Introduction
One of the most difficult tasks in anomaly intrusion detection is to determine the boundaries
between the normal and abnormal behaviours of a monitored object. A well-defined boundary
helps an anomaly detection system correctly label the current behaviour as normal or abnormal.
Unfortunately, the border between the normal and abnormal behaviours may not always be
precisely defined, because the normal and abnormal behaviours can be overlapped or very closed
to each other [18, 33, 34]. This likely leads to an increase of the false positive rate and a reduction
of the detection rate. The work discussed in this chapter focuses on a fuzzy-based solution to
this problem, specifically in the classification of system call sequences, using fuzzy inference for
program anomaly detection.
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In anomaly detection, the boundaries between the normal and abnormal behaviours can be
divided into two types: (i) hard boundaries and (ii) soft boundaries. A hard boundary is usually
used in the form of crisp conditions or fixed thresholds. For example, in [25], a test sequence of
system calls is labelled as normal if it is seen in the training set. Otherwise, it is classified as
abnormal. In the HMM-based anomaly detection model, discussed in Section 5.1, a probability
threshold Pˆ is used to determine the status of test sequences. If a test sequence’s probability P
generated by the HMM model is equal or greater than the probability threshold (P ≥ Pˆ ), it is
considered normal. Otherwise, it is considered abnormal (P < Pˆ ).
On the other hand, a soft boundary is usually represented by fuzzy sets and rules, instead
of crisp conditions or fixed thresholds. In [18], five fuzzy sets, namely LOW, MED-LOW,
MEDIUM, MED-HIGH and HIGH are used to represent the space of each input network data
source. In addition, a set of fuzzy rules is defined to combine a set of inputs in order to produce
an output which is the status of current network activity. In another approach reported in [24],
a set of fuzzy association rules is generated to represent the normal behaviour of network traffic.
Anomaly detection approaches, based on soft boundaries in general, or fuzzy sets and rules
in particular, can produce better detection performance than those based on hard boundaries
because of the following two reasons:
• Since the normalcy and abnormalcy are not truly crisp concepts, it is difficult to define
a hard boundary that can create a sharp distinction between the normal and abnormal.
Therefore, it is natural to use fuzzy sets to define a “soft” border between them [18, 34].
In fuzzy logic terms, the normal is represented by the degree of normalcy. Similarly, the
abnormal is represented by the degree of abnormalcy.
• Anomaly detection systems, based on fuzzy inference, can readily combine inputs from
multiple sources, which likely leads to better detection performance [18].
Although the application of fuzzy inference in intrusion detection is still in an early stage,
promising results have been reported by a number of fuzzy-based anomaly detection approaches.
Cho [12] reported a high detection rate and a significant reduction in the false positive rate, using
fuzzy inference to combine inputs from three separate HMM models in a user anomaly detection
system. In another approach, Luo et al [88] presented a real-time anomaly intrusion detection
system, in which a set of fuzzy frequent episode rules was mined from the training data to
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represent the abnormality. The proposed approach reportedly had lower false positive rates
than those, based on non-fuzzy frequent episode rules. There have also been good detection
results reported in [18, 24, 34].
In our approach, we propose a detection scheme which is based on fuzzy inference for program
anomaly intrusion detection using system calls. We employ the fuzzy inference to combine
multiple inputs generated by a normal database and an HMM model to evaluate each test
sequence of system calls. Each test sequence of test traces is represented by three parameters,
including the sequence probability generated by the HMM model, the sequence distance and the
sequence frequency produced by the normal database. Instead of using crisp conditions or fixed
thresholds, a group of fuzzy sets is defined to represent each parameter’s space. A set of fuzzy
rules is created to combine these input sequence parameters, in order to produce an output of
the sequence status.
The proposed fuzzy-based detection scheme is an extension of the two-layer detection scheme,
discussed in Section 5.2. Like the two-layer scheme, the fuzzy-based scheme also includes a
normal database [25] and an HMM model. Therefore, the two methods share the same process
of database building and HMM training. However, while the normal database and the HMM
model are used directly in the classification of short sequences in the two-layer scheme, they
are only used to generate inputs for the fuzzy inference engine. The fuzzy inference engine is
responsible for the classification of short sequences in the fuzzy-based scheme.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 7.2, we give a brief in-
troduction to fuzzy logic which is the heart of fuzzy inference. Section 7.3 describes the fuzzy
reasoning process for sequence classification and Section 7.4 describes our fuzzy-based detection
scheme to find anomalies and possible intrusions. In Section 7.5, we present the experimental
results. Section 7.6 is the summary of this chapter.
7.2 Introduction to Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic is an extension of boolean logic, which specifically deals with the concept of partial
truth [135]. The mathematical principles of fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic were first presented in
1965 by professor L.A. Zadeh at the University of California at Berkley, USA [137, 138]. Since
then, fuzzy logic has rapidly become one of the most successful technologies in the development
of control systems. The application of fuzzy logic is ranging from simple, small and embedded
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micro-controllers to large data acquisition and control systems [14].
While a truth value in classical logic can always be expressed in binary terms (0 or 1, True
or False, Yes or No), a truth value in fuzzy logic is represented by the degree of truth. The
degree of truth can be any value in the range [0.0, 1.0], with 0.0 representing absolute Falseness
and 1.0 representing absolute Truth.
In this section, we give a brief introduction to two important concepts of fuzzy logic, fuzzy
sets and fuzzy rules. Fuzzy sets and fuzzy rules will be extensively used by our fuzzy-based
detection scheme.
7.2.1 Fuzzy sets
Fuzzy sets are an extension of the mathematical concept of classical sets, which are used in fuzzy
logic. In classical set theory, the membership of elements in relation to a set is assessed in binary
terms according to a crisp condition, which means an element either belongs or does not belong
to the set. Therefore, classical sets are also known as crisp sets. In fuzzy set theory, on the
other hand, an element can belong to one or more fuzzy sets to some degree. The membership
of elements in relation to a fuzzy set can be assessed gradually using a membership function
[135]. Figure 7.1 shows an example of a fuzzy set and a crisp (classical) set.
Mathematically, a fuzzy set A is defined as follows:
A = {(x, µA(x)) | x ∈ U} (7.1)
where µA(x) is the membership function of the fuzzy set A, and U is the Universe of Dis-
course. A Universe of Discourse, or Universe in short is the range of all possible values for an
input to a fuzzy system.
7.2.1.1 Membership functions
The membership function µ(x) of a fuzzy set is the function that maps each element x of the
universe U to a value of the degree of membership. The degree of membership can be zero
or any value in the range of [0, 1]. Generally, the membership function can be represented
mathematically as:
µ(x) : U → [0, 1] (7.2)
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Figure 7.1: Fuzzy set and crisp (classical) set [135]
A membership function of a fuzzy set can either be continuous or discrete. In continuous
form, the membership function is a mathematical function as presented in expression (7.2). For
example, common membership functions are bell-shaped, s-shaped, triangular and trapezoidal.
In discrete form, on the other hand, the membership function is a vector of discrete values as
described in expression (7.3).
µ(x) : {x1, x2, ..., xn} → [0, 1] (7.3)
Figure 7.2 illustrates (a) a fuzzy set with a continuous trapezoidal membership function, and
(b) a fuzzy set with a discrete membership function. The continuous trapezoidal membership
function in this figure is defined as:
µ(x) =

1 if x0 ≤ x < x1
ax+ b if x1 ≤ x < x2; a = − 1
x2 − x1 , b =
x2
x2 − x1
0 if x ≥ x2
(7.4)
and the discrete membership function is expressed as:
µ(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = {µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4, µ5} (7.5)
A fuzzy set is continuous if its universe and membership functions are continuous. On the
other hand, a fuzzy set is discrete if its universe and membership functions are discrete.
7.2.1.2 Fuzzy set operations
An operation on fuzzy sets creates a new fuzzy set from the original fuzzy sets. Since a fuzzy set
is defined by its membership function, it is natural to define operations on fuzzy sets by means
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Figure 7.2: Fuzzy sets with (a) continuous and (b) discrete membership functions
of their membership functions. Due to the scope of our work, we only discuss some primitive
operations on fuzzy sets.
Let A and B be fuzzy sets on a mutual universe U , and µA and µB be the membership
functions of A and B respectively. Three primitive operations on fuzzy sets, namely Intersection,
Union, and Complement are defined as follows:
Intersection: A ∩B ≡ min(µA, µB)
The Intersection of two fuzzy sets A and B is a new fuzzy set that has the membership
function as the minimum of the two indivudual membership functions.
Union: A ∪B ≡ max(µA, µB)
The Union of two fuzzy sets A and B is a new fuzzy set that has the membership function
as the maximum of the two indivudual membership functions.
Complement: A¯ ≡ 1− µA
The Complement of fuzzy set A is a new fuzzy set that has the membership function as
the inverse of the membership function of A.
7.2.2 Fuzzy rules
Rules in fuzzy logic are used to combine and interpret inputs in order to produce an output.
Fuzzy rules are usually expressed in the IF/THEN form as:
IF <variable> IS <fuzzy set> THEN <output>
For example, the following simple set of rules can be used to control a fan [135]:
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IF temperature IS VeryCold THEN stop fan
IF temperature IS Cold THEN turn down fan
IF temperature IS Normal THEN maintain level
IF temperature IS Hot THEN speed up fan
where temperature is the input variable, {VeryCold, Cold, Normal, Hot} are input fuzzy sets,
and {stop, turn down, maintain level, speed up} are output values. In this case, the output value
is an action taken when the corresponding rule fires.
A rule is said to fire if its truth value is greater than 0. It is also noted that there is no “ELSE”
clause in a fuzzy rule. All available rules in a fuzzy control system are evaluated because an
input can belong to more than one fuzzy set. In the above fan control example, the temperature
might belong to Cold set and Normal set at the same time, however, to some different degrees.
Like classical logic, fuzzy logic also supports AND, OR and NOT operators, which can be
used to create more complex fuzzy rules. Let x and y be two fuzzy variables, and µ(x) and
µ(y) be the degrees of membership of x and y, respectively, AND, OR and NOT operators are
defined as:
x AND y = min(µ(x), µ(y))
x OR y = max(µ(x), µ(y))
NOT x = (1 - µ(x))
7.3 Fuzzy Inference for Sequence Classification
As our discussion in Section 3.2, the problem of program anomaly intrusion detection using
system calls is reduced to the problem of classification of short sequences of system calls produced
by the program during its execution. The two-layer detection scheme, presented in Section 5.2,
classifies short sequences of system calls using a double-layer test supported by a normal database
[25] and an HMM model. In this section, we present an enhanced sequence classification scheme
which is based on fuzzy inference, aimed at further accuracy improvement.
Figure 7.3 presents the fuzzy inference engine for the classification of sequences of system
calls. The engine accepts the sequence’s parameters as the input and then applies the fuzzy
sets and rules to produce the sequence’s status as the output. The sequence parameters include
the sequence probability P generated by the HMM model, and the sequence distance D and
frequency F produced by the normal database.
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Figure 7.3: Fuzzy inference engine for the classification of sequences of system calls
7.3.1 Creation of fuzzy sets and rules
As shown in Figure 7.3, fuzzy sets and rules are used by the fuzzy inference engine to interpret
the input in order to generate the output. While fuzzy sets are used to represent the sequence
input and output parameters, the fuzzy rules are used to combine inputs in fuzzy reasoning
process to produce the output.
7.3.1.1 Creation of fuzzy sets
We have created fuzzy sets for the three input parameters, including the sequence probability
P , the sequence distance D and the sequence frequency F , and for the output parameter which
is the anomaly score. Two common types of fuzzy sets, which are trapezium sets and triangle
sets, are selected, based on analyzing the characteristics of each input and output sequence
parameters.
Fuzzy sets for sequence probabilities
The probability of a test sequence is the probability that the HMM model produces the test
sequence. Given the HMM model λ(A,B, pi) and the test sequence Ot = {Ot1, Ot2, ..., Otk},
the sequence probability P is expressed as P (Ot|λ). P (Ot|λ) is computed using forward or
backward procedure, as discussed in Section 4. In practice, log(P ) is usually computed, instead
of P because of the number underflow problem [104].
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Figure 7.4: Fuzzy sets of sequence probability P
Four fuzzy sets are created for the sequence probabilities, which are named VeryLow, Low,
High and VeryHigh, as shown in Figure 7.4. VeryLow and VeryHigh are trapezium sets while
Low and High are triangle sets. The universe of the sequence probability fuzzy sets is [0.0, 1.0],
with 0.0 representing impossible sequence events and 1.0 representing certain sequence events.
The membership functions of these fuzzy sets are determined empirically by computing the
probability distribution of short sequences for some normal and abnormal traces of system
calls. For example, (P10) - the minimum probability that the HMM model produces a normal
sequence is obtained from the sequence probability distribution in normal traces. And, (P1)
- the maximum probability that the HMM model produces an abnormal sequence is obtained
from the sequence probability distribution in abnormal traces.
The sequence probability fuzzy sets are defined as follows:
• VeryLow: VeryLow set represents unlikely probabilities that the HMM model produces
normal sequences. Its membership function is defined as:
µV eryLow(P ) =

1 if P0 ≤ P < P1
a ∗ P + b if P1 ≤ P < P3; a = − 1
P3 − P1 , b =
P3
P3 − P1
0 if P ≥ P3
(7.6)
• Low: Low set represents relatively low probabilities that the HMM model produces normal
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sequences. Its membership function is defined as:
µLow(P ) =

0 if P < P2
a1 ∗ P + b1 if P2 ≤ P < P4; a1 = 1
P4 − P2 , b1 =
P4
P4 − P2
a2 ∗ P + b2 if P4 ≤ P < P6; a2 = − 1
P6 − P4 , b2 =
P6
P6 − P4
0 if P ≥ P6
(7.7)
• High: High set represents relatively high probabilities that the HMM model produces
normal sequences. Its membership function is defined as:
µHigh(P ) =

0 if P < P5
a1 ∗ P + b1 if P5 ≤ P < P7; a1 = 1
P7 − P5 , b1 =
P7
P7 − P5
a2 ∗ P + b2 if P7 ≤ P < P9; a2 = − 1
P9 − P7 , b2 =
P9
P9 − P7
0 if P ≥ P9
(7.8)
• VeryHigh: VeryHigh set represents likely probabilities that the HMM model produces
normal sequences. Its membership function is defined as:
µV eryHigh(P ) =

0 if P < P8
a ∗ P + b if P8 ≤ P < P10; a = 1
P10 − P8 , b =
P10
P10 − P8
1 if P10 ≤ P ≤ P11
(7.9)
Fuzzy sets for sequence distance
We use the Hamming distance to measure the distance between two same-length sequences
of system calls. The distance between a test sequence and normal sequences of the normal
database is defined as:
D = min{D(j)}, j = 1, N
where N is the number of normal sequences in the normal database, and D(j) is the Hamming
distance between the test sequence and the normal sequence j. The distanceD is then normalized
to the length k of the sequence as: Dˆ = D/k. Hereafter, we use the normalized distance as the
sequence distance.
Based on the characteristics of the sequence distance, we create one crisp set and three fuzzy
sets for this input parameter, as shown in Figure 7.5. The crisp set, namely Zero is used to
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Figure 7.5: Fuzzy sets of sequence distance D
represent the “matched” cases when test sequences are found in normal database. Therefore,
the sequence distance values of Zero set are always 0. Three fuzzy sets, namely Small, Medium
and Large are used to represent the sequence distance when test sequences are “mismatched” or
not found in normal database. Among three distance fuzzy sets, Small and Large are trapezium
sets while Medium is a triangle set. The universe of the sequence distance fuzzy sets is [0.0, 1.0],
with 0.0 representing “matched” cases, and 1.0 representing “mismatched” cases in which a
test sequence is entirely different from normal sequences in normal database. The membership
functions of these fuzzy sets are also determined empirically by analyzing the distance pattern of
sequences. For example, for the sequence length k = 11, we have D0 = 0.0, D1 = 0.2, D2 = 0.3,
D3 = 0.4, D4 = 0.5, D5 = 0.6, D6 = 0.7, D7 = 0.8, and D8 = 1.0.
The sequence distance fuzzy sets are defined as:
• Zero: Zero set has only a single distance D = 0. Its membership function is defined as:
µZero(D) =
 1 if D = 00 if D > 0 (7.10)
• Small: Small set represents small differences between a test sequence and
normal sequences. Its membership function is defined as:
µSmall(D) =

1 if D0 ≤ D < D1
a ∗D + b if D1 ≤ D < D3; a = − 1
D3 −D1 , b =
D3
D3 −D1
0 if D ≥ D3
(7.11)
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Figure 7.6: Fuzzy sets of sequence occurrence frequency F
• Medium: Medium set represents medium differences between a test sequence and
normal sequences. Its membership function is defined as:
µMedium(D) =

0 if D < D2
a1 ∗D + b1 if D2 ≤ D < D4; a1 = 1
D4 −D2 , b1 =
D4
D4 −D2
a2 ∗D + b2 if D4 ≤ D < D6; a2 = − 1
D6 −D4 , b2 =
D6
D6 −D4
0 if D ≥ D6
(7.12)
• Large: Large set represents big differences between a test sequence and
normal sequences. Its membership function is defined as:
µLarge(D) =

0 if D < D5
a ∗D + b if D5 ≤ D < D7; a = 1
D7 −D5 , b =
D7
D7 −D5
1 if D7 ≤ D ≤ D8
(7.13)
Fuzzy sets for sequence frequency
The occurrence frequency of a test sequence is the number of occurrences of the sequence in
training data, which is recorded in normal database. Therefore, if a test sequence is not found
in normal database (a mismatched sequence), the sequence frequency is 0.
We define three fuzzy sets for the sequence frequency, namely Low, Medium and High, as
shown in Figure 7.6. Low and High are trapezium sets and Medium is a triangle set. The universe
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of the sequence frequency fuzzy sets is [0, T ], where T is number of sequences formed from the
training set. The membership functions of these fuzzy sets are also determined empirically by
analyzing the distribution of sequence occurrences in the training data recorded in the normal
database. The sequence frequency fuzzy sets are defined as:
• Low: Low set represents small number of occurrences of short sequences in training data.
Its membership function is defined as:
µLow(F ) =

1 if F0 ≤ F < F1
a ∗ F + b if F1 ≤ F < F3; a = − 1
F3 − F1 , b =
F3
F3 − F1
0 if F ≥ F3
(7.14)
• Medium: Medium set represents medium number of occurrences of short sequences in
training data. Its membership function is defined as:
µMedium(F ) =

0 if F < F2
a1 ∗ F + b1 if F2 ≤ F < F4; a1 = 1
F4 − F2 , b1 =
F4
F4 − F2
a2 ∗ F + b2 if F4 ≤ F < F6; a2 = − 1
F6 − F4 , b2 =
F6
F6 − F4
0 if F ≥ F6
(7.15)
• High: High set represents high number of occurrences of short sequences in training data.
Its membership function is defined as:
µHigh(F ) =

0 if F < F5
a ∗ F + b if F5 ≤ F < F7; a = 1
F7 − F5 , b =
F7
F7 − F5
1 if F7 ≤ F ≤ F8
(7.16)
Fuzzy sets for anomaly score
Anomaly score of a test sequence is the score assigned to the test sequence, which is used
to determine the status of the test sequence. In our fuzzy-based model, we have created two
fuzzy sets, namely Normal and Abnormal for the output sequence anomaly score parameter,
as shown in Figure 7.7. Both Normal and Abnormal are trapezium sets. The universe of the
sequence anomaly score fuzzy sets is [0.0, 1.0], with 0.0 representing absolute normal and 1.0
representing absolute abnormal. The anomaly score fuzzy sets are used in the defuzzification
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Figure 7.7: Fuzzy sets of sequence anomaly score A
process to convert the output fuzzy set to the actual anomaly score of the test sequence (refers
to Figure 7.3). The Normal and Abnormal sets are defined as follows:
• Normal: Normal set represents the anomaly scores for normal sequences. Its membership
function is defined as:
µNormal(A) =

1 if A0 ≤ A < A1
a ∗A+ b if A1 ≤ A < A3; a = − 1
A3 −A1 , b =
A3
A3 −A1
0 if A ≥ A3
(7.17)
• Abnormal: Abnormal set represents the anomaly scores for abnormal sequences. Its mem-
bership function is defined as:
µAbnormal(A) =

0 if A < A2
a ∗A+ b if A2 ≤ A < A4; a = 1
A2 −A4 , b =
A4
A4 −A2
1 if A4 ≤ A ≤ A5
(7.18)
7.3.1.2 Creation of fuzzy rules
Since the input sequence parameters of the fuzzy rules, which include probability P , distance D
and frequency F , are generated by the HMM model and the normal database, the definition of
fuzzy rules for our fuzzy-based detection scheme also follows the assumptions for the classification
of test sequences by the normal database and the HMM model. Specifically, these assumptions
are as follows:
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1. A sequence is produced with a likely probability by the HMM model is considered to be
normal.
2. A sequence is produced with an unlikely probability by the HMM model is considered to
be abnormal.
3. A mismatched sequence (which is not found in the normal database) is more suspicious
than a matched sequence (which is found in the normal database). The larger the distance
between a test sequence and normal sequences is the more likely the test sequence is
abnormal.
4. A matched sequence with low occurrence frequency is more suspicious than a sequence
with high occurrence frequency.
In addition, it should be noted in the definition of fuzzy rules that there exists a close
relationship between the distance and the frequency of a test sequence. If a test sequence is
labelled as “mismatched” by the normal database, its distance is greater than 0 (D > 0, and
D ∈ {Small, Medium, Large}). In this case, the sequence frequency is 0 (F = 0). On the
other hand, if a test sequence is labelled as “matched” by the normal database, its distance is 0
(D = 0, and D ∈ {Zero}). In this case, the sequence frequency is greater than 0 (F > 0).
Based on the above mentioned assumptions, we devise a set of fuzzy rules as follows:
Rule 1 : IF probability IS VeryLow AND distance IS Large THEN the test sequence IS
abnormal.
Rule 2 : IF probability IS VeryLow AND distance IS Medium THEN the test sequence IS
abnormal.
Rule 3 : IF probability IS VeryLow AND distance IS Small THEN the test sequence IS
abnormal.
Rule 4 : IF probability IS VeryLow AND distance IS Zero AND frequency IS Low THEN
the test sequence IS abnormal.
Rule 5 : IF probability IS VeryLow AND distance IS Zero AND frequency ISMedium THEN
the test sequence IS abnormal.
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Rule 6 : IF probability IS VeryLow AND distance IS Zero AND frequency IS High THEN
the test sequence IS normal.
Rule 7 : IF probability IS Low AND distance IS Large THEN the test sequence IS abnormal.
Rule 8 : IF probability IS Low AND distance IS Medium THEN the test sequence IS abnor-
mal.
Rule 9 : IF probability IS Low AND distance IS Small THEN the test sequence IS abnormal.
Rule 10 : IF probability IS Low AND distance IS Zero AND frequency IS Low THEN the
test sequence IS abnormal.
Rule 11 : IF probability IS Low AND distance IS Zero AND frequency IS Medium THEN
the test sequence IS normal.
Rule 12 : IF probability IS Low AND distance IS Zero AND frequency IS High THEN the
test sequence IS normal.
Rule 13 : IF probability IS High AND distance IS Large THEN the test sequence IS abnor-
mal.
Rule 14 : IF probability IS High AND distance IS Medium THEN the test sequence IS
normal.
Rule 15 : IF probability IS High AND distance IS Small THEN the test sequence IS normal.
Rule 16 : IF probability IS High AND distance IS Zero THEN the test sequence IS normal.
Rule 17 : If probability is VeryHigh THEN the test sequence is normal.
7.3.2 Sequence classification using fuzzy inference
As shown in Figure 7.3, the decision-making process of the fuzzy inference engine to classify
each sequence of system calls begins when the engine accepts the sequence parameters as the
input, and ends when the output is produced. This process is completed in three phases: (i)
fuzzification, (ii) fuzzy inference, and (iii) defuzzification.
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Figure 7.8: Fuzzification of sequence distance parameter
7.3.2.1 Fuzzification
Fuzzification is the process of transforming crisp input values into linguistic values which usually
are fuzzy sets. There are two tasks involved in the fuzzification process: (a) input values
are converted into linguistic values which are represented by fuzzy sets, and (b) membership
functions are applied to compute the degree of truth for each matched fuzzy set.
Figure 7.8 illustrates two examples, in which input values of sequence distance are fuzzified.
In the first example, for the input sequence distanceD = 0.7, the matched fuzzy set for this input
is Large. And Large’s membership function is used to determine the degree of truth µ(0.7) =
0.75. In the second example, two fuzzy sets of Small and Medium are found to be matched to
the input sequence distance D = 0.3. Applying membership functions of Small and Medium to
the distance input we get the degrees of truth of µSmall(0.3) = 0.37 and µMedium(0.3) = 0.13.
7.3.2.2 Defuzzification
Defuzzification is the process of transforming the fuzzy value into a crisp value. In our fuzzy
inference engine, the output anomaly score fuzzy set is defuzzified to produce the sequence’s
anomaly score. There are many defuzzification techniques available. Among them, some com-
mon defuzzification techniques can be listed as follows:
• Centriod (also known as center-of-area, center-of-gravity) method: This method deter-
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mines the “center point” of the output fuzzy set as:
x¯ =
∫
U
µ(x) ∗ xdx∫
U
µ(x)dx
(7.19)
where x¯ is the output crisp value, U is the universe, x ∈ U , and µ(x) is the membership
function of the output fuzzy set.
• Max-membership method: This method selects an element with maximum value of the
degree of truth of the output fuzzy set.
x¯ : µ(x¯) = max(µ(x)), x ∈ U (7.20)
There exist cases that there is a set of points {x¯1, ..., x¯n} which have a common maximum
membership value. In these cases, x¯ can be selected one of the following options:
x¯ = min(x¯1, ..., x¯n) (7.21)
x¯ = max(x¯1, ..., x¯n) (7.22)
x¯ =
min(x¯1, ..., x¯n) + max(x¯1, ..., x¯n)
2
(7.23)
• Weighted average method: In this method, the output is calculated as the weighted average
of the maximum membership values of fuzzy sets in the output region.
x¯ =
∑
µ(xi) ∗ xi∑
µ(xi)
(7.24)
where µ(xi) is the maximum membership value of the fuzzy set i in the output region.
7.3.2.3 Fuzzy inference
In the fuzzy inference phase, all rules in fuzzy rule-base are applied to input parameters in order
to produce an output. For each rule, first, each premise is evaluated, and then all premises
connected by an AND are combined by taking the smallest value of their degree of membership
as the combination value of rule’s truth value. The final output fuzzy set of the fuzzy rule-base
is the OR combination of results of all individual rules that fire. It is noted that the truth value
of a rule that fires is non-zero. The output fuzzy set is defuzzified to produce a crisp output
value.
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Figure 7.9: Calculation of sequence anomaly score using fuzzy inference
Figure 7.9 shows an example of sequence anomaly score calculation using fuzzy inference.
The input sequence parameters are probability Pi = e−35, distance Di = 0.60 and frequence
Fi = 0. The fuzzy inferrencing process can be described as follows:
1. Fuzzification: Represent input values (Pi, Di, Fi) by corresponding fuzzy sets:
• Pi belongs to the sequence probability High set.
• Di belongs to the sequence distance Medium and Large sets.
• Fi belongs to the sequence frequency Low set.
2. Inference process: Apply fuzzy rules to inputs; only Rule 13 and Rule 14 fire (the fuzzy
rule-base was presented in Section 7.3.1.2). It is noted that Rule 13 and Rule 14 support
only two input parameters Pi and Di. Therefore, Fi does not appear in Figure 7.9.
• Rule 13 fires: the result of this rule is an abnormal fuzzy set with the combined truth
value of 0.50.
• Rule 14 fires: the result of this rule is an normal fuzzy set with the combined truth
value of 0.10.
The final output fuzzy set is the combination of two output sets produced by Rule 13 (part
of Abnormal set) and Rule 14 (part of Normal set).
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3. Defuzzification: Determine the output anomaly score based on the output fuzzy set from
interence process. We use the Max-membership method to compute the output anomaly
score as given in equations (7.20) and (7.23). Based on equation (7.20), we have µ(x¯) =
max(0.50, 0.10) = 0.50. Based on equation (7.23), we get x¯ = (x¯min + x¯max)/2. The
output anomaly score is Ai = x¯ = (0.40 + 1.0)/2 = 0.70.
7.4 Detecting Program Anomalies: A Fuzzy-based
Detection Scheme
In this section, we incorporate the fuzzy inference engine for sequence classification, discussed
in Section 7.3 to form a fuzzy-based detection scheme. As an extension of the two-layer scheme
presented in Section 5.2, the fuzzy-based scheme utilizes fuzzy inference techniques to combine
inputs from multiple sources, in order to further increase the detection accuracy.
Figure 7.10 shows the structure of the fuzzy-based detection scheme to evaluate short seq-
uences of system calls of test traces for possible intrusions. The fuzzy-based detection scheme
is built as follows:
1. Building a normal database, an HMM model and fuzzy sets from training data:
(a) Normal database: The normal database is an ordered list of all unique short sequences
of system calls found in training data. The database is created from the training data
of normal traces of system calls using the method given in [25, 26]. All short sequences
in the normal database have the same number of system calls k, and k is used as the
short sequence length. In addition, the frequency of each short sequence, that is
the number of occurrences of that sequence in training data, is also recorded in the
normal database.
(b) HMM model: The HMM model is trained from normal traces of system calls using
HMM incremental training with optimal initialization, as discussed in Section 6.1.2.
(c) Fuzzy sets: The fuzzy sets are created, as discussed in Section 7.3.1 of this chapter.
2. Fuzzy-based testing: First, test short sequences are formed from test traces of system
calls using the sliding window method. The length of short sequences is k system calls
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Figure 7.10: Fuzzy-based detection scheme: evaluation of short sequences for anomalies
and is equal to the length of short sequences in the normal database. Then, each short
sequence is evaluated in two steps as follows:
(a) Evaluation of the short sequence by the normal database and by the HMM model: In
this step, the normal database and the HMM model are used to compute the input
parameters for fuzzy inference engine in next step. The input parameters include the
sequence probability P generated by the HMM model, and the sequence distance D
and frequency F produced by the normal database.
(b) Classification of the test sequence by the fuzzy inference engine: In this step, the fuzzy
inference engine applies the fuzzy sets and rules to interpret the input parameters in
order to produce the output which is the status of the short sequence: normal or
abnormal.
7.5 Experimental Design and Results
In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed fuzzy-based detection scheme, we conducted
experiments to measure the false positive rate and the detection rate of the fuzzy-based scheme.
Then, the performance results are compared to those of the two-layer detection scheme presented
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in Section 5.2.2 and the normal database scheme [25].
7.5.1 Data sets
We use sendmail traces of system calls collected in a synthetic environment1, as given in [132].
The format of system call traces and the data collection procedures were discussed in Section
5.1.1. The data sets include:
1. Normal traces are traces collected during the program’s normal activity. Normal traces of
sendmail program include 2 traces with the total of 1,595,612 system calls.
2. Abnormal traces are traces that come from a program’s abnormal runs generated by known
intrusions. The sendmail abnormal traces consist of 1 trace of sm5x, 1 trace of sm565a, 2
traces of syslog-local, and 2 traces of syslog-remote intrusions.
7.5.2 Experimental design
In order to measure the detection rate and the false alarm rate of our fuzzy-based detection
model, our experiments were designed as follows:
1. Measurement of the false positive rate: In this test, we use the proposed fuzzy-
based detection scheme to classify normal traces of system calls which are not used in the
construction of the normal database, the HMM model and fuzzy sets. Since the normal
traces do not contain any intrusions, any reported alarms are considered false positive
alarms. This experiment was set up as follows:
(a) Select first 1,000,000 system calls of sendmail normal traces as the full training set.
(b) Form 4 training sets which account for 30%, 50%, 80% and 100% of the size of the
full training set.
(c) Construct normal databases and HMM models from these training sets. The chosen
values for the length of short sequences are k = 5, 11 and 15 system calls.
(d) For each training set and on each selected sequence length, assign membership func-
tion values for fuzzy sets of the three sequence parameters as discussed in Section
7.3.1.
1A type of artificial or simulated environment created to test programs. Detailed description of synthetic
environments is given in [26].
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(e) Select three test traces, each trace of 50,000 system calls from sendmail normal traces,
which are not used in the training process to test for false positive alarms of our
scheme and the normal database scheme [25]. Reported abnormal short sequences
are counted for each test trace.
2. Measurement of anomaly signals and detection rate: In this test, we use the
proposed fuzzy-based scheme to classify abnormal traces to find possible intrusions. Since
the abnormal traces have been collected from the program’s abnormal runs generated by
known intrusions, reported alarms in this case can be considered true alarms or detected
intrusions. This experiment was implemented as follows:
(a) Construct a normal database and an HMM model for sendmail program from normal
traces of system calls. We choose length of short sequences k = 11 to construct the
normal database from normal traces, and to form test short sequences from abnormal
traces.
(b) Assign membership function values for fuzzy sets of the three sequence parameters,
as discussed in Section 7.3.1.
(c) Use the proposed fuzzy-based detection scheme to evaluate abnormal traces to find
abnormal sequences.
(d) Use temporally local regions to group individual abnormal sequences to measure the
anomaly signals, as discussed in Section 5.1.2. The selected region length is r = 20.
7.5.3 Experimental results
7.5.3.1 False positive rate
Table 7.1 shows the false positive rate for three test traces with total of 150,000 system calls
(each trace consists of 50,000 system calls), reported by the normal database scheme, two-
layer detection scheme and fuzzy-based detection scheme on different training sets, with short
sequence length k = 5, 11 and 15. The overall false positive rate is calculated as the ratio of
the total number of reported abnormal short sequences to the total number of short sequences
in the three test traces. The total number of short sequences in the test traces is dependent on
the short sequence length and is also given in Table 7.1.
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Table 7.1: Overall false positive rate of the normal database scheme, the two-layer
detection scheme and the fuzzy-based detection scheme with the short sequence
length, k = 5, 11 and 15.
Training data sets
(% of full data set)
Normal database
scheme (%)
Two-layer
scheme (%)
Fuzzy-based
scheme (%)
Sequence length, k = 5; 3 test traces with the total of 149,988 sequences
30% 0.131 0.112 0.067
50% 0.099 0.079 0.057
80% 0.094 0.069 0.049
100% 0.094 0.069 0.049
Sequence length, k = 11; 3 test traces with the total of 149,970 sequences
30% 0.194 0.170 0.099
50% 0.155 0.115 0.081
80% 0.150 0.107 0.077
100% 0.147 0.107 0.077
Sequence length, k = 15; 3 test traces with the total of 149,958 sequences
30% 0.225 0.164 0.107
50% 0.176 0.121 0.091
80% 0.174 0.116 0.085
100% 0.171 0.116 0.085
It can be seen from Table 7.1 that the false positive rate of the fuzzy-based detection scheme
is much lower than that of the normal database scheme [25]. For example, the fuzzy-based
detection scheme produced 48.23%, 48.89% and 50.96% fewer false positive alarms than the
normal database scheme for the training set of 80% of full set, with the sequence length k = 5,
k = 11 and k = 15, respectively.
It is also noted that there is a significant reduction in the false positive rate of the fuzzy-
based detection scheme, compared to that of the two-layer detection scheme. For example, the
fuzzy-based detection scheme produced 29.81%, 28.13% and 26.44% fewer false positive alarms
than the two-layer detection scheme for the training set of 80% of full set, with sequence length
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Figure 7.11: The relationship between the size of training
sets and the false positive rate with k = 11
Figure 7.12: The relationship between the size of training
sets and the false positive rate with k = 15
k = 5, k = 11 and k = 15, respectively (refers to Table 7.1).
Figures 7.11 and 7.12 describe the dependence of the false positive rate on the size of the
training sets with the short sequence length k = 11 and k = 15 respectively. When the size of the
training set increases, the false positive rate of the normal database scheme and the two-layer
CHAPTER 7. DETECTING PROGRAM ANOMALIES BASED ON FUZZY 151
scheme decreases considerably, especially from the training set of 30% of the full set to the set
of 50% of the full set. Since the fuzzy-based scheme has already achieved a low false positive
rate at the set of 30% of the full set, there is only a small reduction of the false positive rate
when the size of the training set increases.
7.5.3.2 Anomaly signals and the detection rate
Table 7.2 shows a summary of the detection results of the two-layer scheme and the fuzzy-based
scheme for some abnormal traces embedded with known intrusions. The detection performance
results of the two-layer scheme are taken from Section 5.2. In both proposed methods, we
measure anomaly signals based on temporally local regions. The anomaly score A of a region is
computed as the ratio of the number of detected abnormal short sequences in the region to the
length of the region r, as given in Equation (5.1). The average of anomaly scores is computed
over abnormal regions which have the anomaly score A, with A ≥ Aˆ, where Aˆ is the region score
threshold, Aˆ = 40.0%.
It can be seen from Table 7.2 that the fuzzy-based scheme produced significantly better
detection results than the two-layer scheme in terms of the number of detected abnormal regions
and the generated anomaly signal level. For “sm5x” trace, the rates of detected abnormal regions
are 31.58% and 67.11% by the two-layer scheme and fuzzy-based scheme, respectively. Also
for this test trace, the fuzzy-based scheme generated an average of anomaly scores of 72.55%,
compared to the average of anomaly scores of 60.42% produced by the two-layer scheme.
Figures 7.14, 7.13, 7.15, 7.16, 7.17, and 7.18 show the anomaly signals produced by the
two-layer scheme and the fuzzy-based scheme for some abnormal traces, namely s5mx, sm565a,
syslog-remote No1, syslog-remote No2, syslog-local No1 and syslog-local No2, respectively, at the
short sequence length k = 11. It is noted that we measure anomaly signals based on temporally
local regions for both methods, as discussed in Section 5.1.2.3. It can be seen from these figures
that the fuzzy-based scheme generated much stronger and clearer anomaly signals than the two-
layer scheme. For both schemes, all embedded intrusions are detected correctly at the region
score threshold Aˆ = 40.0% for all tested traces.
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Table 7.2: Detection results produced by the normal database scheme [25], by the two-layer
scheme and by the fuzzy-based scheme for some abnormal traces with the short sequence
length k = 11, region length r = 20 and the score threshold of abnormal regions, Aˆ = 40.0%.
Name
of test
abnormal
traces
% detected
abnormal
sequences
by [25] (#)
Percent of detected Average of scores of
abnormal regions (*) abnormal regions (!)
Two-
layer(%)
Fuzzy-
based(%)
Two-
layer(%)
Fuzzy-
based(%)
sm565a 0.60 38.46 76.92 68.00 88.00
sm5x 2.70 31.58 67.11 60.42 72.55
syslog-local No1 5.10 12.00 60.00 73.33 84.67
syslog-local No2 1.70 16.67 60.26 71.54 86.49
syslog-remote No1 4.00 28.26 67.39 72.31 86.53
syslog-remote No2 5.30 24.68 61.04 74.74 83.40
(#) Results produced by the normal database scheme are extracted from Table 3 of [25].
(*) The percentage of the number of detected abnormal regions out of the total number
of regions of the test trace.
(!) The average of anomaly signals is computed over abnormal regions, those with A ≥ Aˆ.
Figure 7.13: Anomaly signal generated for sm565a abnormal trace by two-layer and
fuzzy-based schemes with short sequence length k = 11, region length r = 20.
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Figure 7.14: Anomaly signal generated for s5mx abnormal trace by two-layer and
fuzzy-based schemes with short sequence length k = 11, region length r = 20.
Figure 7.15: Anomaly signal generated for syslog-local abnormal trace No. 1 by two-
layer and fuzzy-based schemes with short sequence length k = 11, region length r = 20.
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Figure 7.16: Anomaly signal generated for syslog-local abnormal trace No. 2 by two-
layer and fuzzy-based schemes with short sequence length k = 11, region length r = 20.
Figure 7.17: Anomaly signal generated for syslog-remote abnormal trace No. 1 by
two-layer and fuzzy-based schemes with short sequence length k = 11, region length
r = 20.
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Figure 7.18: Anomaly signal generated for syslog-remote abnormal trace No. 2 by
two-layer and fuzzy-based schemes with short sequence length k = 11, region length
r = 20.
7.6 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a program anomaly detection scheme which utilizes the fuzzy
inference techniques to increase the detection rate and to reduce the false positive rate. In the
proposed fuzzy-based scheme, a normal database and an HMM model are used to produce inputs
for the fuzzy inference engine. The fuzzy inference engine evaluates each sequence of system
calls by combining the sequence’s multiple inputs through a fuzzy reasoning process to correctly
label the sequence. This in turn helps improve the detection accuracy.
Our experimental results showed that the proposed fuzzy-based scheme correctly detected
“sm5x”, “sm565a”, “syslog-local” and “syslog-remote” intrusions in all tested abnormal traces.
The fuzzy-based scheme produced about 48% fewer false positive alarms than the normal data-
base model [25], and it produced about 28% fewer false positive alarms than the the two-layer
scheme (refers to Table 7.1 (page 149), the case of k = 11 with data sets of 50%, 80% and 100%
of full data set). Futhermore, the fuzzy-based scheme generated much stronger anomaly signals
for all tested abnormal traces than the two-layer scheme and the normal database scheme, as
results presented in Table 7.2 (page 152).
In Chapter 8, we present our complete model for program anomaly detection using system
calls. The fuzzy-based detection scheme will be an important component of the complete model.
Chapter 8
Putting It All Together: The
Proposed Program Anomaly
Detection Model
In this chapter, a complete model for program anomaly detection using system calls is presented,
which is a combination of all model components, discussed in previous chapters of this part. The
HMM modelling is used to characterize normal program behaviour, and the HMM incremental
training scheme is used to construct the HMM model from training data. Instead of using crisp
conditions and thresholds to represent the normalcy and the abnormalcy of sequences of system
calls, fuzzy sets and rules are used to represent the space and combined conditions of sequence
parameters. To detect anomalies and possible intrusions, the fuzzy inference is used to combine
the input sequence information from multiple sources to evaluate sequences of system calls.
8.1 The Proposed Program Anomaly Detection Model
Figure 8.1 shows the proposed detection model developed in two stages: (a) model training and
(b) model testing. In the training stage, the detection model is constructed from the training
data which is normal traces of system calls of the program. In the testing stage, the built
detection model is used to evaluate test traces of system calls to find anomalies and possible
intrusions.
CHAPTER 8. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: THE PROPOSED PROGRAM 157
Figure 8.1: The proposed program anomaly detection model:
(a) Training stage and (b) Testing stage
8.1.1 Model training stage
In the training stage, the proposed detection model’s components which are (i) a normal data-
base, (ii) an HMM model and (iii) fuzzy sets of sequence parameters are constructed from
training data. The training data collection and the model construction can be described as
follows:
1. Training data collection:
(a) Data collection: Training data consist of normal and abnormal traces of system calls
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collected from the normal and abnormal runs of a program. The normal traces are
used to construct the normal database and the HMM model. The normal traces and
certain abnormal traces are used to build fuzzy sets. The program’s raw data can be
collected in real working conditions or simulated conditions, as discussed in Section
5.1.1.
(b) Data pre-processing: Collected raw data must be processed to extract useful infor-
mation from raw traces of system calls. The data is also transformed to observation
sequences using HMM notations for the HMM training. The data pre-processing
procedure was discussed in Section 5.1.2.1.
2. Model construction:
(a) Building of the normal database : The normal database is an ordered list of all unique
short sequences of system calls found in training data. The database is created from
the training data of normal traces of system calls using the method given in [25, 26].
All short sequences in the normal database have the same number of system calls k,
and k is used as the short sequence length. In addition, the frequency of each short
sequence, that is the number of occurrences of that sequence in training data, is also
recorded in the normal database.
(b) HMM training: The HMM model is trained from normal traces of system calls using
the HMM incremental training scheme with optimal initialization, as discussed in
Section 6.1.2.
(c) Creation of fuzzy sets: The fuzzy sets are created from normal and abnormal traces
of system calls, as discussed in Section 7.3.1.
8.1.2 Model testing stage
In the testing stage, the constructed detection model is used to evaluate test traces of program
system calls to find anomalies and possible intrusions. There are three steps in the testing
procedure: (i) formation of short sequences of system calls from test traces, (ii) evaluation of
each short sequence, and (iii) calculation of the region anomaly score. The three steps of the
testing stage are described as follows:
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1. Formation of short sequences: Short sequences, each of which is used as the test unit in
next step, are formed from test traces of system calls using the sliding window method, as
discussed in Section 5.1.2.3. The short sequence length is k system calls, and is equal to
the short sequence length of the normal database.
2. Evaluation of each short sequence by the detection engine:
(a) First, the normal database and the HMM model are used to compute the short
sequence’s parameters which are used as the input for the fuzzy inference engine. The
input parameters consist of the sequence probability P generated by the HMMmodel,
and the sequence distance D and frequency F produced by the normal database.
(b) Then, the fuzzy inference engine is used to evaluate the short sequence using seq-
uence’s parameters generated by the normal database and the HMM model. The
fuzzy inference engine applies the fuzzy sets and rules to interpret the input sequence
parameters in order to produce the output which is the status of the short sequence:
normal or abnormal.
3. Calculation of the region anomaly score: As discussed in Section 5.1.2.3, we group individ-
ual abnormal short sequences into temporally local regions to measure the anomaly signal.
A region’s anomaly score A is calculated as the ratio between the number of detected
abnormal sequences in the region to the total number of sequences of the region, as given
in equation (5.1). A region with anomaly score A, is labelled as abnormal if A ≥ Aˆ, where
Aˆ is region score threshold. A detected abnormal region can be used to raise an intrusion
alarm.
8.1.3 Online update of the detection model
Although the behaviour of a program is relatively stable over time [25, 26, 66, 93], there are
still good reasons for the program’s anomaly detection model to be updated dynamically: (i)
the detection model may not fully represent normal program behaviour due to the shortage of
training data, (ii) updates to the program itself may change the program behaviour, and (iii)
updates to the underlying operating system may also affect the program behaviour.
We propose an online update scheme for the proposed anomaly detection model, as shown in
Figure 8.2. The proposed update scheme is capable of updating the detection model’s two main
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Figure 8.2: Online update scheme of the proposed anomaly detection model
components: the normal database and the HMM model. It is assumed that these components of
the initial detection model have been built from the program’s normal traces of system calls in
the off-line training stage, as discussed in Section 8.1.1. The proposed online update scheme uses
the detection model itself as a filter to remove noisy data (anomalies) from an online test trace
before it is used for the online update. The proposed online update scheme can be described as
follows:
1. First, online short sequences are formed from an online test trace using the sliding window
method with length of k system calls.
2. Then, each of these short sequences is evaluated by the proposed detection model. This
task is done in the model testing stage, as discussed in Section 8.1.2. Abnormal short
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sequences detected in this process are used for the anomaly signal evaluation, while normal
short sequences are added to the online training set.
3. When the online training set reaches a pre-defined size, it is used to update the normal
database and the HMM model.
• Update of the normal database: Short sequences that do not exist in the normal
database are added, and the occurrence frequency of each short sequence in the
normal database is also updated.
• Update of the HMM model: The HMM model is incrementally updated using the
HMM incremental training scheme, as discussed in Section 6.1.
4. The online training data set is reset after each successful update.
8.2 Discussion
In this section, we evaluate the proposed program anomaly detection model based on the three
most important characteristics of an anomaly intrusion detection approach: accuracy, efficiency
and adaptability.
8.2.1 Accuracy
The accuracy of an anomaly intrusion detection approach can be determined on its detection rate
and false positive rate. An effective intrusion detection approach should have a high detection
rate and a low false positive rate.
8.2.1.1 Detection rate
According to experimental results presented in Section 5.1.3.2, Section 5.2.2.3 and Section 7.5.3,
our detection models correctly detected all intrusions embedded in all abnormal traces tested.
The detected intrusions include a DoS intrusion on sendmail program, a DoS intrusion on inetd
program, and sm5x, sm565a, syslog-local and syslog-remote intrusions on sendmail program.
In contrast, the normal database scheme [25] missed the sm565a intrusion, with only 0.6% of
abnormal sequences detected. This scheme [25] possibly also missed the syslog-local intrusion
embedded in syslog-local trace No 2, with just 1.7% of abnormal sequences detected.
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The better detection performance of the proposed detection model can be explained by (i)
its application of the fuzzy inference and (ii) its ability to generate strong anomaly signals. On
one hand, the model’s fuzzy inference engine is capable of combining multiple sequence inputs
using the fuzzy reasoning for the classification of sequences of test traces, which results in better
detection rate. On the other hand, strong anomaly signals generated by the proposed model
helps it to correctly recognize abnormal sequences in the test traces, which also results in a
higher detection rate. More discussion on the gain of detection performance is given in following
sections.
8.2.1.2 False positive rate
The proposed detection model generated much fewer false positive alarms than the normal
database scheme [25], as shown in Table 7.1. For example, the false positive rate of the normal
database scheme is 0.174%, as opposed to 0.085% of the proposed model, or a reduction of
50.96%, on the training set of 50% of the full set, with k = 15.
It is also noted that the proposed detection model achieved a much lower false positive rate
on small-size training sets than the normal database scheme [25]. On the training set of 30% of
the full set, the false positive rate of proposed detection model is lower than that of the normal
database scheme on the training set of 100% of the full set. This means that the proposed
detection model requires much less training data to achieve the same level of the false positive
rate of the normal database scheme [25].
The fuzzy inference engine plays an important role in the reduction of false positive alarms.
The engine’s capability of incorporating multiple sequence information, generated by the normal
database and the HMM model, through the fuzzy reasoning process, accurately classifies the
sequence. This in turn reduces the false alarms.
8.2.1.3 Strength of anomaly signal
There are two types of anomaly signals generated by our detection models: (i) raw anomaly
signals and (ii) region-based temporal anomaly signals. We evaluate the strength of each type
of anomaly signals separately.
Raw anomaly signals
The raw anomaly signal is generated by our basic detection model for each test short sequence
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of system calls, which is represented by log(P) - the logarithm of the probability that the
HMM model produces a particular short sequence. Our basic detection model clearly generated
two levels of raw anomaly signals for normal and abnormal short sequences in the test trace,
according to the experimental results given in figures 5.2 and 5.3. Short sequences associated
with likely probabilites are considered normal, and those associated with unlikely probabilites
are considered abnormal. For both sendmail and inetd DoS intrusion traces, the difference
between the probabilites of normal and abnormal sequences is substantial, which is greater than
50%.
Region-based temporal anomaly signals
The region-based temporal anomaly signal is created by grouping raw anomaly signals of
individual short sequences into temporally local regions, as presented in Section 5.1.2.3. The
proposed detection model produced much higher levels of region-based temporal anomaly signals,
compared to the normal database model [25]. For example, for the sm565a trace, there are 68%
of abnormal regions detected by the proposed model, as opposed to only 0.6% of abnormal
sequences detected by the normal database model. Similar results can also be seen for other
tested traces (refer to Table 7.2).
Our method of grouping individual abnormal short sequences into temporally local regions,
generates stronger anomaly signals, because abnormal short sequences usually occur in local
groups across the test traces. On the other hand, the anomaly signal evaluation method in [25]
generates weak anomaly signals because it evaluates the anomaly signal by counting the total
number of abnormal short sequences in the whole test traces. This anomaly signal evaluation
method [25] does not properly represent the distribution of abnormal short sequences in the test
traces.
8.2.2 Efficiency
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, we focused our discussion on the efficiency of our detection models
in two aspects: (i) the cost of model construction, and (ii) the cost of testing for intrusions.
Specifically, we consider these costs in terms of time (or computation) and storage (space)
demands for model construction and model testing.
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8.2.2.1 Model construction
HMM training accounts for a major portion of the time and storage demands in the construction
of an HMM-based detection model. Therefore, we discuss the construction costs of our model,
which is based on the HMM incremental training and the construction costs of other detection
approaches, which are based on the HMM batch training.
Training time
Our detection model, based on the HMM incremental training, requires much less training
time than other detection approaches [102, 134], which are based on the Baum-Welch batch
training, using the same training data set. According to the experimental results shown in
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3, the elapsed training time of HMM models, based on the Baum-Welch
batch training, and our HMM incremental training are 201.37 and 48.47 minutes respectively.
This is a time reduction of over 4 times, using the training set of 40 subsets.
It is also noted that the training time for each incremental update of the HMM model,
using a data subset, is relatively small, which makes it possible for the online update of the
detection model. The training time for each incremental update is 1.11 minutes on average, for
the incremental training option of 50 subsets, as shown in Table 6.3.
Storage demand
As the training data set of T system calls has been broken up to K subsets of equal length
Tk, we have Tk = T/K system calls. And, since our HMM incremental training scheme only uses
one subset at a time to update the HMM model, its storage demand is reduced by a factor of K.
In other words, while the storage demand of the HMM Baum-Welch batch training scheme is
O(N2T ), the storage demand of our HMM incremental training scheme is only O(N2Tk), where
N is the number of HMM states.
Since the training data set in anomaly detection using program system calls is extremely
large, T >> N , the reduction of K times in storage demand is substantial. This in turn
improves the efficiency and applicability of our HMM-based detection model in both online
detection and offline analysis.
Amount of training data required
It can be seen in Table 7.1 that our proposed detection model requires less training data
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to achieve the same levels of false positive rate as the normal database scheme [25]. For short
sequence length k = 11, our model requires only 30% of the full training data set to achieve the
false positive rate of 0.099%, which is lower than the rate of 0.147%, produced by the normal
database scheme [25], on 100% training data set.
8.2.2.2 Model testing
In terms of computations for model testing, the proposed detection model is more expensive
than the normal database model [25] because there is an additional HMM test on all short
sequences to produce the sequence probability parameter for the fuzzy inference engine. In
addition, there are some additional overheads for the fuzzy reasoning process to produce the
output. However, the model testing costs are relatively small, compared to the model training
costs. This is because the length of each short sequence is much smaller than the length of a
training set.
8.2.3 Adaptability
An intrusion detection approach is said to be adaptable if it can (i) detect novel/unknown in-
trusions and (ii) support the dynamic update of its detection model. As anomaly detection
approaches, HMM-based anomaly detection approaches are capable of detecting unknown intru-
sions. We use HMM modelling to characterize normal program behaviour, and attempt to detect
deviations of the program’s current behaviour from its normal behaviour. Therefore, any known
and unknown intrusions, that cause significant changes to the program’s current behaviour from
its normal behaviour, can be detected by our HMM-based detection model.
In addition, the proposed detection model supports the online update of its detection model,
which is based on the incremental update of the model’s components, as discussed in Section
8.1.3. Since the online test data may include anomalies and intrusions, it needs to be cleaned
by the detection model, before it can be used. And, only clean data (normal short sequences
specifically) are added into the online training set for the periodic update. This online update
keeps our detection model up-to-date, and therefore it is able to adapt to the changes of the
program’s behaviour. This in turn maintains the model’s detection accuracy.
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8.3 Conclusion
In Part II, we presented the development process of the proposed program anomaly intrusion
detection model using system calls. The proposed anomaly detection model focuses on improv-
ing the detection accuracy, efficiency and adaptability of existing anomaly intrusion detection
approaches.
8.3.1 Reducing false alarms and increasing the detection rate
The HMM modelling was used to characterize normal program behaviour using normal traces
of system calls to improve the detection rate since HMM is a powerful modelling technique in
many research areas [103, 104]. The strong anomaly signal generated by our HMM-based basic
detection model for some abnormal traces embedded with DoS intrusions on programs indicated
that the HMM model is a good model of normal program behaviour.
Reducing false alarms is an integral part of improving detection accuracy because a high
level of false alarms will reduce the effectiveness of an intrusion detection system [81, 82]. We
introduced two detection schemes in order to reduce false alarms: a two-layer detection scheme
and a fuzzy-based detection scheme. The two-layer detection scheme is an extension of the basic
detection model, which uses a normal database [25] and an HMM model to form a double-layer
test on each sequence of system calls. Experimental results showed that the proposed two-layer
scheme detection produced about 28% fewer false alarms than the normal database scheme [25].
On the other hand, the fuzzy-based detection scheme focuses on further improving the de-
tection accuracy. It uses the fuzzy inference to combine the sequence information from multiple
sources. Like the two-layer scheme, the fuzzy-based scheme also includes a normal database
[25] and an HMM model. However, the normal database and the HMM model are only used
to generate the inputs for the fuzzy inference engine. The fuzzy inference engine uses its fuzzy
sets and rules to combine multiple sequence inputs to produce an output. Experimental results
showed that the fuzzy-based detection scheme produced about 48% fewer false alarms than the
normal database scheme [25]. Moreover, it generated a much stronger anomaly signal than the
two-layer detection scheme for all tested abnormal traces.
Our anomaly signal measurement method, which groups individual abnormal sequences into
temporally local regions, also helps produce a stronger anomaly signal since abnormal sequences
usually occur in local groups across the test traces. A strong anomaly signal helps the detection
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engine correctly classify test sequences, which in turn improves detection accuracy.
8.3.2 Improving the efficiency and adaptability
In our basic detection model, the HMM modelling of normal program behaviour generated
strong abnormal signals, and therefore it produced a high detection rate. However, the basic
detection model suffers a efficiency problem because the training of its HMM model, using
the Baum-Welch algorithm, is very expensive in terms of training time and storage demand.
Our HMM incremental training scheme with optimal initialization was designed to solve this
efficiency problem. Experimental results showed that the proposed HMM incremental training
scheme reduced training time and storage demand substantially. In addition, the proposed HMM
incremental training scheme was used to support the online update of the proposed program
anomaly detection model, which makes the detection model adaptable to the changes of the
program’s behaviour.
Chapter 9
Conclusions
9.1 Summary
This thesis developed a solution to protect computer and information systems with two lines
of defence: (i) preventing intrusions at the first line and (ii) detecting intrusions at the second
line if the prevention measures of the first line have been penetrated. We presented a security
enhancement for E-commerce applications at the first line of defence, and an improvement of the
detection accuracy, efficiency and adaptability of existing program anomaly intrusion detection
approaches at the second line of defence.
9.1.1 Security enhancement for E-commerce applications
Part I of this thesis described a hardware-based encryption model for the enhancement of com-
munication and end-system security, and performance for E-commerce applications. Although
existing software based security solutions, such as SSL/TSL protocols have been widely used,
they have problems with the protection of long-term private keys and the degradation of system
performance. Moreover, the security of these software based security solutions depends on the
security of the underlying operating system, and therefore they are vulnerable to threats caused
by security flaws of the underlying operating system.
The proposed encryption model is based on the integration of an existing web-based client/
server model and embedded hardware-based RSA encryption modules. The proposed encryption
model consists of two main components: the client and the server. The client consists of a web
browser, a hardware-based encryption engine and a client communication module. The server
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includes a web server, a hardware-based decryption engine and a server communication module.
Plaintext messages are encrypted by hardware encryption engines before they are transferred
from one end to the other through an open environment, such as the Internet. The proposed
model’s security is assured by the strength of RSA encryption at large keys, and the security of
a hardware based cryptosystem. On the other hand, the model’s performance is guaranteed by
the hardware’s high processing capability.
Hardware was selected as the platform for the implementation of the proposed encryption
model because of its advanced security features. Hardware based cryptosystems are generally
considered more secure than software based counterparts, since a hardware based cryptosystem
runs on its own physical memory space, and therefore it can effectively prevent malicious access
from external programs. This also means that the security of a hardware based cryptosystem
does not depend on the security of the underlying operating system. Furthermore, hardware
can be used to safely store sensitive information, such as long-term private keys.
A successful implementation of DSP hardware based RSA encryption modules using Texas
Instruments’ TMS320C6416 DSK boards was presented. Each encryption module at each end
of the proposed model supports both message encryption and decryption functions. We also
provided the details on how to integrate these hardware modules into an existing E-commerce
system, and how to communicate efficiently between the computer applications (the web browser
and the web server) and the DSP hardware based encryption modules.
A fully functional E-commerce system, including the web and database applications was
built to evaluate the performance and security of the proposed encryption model. According to
our experimental results, the proposed hardware based RSA encryption model performs better
than the software based RSA implemetation running on Intel Pentium 4 machines that have
almost double clock speed of the DSP’s at large RSA encryption keys. The results confirmed
that our encryption model is more scalable than software based implementations, and it can be
used to efficiently improve the security and performance of E-commerce applications.
9.1.2 Improvement of accuracy, efficiency and adaptability for program
anomaly intrusion detection
Part II of this thesis described an HMM-based program anomaly intrusion detection model
using system calls. Our goal is to improve the detection accuracy, efficiency and adaptability of
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existing anomaly detection approaches. We started with an intensive investigation of existing
anomaly intrusion detection approaches, and then focused on approaches that monitor program
behaviour to detect intrusions. Generally, anomaly detection approaches are not effective as they
usually generate a high level of false alarms. In addition, several anomaly detection approaches
[102, 134] demand excessive system resources for training and testing.
We applied the HMM modelling to represent normal program behaviour using system calls in
our basic anomaly detection model. The procedure for collecting and pre-processing raw traces
of system calls from programs’ runs was proposed. In the model training stage, an empirical
method to select the number of HMM states and the number of distinct observation symbols
for HMM training was discussed. In the model testing stage, we presented an anomaly signal
measurement method which produces strong anomaly signals by grouping individual abnormal
sequences into a temporally local regions. Our experimental results confirmed that the HMM-
based basic detection model generated strong and clear anomaly signals for a DoS intrusion
trace on the sendmail program and a DoS intrusion trace on the inetd program.
We then proposed an extension to the basic detection model, and presented a two-layer
detection scheme to reduce false alarms, since an HMM-based single-layer detection engine of
the basic detection model may generate relatively a high level of false alarms. The scheme’s
double-layer detection engine consists of a normal database [25] and an HMM model. In this
scheme, each sequence of system calls goes through two sequential tests, first against the normal
database and then against the HMM model. The HMM model test only applies to sequences
which were classified as mismatched, or rare, by the normal database. Experimental results
showed that the two-layer scheme effectively reduced false alarms by about 28%, compared to
the normal database scheme.
We next examined the HMM training efficiency problem of the basic detection model. The
basic detection model suffers an efficiency problem because the construction of its HMM model,
based on the HMM Baum-Welch batch training, was found to be very expensive in terms of
training time and storage demands, as discussed in Section 5.1.2.2. The basic detection model
must be improved in terms of efficiency, before it can be used. The proposed HMM incremental
training scheme with optimal initialization is our solution to the basic model’s efficiency problem.
Unlike the HMM batch training, our HMM incremental training scheme incrementally updates
the HMM model using one training subset at a time until convergence. Our experimental results
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showed that the proposed HMM incremental training scheme reduced training time four-fold,
compared to the HMM batch training based on the Baum-Welch algorithm. Our training scheme
also reduced the storage demand in proportion to the number of training subsets used, compared
to the HMM batch training.
We next improved the two-layer detection scheme in order to further reduce false alarms and
increase the detection rate. We were motivated by the fact that the normalcy and the abnormalcy
are not truly crisp concepts. Therefore, it is not always possible to correctly classify an object’s
behaviour as normal or abnormal using crisp conditions [18, 33, 34]. We proposed a fuzzy-based
detection scheme, in which fuzzy sets and rules were used to represent the space and combined
conditions of parameters of each test sequence. A normal database and an HMM model were
used to generate sequence parameters which are used as the input to the fuzzy inference engine.
The fuzzy inference engine evaluates each sequence of system calls, by combining the sequence
information using its fuzzy sets and rules to produce the sequence status. Our experimental
results showed that the fuzzy-based detection scheme reduced false alarms by about 28% and
48%, compared to the two-layer detection scheme and the normal database scheme, respectively.
In addition, the fuzzy-based scheme produced much stronger anomaly signals for all tested
abnormal traces, as presented in Section 7.5.3.
In Chapter 8, we presented a complete model for program anomaly intrusion detection using
system calls. The proposed detection model consists of two development stages: training stage
and testing stage. In the training stage, an HMM model and a normal database were built from
system call data to characterize normal program behaviour. The proposed HMM incremental
training scheme was used to construct and update the HMM model. Fuzzy sets were empirically
created from training data to represent the space of sequence parameters. In the testing stage,
the fuzzy-based detection scheme was used to evaluate test traces of system calls to find anomalies
and possible intrusions. In addition, the proposed detection model also supports an online update
scheme which is used to update the HMM model and the normal database using online data.
9.2 Future Work
There are some possible improvements for the proposed hardware-based RSA encryption model
and the proposed program anomaly detection model, which can be the topic of future research.
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9.2.1 Possible improvements for the proposed hardware based
RSA encryption model
• Further optimization of the RSA hardware implementation for higher performance: The
current RSA hardware implementation using the C programming language performs better
than the RSA software implementation running on Intel-based PCs at large RSA keys. The
RSA hardware implementation can be further optimized at atomic integer operations, such
as adders and multipliers, to fully exploit the processing capability of DSP hardware. In
addition, the C implementation of critical modules of the BigInt package can be replaced
with low-level languages, such as Assembler. This can reduce code size, as well as improve
performance.
• Extend the proposed DSP-based RSA encryption model to support more platforms: Cur-
rent implementation of the proposed encryption model only works on the Microsoft plat-
form, specifically on Microsoft Internet Explorer web browser on the client side, and Mi-
crosoft web server on the server side. Making the proposed encryption model able to work
on other web browsers, such as Firefox and Netscape on the client side, and other web
servers, such as Apache on the server side, are other possible extensions.
9.2.2 Possible improvements for the proposed program anomaly detection
model
• Automatic learning of fuzzy sets and rules from training data: In the current implemen-
tation of the proposed detection model, we manually created fuzzy sets and rules for the
fuzzy inference engine to evaluate each sequence of test traces of system calls. The fuzzy
rules were manually defined, based on the detection assumptions of the HMM model and
the normal database. For example, the membership functions of fuzzy sets for parame-
ters, such as sequence probability and sequence frequency, were empirically determined
by analysing the parameter distributions in the training data. An automatic learning
scheme, which can generates fuzzy sets and rules from training data, is a possible future
improvement for the proposed detection model.
• Improve the weighted merging method of HMM models of the proposed HMM incremental
training scheme to further reduce training time and storage demand: To make the weighted
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merging method simple, we chose a uniform size (the number of HMM states N and the
number of distinct observation symbols M) for the final HMM model and all HMM sub-
models. However, the size of each HMM sub-model can be significantly smaller than the
size of the final HMM model, since an HMM sub-model is trained from a training subset
which is substantially smaller than the full training set. A possible solution is to select
the size of each HMM sub-model based on the corresponding training subset. Small-size
HMM sub-models help further reduce the overall training time and storage demands. The
proposed HMM incremental scheme must be improved to support the HMM incremental
merging of two HMM models with different sizes.
• Improve the region-based anomaly signal evaluation scheme to produce a stronger anomaly
signal: We used the region-based scheme to group individual abnormal sequences into
temporally local regions, in which a region’s anomaly score is calculated as the ratio of the
number of abnormal sequences detected in the region, to the total number of sequences
in the region. This means that all abnormal sequences in a region are treated equally,
although they have different anomaly scores. We believe that, an anomaly signal evaluation
scheme, which takes the anomaly score of individual abnormal sequences into consideration,
will generate a stronger anomaly signal. A stronger anomaly signal, in turn helps to
improve detection accuracy.
9.3 Closing Remarks
This thesis developed an approach to secure computer and communication systems from intru-
sions with two lines of defence: preventing intrusions at the first line and detecting intrusions
at the second line. For the first line of defence, we proposed a hardware based RSA encryption
model. For the second line of defence, we proposed an HMM-based program anomaly intrusion
detection model. The hardware based RSA encryption model and the program anomaly intru-
sion detection model have been designed, implemented and evaluated for the proof of concepts.
Appendix A
Main Features of TMS320C6416
DSP Starter Kit
The Texas Instruments’ TMS320C6416 DSP Starter Kit (DSK) is an external DSP board with
central processing unit C6416 running at the default clock of 1000MHz. In this appendix, we
describe main technical specifications of the DSP board mentioned in Section 2.5.1. Table A.1
presents main features of the DSP board. Figures A.1 and A.2 show the board layout and the
block diaram of the DSP board respectively.
174
APPENDIX A. MAIN FEATURES OF TMS320C6416 DSP STARTER KIT 175
Figure A.1: Texas Instruments TMS320C6416 DSK board layout [121, 128]
Figure A.2: Texas Instruments TMS320C6416 DSK block diagram [121, 128]
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Table A.1: Main Features of TMS320C6416 DSK [127]
TMS320C6416 DSK Features
Highest-Performance Fixed-Point DSPs
2.00, 1.67, 1.39, 1.18, 1.00, 0.84 ns Instruction Cycle Time
500, 600, 720, 850, 1000, 1200MHz Clock Rate
Eight 32-Bit Instructions/Cycle
Twenty-Eight Operations/Cycle
4000, 4800, 5760, 6800, 8000, 9600 MIPS
Fully Software-Compatible With C62x
C6414/15/16 Devices Pin-Compatible
VelociTI.2 Extensions to VelociTI Advanced Very-Long-Instruction-Word
(VLIW) TMS320C64x DSP Core
Eight Highly Independent Functional Units With VelociTI.2 Extensions:
- Six ALUs (32-/40-Bit), Each Supports Single 32-Bit, Dual 16-Bit,
or Quad 8-Bit Arithmetic per Clock Cycle
- Two Multipliers Support Four 16 x 16-Bit Multiplies (32-Bit Results) per
Clock Cycle or Eight 8 x 8-Bit Multiplies (16-Bit Results) per Clock Cycle
Non-Aligned Load-Store Architecture
64 32-Bit General-Purpose Registers
Instruction Packing Reduces Code Size
All Instructions Conditional
Instruction Set Features
Byte-Addressable (8-/16-/32-/64-Bit Data)
8-Bit Overflow Protection
Bit-Field Extract, Set, Clear
Normalization, Saturation, Bit-Counting
VelociTI.2 Increased Orthogonality
Viterbi Decoder Coprocessor (VCP)
Supports Over 600 7.95-Kbps AMR
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TMS320C6416 DSK Features (continued)
Programmable Code Parameters
Turbo Decoder Coprocessor (TCP)
Supports up to 7 2-Mbps or 43 384-Kbps 3GPP (6 Iterations)
Programmable Turbo Code and Decoding Parameters
L1/L2 Memory Architecture
128K-Bit (16K-Byte) L1P Program Cache (Direct Mapped)
128K-Bit (16K-Byte) L1D Data Cache (2-Way Set-Associative)
8M-Bit (1024K-Byte) L2 Unified Mapped RAM/Cache (Flexible Allocation)
Two External Memory Interfaces (EMIFs)
One 64-Bit (EMIFA), One 16-Bit (EMIFB)
Glueless Interface to Asynchronous Memories (SRAM and EPROM) and Syn-
chronous Memories (SDRAM, SBSRAM, ZBT SRAM, and FIFO)
1280M-Byte Total Addressable External Memory Space
Enhanced Direct-Memory-Access (EDMA) Controller (64 Independent Channels)
Host-Port Interface (HPI)
User-Configurable Bus Width (32-/16-Bit)
32-Bit/33-MHz, 3.3-V PCI Master/Slave Interface Conforms to PCI Specifi-
cation 2.2
Three PCI Bus Address Registers: Prefetchable Memory, and Non-Prefetchable
Memory I/O
Four-Wire Serial EEPROM Interface
PCI Interrupt Request Under DSP Program Control
DSP Interrupt Via PCI I/O Cycle
Three Multichannel Buffered Serial Ports
Direct Interface to T1/E1, MVIP, SCSA Framers
Up to 256 Channels Each
ST-Bus-Switching-, AC97-Compatible
Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) Compatible (Motorola)
Three 32-Bit General-Purpose Timers
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TMS320C6416 DSK Features (continued)
Universal Test and Operations PHY Interface for ATM (UTOPIA)
UTOPIA Level 2 Slave ATM Controller
8-Bit Transmit and Receive Operations up to 50 MHz per Direction
User-Defined Cell Format up to 64 Bytes
Sixteen General-Purpose I/O (GPIO) Pins
Flexible PLL Clock Generator
IEEE-1149.1 (JTAG) Boundary-Scan-Compatible
Appendix B
Implementation of the DSP
Hardware RSA Encryption Model:
Major Functions
This appendix provides more details about the implementation of the major components of the
proposed DSP hardware RSA encryption model, presented in Section 2.4. Table B.1 shows
the crucial functions of the BigInt package that is the core of the implementation of the RSA
algorithm. Table B.2 lists the core RTDX built-in functions which are used to implement the
DSP RTDX Interfaces of the DSP Hardware RSA Encryption Engine and the DSP Hardware
RSA Decryption Engine. Table B.3 presents core RTDX exported functions that are used to
develop the Client DSP Communication Module and the Server DSP Communication Module.
Table B.4 shows main functions of the Client DSP Communication Module which are responsible
the communications between the client web browser and the DSP Encryption Engine. Table
B.5 shows main functions of the Server DSP Communication Module which are responsible the
communications between the web server and the DSP Decryption Engine.
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Table B.1: Major functions of BigInt package
=== Initialization, memory management and conversion functions ===
int BigIntInit(BigInt *bn, unsigned int initLength): initialize a big integer of
initLength digits, and assign all digits to 0.
int BigIntInitStrHex(BigInt *bn, char *inputStr): initialize a big integer from a
hexadecimal string.
int BigIntInitStrBin(BigInt *bn, char *inputStr): initialize a big integer from an
octet string.
void BigIntToChar(BigInt *bn, char *outputStr): convert a big integer to an octet
string.
void BigIntToHex(BigInt *bn, char *outputStr): convert a big integer to a hexadec-
imal string.
void BigIntRelease(BigInt *bn): deallocate memory occupied by a big integer.
=== Arithmetic functions ===
int BigIntAdd(BigInt *bn1, BigInt *bn2): add two non-negative big integers;
bn1← bn1 + bn2
int BigIntAddSign(BigInt *bn1, BigInt *bn2): add two signed big integers;
bn1← bn1 + bn2
int BigIntSub(BigInt *bn1, BigInt *bn2): substract two non-negative big integers,
bn1 ≥ bn2; bn1← bn1− bn2
int BigIntSubSign(BigInt *bn1, BigInt *bn2): substract two signed big integers;
bn1← bn1− bn2
int BigIntMulVal(BigInt *bn, unsigned short theValue, BigInt *result): mul-
tiply a non-negative big integer with a non-negative integer value;
result← bn1 ∗ theV alue
int BigIntMulVal2(BigInt *bn, unsigned short theValue): multiply a non-
negative big integer with a non-negative integer value;
bn1← bn1 ∗ theV alue
int BigIntShiftLeft(BigInt *bn, unsigned int pos): Shift all digits of a big integer
pos position to the left.
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Major functions of BigInt package (continued)
int BigIntShiftRight(BigInt *bn, unsigned int pos): Shift all digits of a big inte-
ger pos position to the right.
int BigIntDiv(BigInt *bn1, BigInt *bn2, BigInt *qt): big integer division of
bn1/bn2; results: qt is quotient and bn1 is remainder.
=== Comparison functions ===
unsigned short BigIntCmpZero(BigInt *bn): compare a big integer with 0.
unsigned short BigIntCmp(BigInt *bn1, BigInt *bn2): compare two non-negative
big integers.
unsigned short BigIntCmpSign(BigInt *bn1, BigInt *bn2): compare two signed big
integers.
=== Modular arithmetic functions ===
int BigIntMontMul(BigInt *x, BigInt *y, BigInt *modulus,
unsigned short modInverse, BigInt *a): Implementation of
Montgometry multiplication that computes a = x ∗ y ∗R−1 mod modulus, where R = Bl,
B is the radix of the big integer, and l is the number of digits of modulus; and
modInverse = −modulus−1 mod B
int BigIntMontExp(BigInt *m, BigInt *exp, BigInt *modulus,
unsigned short modInverse, BigInt *c): Implementation of
Montgomery exponentiation that computes c = mexp mod modulus
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Table B.2: Core RTDX built-in functions [62, 128]
=== Target initialization for RTDX ===
TARGET_INITIALIZE(): initialize the RTDX communications on the DSP target.
=== Create RTDX channels ===
RTDX_CreateInputChannel(ichan): create an input channel to get data from host com-
puter with provided name ‘ichan’.
RTDX_CreateOutputChannel(ochan): create an output channel to send data to host com-
puter with provided name ‘ochan’.
=== Enable/diable RTDX channels ===
void RTDX_enableOutput(RTDX_outputChannel *ochan): enable the output channel
‘ochan’.
void RTDX_disableOutput(RTDX_outputChannel *ochan): disable the output channel
‘ochan’.
void RTDX_enableInput(RTDX_outputChannel *ichan): enable the input channel
‘ichan’.
void RTDX_disableInput(RTDX_outputChannel *ichan): disable the input channel
‘ichan’.
=== Read and write data to RTDX channels ===
int RTDX_read(RTDX_inputChannel *ichan, void *buffer, int bsize): read the
bsize bytes from the input channel and put it into the buffer; return the error code.
The function causes a read request and blocks the current process until it gets the data.
int RTDX_readNB(RTDX_inputChannel *ichan, void *buffer, int bsize): read the
bsize bytes from the input channel and put it into the buffer; return the error code. The
function causes a read request, but not blocks the current process.
int RTDX_write(RTDX_outputChannel *ochan, void *buffer, int bsize): write
bsize bytes stored in buffer to the output channel. Return the error code.
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Table B.3: Core RTDX Exported functions [62, 128]
=== RTDX COM initialization ===
::CoInitialize(NULL): initialize COM.
::CoUninitialize(): uninitialize COM.
rtdx.CreateInstance(L"RTDX"): creates an RTDX instance.
rtdx.Release(): release RTDX instance.
rtdx->SetProcessor(BSTR board, BSTR processor): set the board and processor used.
=== Open/close input/output RTDX channels ===
rtdx->Open(char channel[], char mode[]): open an RTDX channel for reading or
writing data based on mode.
rtdx->Close(): close the RTDX channel.
=== Read/write data to the RTDX channels ===
long ReadSAI1(VARIANT *pArr): read a SAFEARRAY of 8 bit integer; ∗pArr is a
pointer to the array.
long ReadI1(BYTE *pData): read 8 bit integer.
long WriteI1(unsigned char data, long *numBytes): write 1 byte of data to the
channel.
long Write( VARIANT Arr, long *numBytes): Writes a message (SAFEARRAY type)
to a channel. The parameter Arr is a V ARIANT that contains a pointer to the
SAFEARRAY . The SAFEARRAY can contain: 8-bit integers, 16-bit integers, 32-bit
integers, 32-bit floats, or 64-bit floats.
=== Query functions ===
long GetMsgLength(long *pLength): returns the number of bytes in the current mes-
sage. The value is returned in ∗pLength.
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Table B.4: Major functions of the client DSP communication module
=== Interface - Public function ===
BSTR DSPEncrypt(LPCTSTR boardName, LPCTSTR processorName,
LPCTSTR rsaPublicKeys, LPCTSTR plainText): invoke the DSP encryption en-
gine to encrypt the plaintext and return the ciphertext; the function is called from the
client browser using JavaScript.
=== Private functions ===
int RTDX_Initialize(BSTR boardName, BSTR processorName): initialize the RTDX
communications with provided board name and process name.
void RTDX_Remove(): release RTDX communications.
int RTDX_OpenChannel(char channel[],char mode[]): open a communication chan-
nel. The mode can be “R” for reading or “W” for writing.
int RTDX_CloseChannel(): close a RTDX channel
char *RTDX_ReadMsg(): read a message from the RTDX channel.
long RTDX_WriteMsg(char buffer[]): write a message to the RTDX channel.
Table B.5: Major functions of the server DSP communication module
=== Interface - Public function ===
BSTR DSPDecrypt(BSTR boardName, BSTR processorName, LPCTSTR cipherText):
invoke the DSP decryption engine to decrypt the ciphertext and return the plaintext; the
function is called from the web browser using VBScript/JScript.
=== Private functions ===
The server DSP communication module uses the same privates functions used by the client
DSP communication module.
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